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Finally arriving in Tarnopol, Ptukhin and his staff managed to establish communications only with the 14th, 16th, and 17th Air divisions and with Kiev staff. Contact with the other units was possible only by routing communications through the Kiev headquarters. Back in Kiev, General Maltsev’s group served as a clearing-house between Tarnopol and those air force units that could be reached.

An unforeseen crucial situation developed at this juncture. The small air force staff element in Kiev strictly adhered to protocol of only sending encoded messages. However, the few cipher clerks left behind in Kiev with Maltsev could not possibly handle the sudden avalanche of reports that needed processing. Nobody could have foreseen that the invasion would catch Ptukhin’s element in transit to the new headquarters. There was simply no visible need at the time to leave more cipher clerks with Maltsev.

Now the reports began to bottleneck in Kiev. Received information needed to be decoded, evaluated, and disposition decided. Outgoing reports needed to be encoded and transmitted. Maltsev’s small group was not equipped or staffed to cope with their sudden task during the most crucial hours of the invasion and became overwhelmed by the avalanche of communiqués. Only by evening of June 22 was Ptukhin able to somewhat sort things out and ascertain damages inflicted upon his command.

Ptukhin and Maltsev paid the steep price for all oversights, real or imagined. They were relieved of command the following week and shot a month later.

The convoy, in which General Ptukhin started out his trip from Kiev, was constantly suffering mechanical breakdowns. Colonel Ivan Kh. Bagramyan, in charge of the convoy, was becoming concerned that this unplanned loss of time would delay their scheduled arrival in Tarnopol by seven hours. Still, he prudently instituted periodic ten-minute stops to inspect the vehicles and do minor preventive maintenance.

At daybreak, when his convoy was halted just north of Brody, Bagramyan heard an increasing howl of aircraft engines overhead. “Our pilots starting their day a bit early,” Bagramyan thought.[30] Soon, shattering explosions and oily clouds of fire rising above Brody made the situation brutally clear. War!

They raced through the waking town and made it the remaining forty miles to Tarnopol. On their way they were strafed by German aircraft once, causing several light casualties. More vehicles broke down, and Bagramyan decided to abandon them on the road, leaving their drivers to do their best to fix the vehicles and rejoin the headquarters. It is unknown but possible that General Ptukhin’s delayed arrival in Tarnopol was caused by such breakdown. Still, in spite of all delays, the mad dash from Brody allowed Bagramyan to make up lost time, even arriving in Tarnopol slightly ahead of schedule.

As Bagramyan’s column rolled up to the new location of Kiev Special Military District’s headquarters, he was expected. The front door flew open, and worried Major General Purkayev, Bagramyan’s boss, ran down the steps. Interrupting Bagramyan’s salutation, Purkayev ordered: “Unload quickly and get to work! Use all communication channels to alert commanders of the second-echelon corps to implement plan KOVO-41! Insist on confirmation of orders and report them to me!”[31]

Purkayev was followed by Col. Gen. Mikhail P. Kirponos himself. Bagramyan was taken aback when Kirponos began loudly and angrily lambasting him for arriving late. “Things must have gone really badly,” Bagramyan thought, watching red-faced district commander who normally was very calm and collected. The colonel attempted to explain that he actually arrived before schedule, and it calmed Kirponos down a bit. He stomped off, ordering Bagramyan to be ready with a situation report in an hour. Kirponos’ unfortunate tendency to lose his head under pressure was remarked upon by other memoir writers as well.

Bagramyan rushed to find General Dobrykin, Kiev Special Military District’s chief of communications, whom he found huddled with several junior officers. The telephone lines, routed mainly through civilian exchanges, were constantly suffering breakdowns. While communications with Moscow were relatively reliable, connections with the armies at the border were tentative at best.

As in all other border districts, district-level signal units were supposed to be activated upon mobilization and their equipment was largely to come from the civilian sector. The sudden German attack caught Kirponos without vital communications means and personnel, immediately handicapping his ability to keep in touch with his units.

Dobrykin brought Bagramyan up to speed. Communications with the Twelfth and Twenty-Sixth armies were reliable. The Twelfth Army reported that the border with Hungary was quiet. The Twenty-Sixth Army reported some fighting along its front, but situation stable overall. However, there was virtually no contact with Fifth or Sixth armies. As the sketchy and disjointed reports began coming in, it appeared that the main German attack fell on these two armies.

Chief of Intelligence Colonel Bondarev had very little to add: Germans crossed the Western Bug River on the far right, several small border towns were captured, and Germans were conducting major artillery and air strikes in the areas of Ustilug and Vladimir-Volynskiy. However, there was absolutely no reliable information about German strength or composition. At this point, only several small units moved forward and engaged the invaders.

After listening to Bagramyan’s meager report, Kirponos flew into a rage at the lack of communications. General Purkayev interceded on behalf of his subordinate, informing Kirponos that efforts at reestablishing and maintaining communications were given top priority and liaison officers had been dispatched by planes to all army headquarters.[32]

Reports continued slowly trickling in. Around 1030 hours came the first radio report from Fifth Army: “Sokal and Tartakov on fire. The 124th Rifle Division could not fight through to the border and took up defensive positions north of Strumilov Fortified District.”[33]

In midafternoon, telegram from Timoshenko in Moscow arrived:

On June 22, 1941, at 0400 hours German aviation without any provocation attacked our airfields and cities along the border and subjected them to bombardment. Simultaneously, German forces opened artillery fire along many points and crossed our border. Due to this brazen attack by Germany upon the Soviet Union, I order:

1. Our troops to use all force and means to attack enemy forces and destroy them in the areas where they violated Soviet border. Our ground forces are not to cross the border without specific orders to do so.

2. Reconnaissance and combat aviation is to identify areas of concentration of enemy ground and air forces. [German] main concentrations of ground forces are to be bombed and [their] aviation destroyed on their airfields by mighty blows of our bomber aviation. Air attacks are to be carried out to the depth of 100–150 km [sixty to ninety-two miles] of German territory. Koenigsberg and Memel are to be bombed. Territories of Finland and Rumania are not to be attacked without special orders.

The staff of Kiev Special Military District was supposed to send its first situation report to Moscow at 1500 hours. Bagramyan later wrote in his memoirs that this document was the most difficult one he had to prepare in his career as staff officer.

The picture still remained unclear: What was the real situation of the armies? Where was the main push by the enemy? What are his intentions?—we could only guess about these things. And our first combat report to Moscow was full of generalities and unclarities. Because of this, although guiltless, my aides and I could not but feel ourselves guilty.[34]

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30

Bagramyan, 81.

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31

Ibid., 83.

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32

Ibid., 85.

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33

Ibid., 86.

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34

Ibid., 89.