From fragmentary data coming in, by evening of 22nd of June the picture began clearing up: the main thrust was in the areas of Ustilug and Sokal at the junction of Fifth and Sixth Armies. The main invasion axis was directed towards Lutsk and Dubno. At the same time, there was heavy fighting in the sectors of Sixth and Twenty-Sixth Armies, especially around Rava-Russka and Peremyshl.
General Kirponos was informed that enemy tanks were rushing for Radekhov. These were the leading elements of the 11th Panzer Division, which was moving through defensive lines of the 124th Rifle Division. Still not knowing the exact strength of German units advancing on Radekhov, Kirponos ordered the main body of XV Mechanized Corps to be moved there to meet the developing threat. Its 10th Tank division was approximately forty miles from Radekhov. Who would get there first? Kirponos and his staff were well aware that even if the 10th Tank Division could reach Radekhov ahead of Germans, the XV Mechanized Corps overall would still enter the fight piecemeal.
Major General Ignatiy I. Karpezo, commander of the XV Mechanized Corps, soon reported that his 10th Tank Division had already set off, but only four tank battalions of the 37th Tank Division were on the move. His 212th Motorized Rifle Division was marching on foot due to lack of wheeled transport. The corps signal and combat engineer battalions and the motorcycle regiment could not move at all—no transport. Karpezo was urgently requesting transportation.
Kirponos told Purkayev to find out what could be done to help the XV Mechanized Corps. Purkayev instructed Bagramyan to find out if any trucks could be taken from local civilian infrastructure. While seeing to this task, Bagramyan found General Morgunov, chief of Auto-Armor Directorate of Kiev Special Military District, and asked him for at least one transportation battalion. Morgunov had nothing at hand. Almost all transportation units under direct command of Kiev Special Military District were already employed moving forward the several rifle corps from deeper within the district. There was a small reserve vehicle park left around Shepetovka, almost two hundred miles away, but it would take some time to move them to Tarnopol.[35] Thus, Karpezo received reply: “Carry on with your orders.”
Similar requests came from Major General Feklenko’s IX Mechanized Corps and Major General Rokossovskiy’s 19th, both located deeper within the district’s territory. Since Rokossovskiy’s and Feklenko’s corps were urgently needed at the border, they were given priority with all trucks coming in from the civilian sector. Also, Kirponos ordered Morgunov to immediately move forty trucks from Shepetovka to Feklenko.
Bagramyan later wrote in his memoirs: “By the evening of 22nd of June nobody at the front’s headquarters could think about the possibility of immediate counterattack. We could barely hold! Everybody was convinced that further directives from Moscow would be aimed at defensive actions.”[36]
However, when the next directive arrived around 2300 hours, it was a rude shock to the command element of the Kiev Special Military District, renamed into wartime South-Western Front. This Directive #3 from the People’s Committee of Defense bore General Zhukov’s signature. Years later in his memoirs, Zhukov claimed that he was not the author of this directive, but was ordered to sign it by Stalin.[37]
While correctly determining that the main thrust was at the juncture of Fifth and Sixth armies, this directive was downplaying enemy gains, stating that in most places German attacks have been halted or achieved only minor penetrations. Bagramyan could not help thinking that this optimism in Moscow was partially caused by his staff’s overly cautious report. He tried to justify their inadequate reporting by stating that around 1500 hours, when they sent in their first report, they had no information yet about the breakthroughs of two strong enemy panzer forces at Sokal and Vladimir-Volynskiy—they received this concrete news only in late afternoon.
After the war, while writing memoirs and poring over the first intelligence reports, Bagramyan saw how easily the situation was misinterpreted. From the reports issued by Kirponos’ staff, it appeared that only five or six enemy divisions were attacking in the area of Fifth Army. This would not have been seen as very alarming by Moscow due to the fact that the Fifth Army had four divisions of its own near the border. The first intelligence summary sent to Moscow by the South-Western Front made the following conclusion estimating the attacking German forces:
The Lutsk [Fifth Army] direction: four–five infantry and one panzer division; the Rava-Russkaya-Lvov [Sixth Army] direction: three–four infantry divisions with [some] tanks; the Peremyshl-Lvov [Twenty-Sixth Army] direction: two–three infantry divisions; the Chernovtsy [Twelfth Army] direction: four Rumanian infantry divisions.[38]
“It is possible that similar mistakes in evaluating correlation of forces which invaded us took place at the other fronts as well,” Bagramyan wrote.[39]
Regardless of the reasoning upon which its decision was made, the Soviet High Command issued its infamous Directive #3:
While maintaining strong defense of the state border with Hungary, the 5th and 6th armies are to carry out concentric strikes in the direction of Lyublin, utilizing at least five mechanized corps and aviation of the [South-Western] Front, in order to encircle and destroy the enemy group of forces advancing along the front Vladimir-Volynski–Krystonopol, and by the end of June 24th to capture the vicinity of Lyublin.[40]
To Bagramyan and Purkayev these orders were plainly unrealistic: at the present time they would be lucky just to hold on. Lyublin, located roughly eighty miles on the other side of the border, was as unreachable as the moon. Purkayev took Bagramyan with him to see Kirponos.
Upon receiving these news, Kirponos immediately called for Vashugin. Predictably, Commissar Vashugin was enthusiastic about attacking. Purkayev plunged into an argument with Vashugin, trying to convince the party hack about the necessity of defense, not attack. Purkayev tried to reason with him, pointing out that against the ten already-identified infantry and panzer German divisions between Sokal and Lyuboml, they could only place four weak rifle divisions. At best, on June 23 two more divisions could come up, the 135th Rifle and, maybe, the 41st Tank Division, of which there were still no news. They did not know yet that without contact with his superiors, the commander of the 41st Tank Division broke open his red envelope and moved his unit from Vladimir-Volynski to Kovel, away from the fighting, where the XXII Mechanized Corps was to concentrate in accordance with pre-war plans.
Therefore, Purkayev continued, by tomorrow they could have six divisions against ten German ones, not even taking into account additional divisions which the Germans were sure to send in to exploit the breakthroughs. Of the approaching reserve corps, the XXXI and XXXVI Rifle Corps would need five or six days to arrive, the IX and XIX Mechanized Corps were still three to four days away. The IV, VIII, XV, and XXII Mechanized Corps could be ready in a day or two. He especially stressed the fact that neither the armies nor the South-Western Front itself had rear echelon support structures, because they had not been mobilized yet.
General Purkayev went as far as making an outrageous suggestion that Kirponos tell Moscow the real situation and insistently request to change the mission. Purkayev wanted permission to organize strong defenses along the pre-1939 border using the second echelon units. Only after halting the Germans along the old border, he argued, any thoughts of offensive could be entertained.