His main worry, however, was the fact that he received operational orders as if he were commanding a fully manned and operational mechanized corps, not the weak facsimile of one. He was appalled that orders given to him treated his corps as a fully combat-ready formation.[16]
Rokossovskiy described events of the first day of the war:
After completing a 30-mile march during the first day, the main body of the corps, represented by infantry, was completely exhausted and lost all combat capability. We did not take into consideration that the infantry, for the lack of any transportation, besides personal equipment had to carry light and heavy machine guns, 50mm and 82mm mortars, and spare ammunition. This development forced us to reduce the infantry marches to 30–35 kilometers (18–22 miles), which resulted in 20th and 35th so-called “tank divisions” to move on ahead. The motorized rifle division, having ability to load its infantry on trucks and tanks, albeit with an extreme overloading, proceeded at normal pace.[17]
Even though the 131st Motorized Rifle Division had 595 trucks, it was only a paltry 37 percent of authorized 1,587 vehicles. Ironically, this division made the best progress and, after covering almost sixty-five miles, halted for the night near Rovno. In the tank divisions, all available trucks were allocated to carry supplies and ammunition, leaving the “motorized” infantry to march on foot.
In the evening, while his exhausted men rested, Rokossovskiy called together his tank division commanders, Colonels Nikolay Novikov and Vasiliy Chernyaev. Together they worked out movement plans for the next day. They would send forward all the tanks with as many infantrymen they could pile aboard and part of artillery which had mechanized vehicles. This mobile group would be followed by infantry marching on foot and horse-drawn artillery. The mechanized echelon would leapfrog, moving forward and halting, waiting for marching infantry to catch up. Then they would repeat the maneuver. While waiting for the infantry, the tankers would perform preventive maintenance on their vehicles and refuel.
One thing that Rokossovskiy was happy about so far was that he managed to maintain good communication with all three of his divisions and was well aware about the situation in his corps. However, throughout the day, Rokossovskiy was extremely concerned about the total lack of communication with the South-Western Front’s headquarters.
XIX MECHANIZED CORPS
Unlike Major General Rokossovskiy, who moved his corps as a cohesive unit, Feklenko’s XIX Mechanized moved in two echelons: the “mobile” echelon, comprising almost all operational tracked and wheeled vehicles, and the “dismounted” echelon, comprising troops marching on foot and some horse-drawn supply wagons and artillery. Colonel Tsibin described his 43rd Division’s departure:
By the start of combat, operations division was made up of two groups: a) mobile group—tank regiments, each of two-battalion composition… and two battalions of motorized regiment on trucks; b) dismounted group of approximately 1,500 men, composed of parts of motorized rifle regiment and other specialists without vehicles (reconnaissance troops, combat engineers).[18]
Lack of mobility of reconnaissance detachments was endemic among Soviet forces at the beginning of the war, and their effectiveness was largely negated. With their mobility severely reduced, Red Army recce troops could not provide their commanders with sufficient information about German strengths and dispositions or scout out their own routes of advance. In the similar manner, combat engineers were usually absent from locations that required their specialist attention.
The 43rd Tank Division, in the manner similar to other divisions of the IX and XIX Mechanized Corps, experienced shortages of all kinds and operated virtually without instructions:
During the march… division experienced major difficulties obtaining spare parts and petroleum/oil/lubricants, which had to be foraged for, with the [foraging parties] ranging out to 60-80 miles away from their units. During the march, up to June 26, 1941, there was no information from higher headquarters about situation at the front. Lack of intelligence information and situation reports did not allow us to correctly appraise the situation, especially about situation on the flanks. There was mostly conflicting and contradictory information about the enemy.[19]
Ironically, and almost defeating the purpose, these foraging parties, while looking for resources, were, in turn, using up valuable resources themselves.
1ST ANTITANK ARTILLERY BRIGADE
Another person whom Potapov’s urgent telephone call ripped out of bed was Maj. Gen. K. S. Moskalenko, commander of the 1st Antitank Artillery Brigade. He was supposed to meet with Potapov in the morning of the 22nd and spent the night in Lutsk in a temporary apartment which Potapov provided for him.
After Potapov informed him that they were under attack, Moskalenko immediately called Kivertsi to his political deputy, Battalion Commissar N. P. Zemtsov, and ordered an alarm sounded. Interestingly, Moskalenko did not inform Zemtsov of the nature of emergency.
As Moskalenko’s car sped along the road to Kivertsi, he witnessed a German air attack on a small airfield housing about thirty Soviet aircraft. Not a single one of them was able to take off, with most of them burning on the ground.
When Moskalenko arrived at his brigade’s base camp, he found everything quiet: soldiers were still largely in their bunks, no efforts to get the brigade ready to move were taken. As it turned out, Commissar Zemtsov, not sure of what to make of Moskalenko’s vague phone call, delayed taking any actions until the latter’s arrival.
As Moskalenko rushed up the flight of stairs to his headquarters office, he was greeted by a smiling Zemtsov.
“What, maneuvers started already? I keep hearing explosions and shooting, but our brigade is not taking part.”
Moskalenko curtly cut him off:
“The hell you say, maneuvers! WAR! The Germans attacked us! Can’t you hear they are bombing the airfield!”[20]
Moskalenko and Zemtsov rushed to the safe containing secret mobilization packet. Hurriedly, Moskalenko ripped the envelope open. According to instructions, the 1st Antitank Artillery Brigade was to proceed southwest to Lvov vicinity, in the area of operations of the Sixth Army.
Despite being directly subordinated to the Reserves of Supreme Command, Moskalenko had developed cordial relations with Potapov before the war. Naturally, not knowing what the secret mobilization orders would proscribe, both Potapov and Moskalenko assumed that the 1st Antitank Artillery Brigade would operate in the Potapov’s Fifth Army area of responsibility.
Moskalenko immediately called Potapov with this unexpected development. Potapov was shocked:
The situation along the front of the 5th Army is extremely serious: German troops forged the Western Bug River in the area of Ustilug-Sokal and are advancing on Vladimir-Volynskiy. Therefore, I am asking you, no, demanding, that you set off for Vladimir-Volynskiy and, together with the 22nd Mechanized Corps, destroy the enemy units which crossed our border and stabilize the situation![21]