While Moskalenko was very sympathetic to Potapov’s plight, he had to politely remind him that his brigade was subordinated directly to the Reserve of Supreme Command and had to carry out its instructions. Potapov requested that Moskalenko wait while he contacted Moscow or Kiev. Since the brigade was still mobilizing and not ready to move in any direction yet, Moskalenko agreed to wait for clarifications.
General Potapov called back within twenty minutes to tell him that he could not contact either Moscow or Kiev. Moreover, they received news (which turned out to be false) that the 41st Tank Division from the XXII Mechanized Corps was hit hard by German aviation and suffered severe casualties. Therefore, Potapov on his own authority overruled Moskalenko’s original orders and ordered him to proceed to Vladimir-Volynskiy, which was about to fall into enemy’s hands. Moskalenko agreed with Potapov. After holding a meeting with his subordinate commanders, he ordered departure time set for 1000 hours.
Both Potapov and Moskalenko very well knew that the punishment for deviating from the mobilization orders could cost them their heads. Courage to face their superiors was in far shorter supply on that fateful day than courage to face the enemy. Had more Soviet commanders, above and below them in rank, displayed similar qualities, the events of the border battle would have most likely unfolded differently.
Moskalenko was pleased that his brigade was ready to move ahead of schedule. After a short speech, he gave a terse command: “Mount up!” Unlike the rest of the antitank artillery brigades still in the process of forming, Moskalenko’s units received all of its allocated wheeled and tracked vehicles. Therefore, he began making good time towards Vladimir-Volynskiy.
Once across the bridge over Styr River, German aircraft carried out its first attack on Moskalenko’s columns. In his memoirs he wrote that despite very intense bombing and strafing, his units suffered only light casualties. Noting the unpaved nature of the roads, he remembers how the German bombs raised such huge clouds of dust as to completely obscure the moving Soviet columns. Even though the casualties were light, valuable time was lost reorganizing Moskalenko’s units and getting them moving again.
By the end of the day, despite all the difficulties experienced while deploying forward, an impressive array of Soviet armor began converging on the threatened sector of the border. Panzer Group 1, commanded by General Oberst Ewald von Kleist, the strike force of German Army Group South, numbered less than eight hundred operational tanks in its five panzer divisions. Opposing them, the armored forces of the Soviet South-Western Front numbered over 4,500 tanks and 1,000 armored cars. Even allowing for the common disclaimer of roughly 15 percent non-operational vehicles, over 3,800 Red Army machines were converging on the German spearhead. The clash of the iron avalanches was promising to be a loud one. Halder’s diary seconded this:
In Army Group South, Group Kleist was able to get its northern and central corps moving in the midday hours. If, as seems likely, they reach the Styr River still today, they will have to fight it out with the enemy motorized group east of Styr tomorrow and the day after. The outcome will be decisive for their operational freedom of movement.[22]
CHAPTER 8
Hold What You’ve Got! June 23–24
JUNE 23, 1941
DURING THE NIGHT OF JUNE 22–23 almost no one slept at the South-Western Front’s command post. There was still no reliable telephone communications, and most of liaison officers sent to the major commands had not returned yet. News that did get in were often either discouraging or confusing. Colonel Bagramyan remembered: “Meager reports were coming in without any rhyme or reason.”[1]
Mobilization efforts were producing poor results in the chaotic environment. For example, the 2nd Antitank Artillery Brigade did not receive its allotment of tractors from the civilian sector and could only send one artillery battalion to the border.
Only by the evening of June 23, the command group of the South-Western Front developed relatively clear picture of the situation at the border. It became obvious that the main German effort fell on the Soviet Fifth Army, and the fate of the border battle would be decided on its front, in the area from Vladimir-Volynskiy to Sokal.[2]
After the 87th and 124th Rifle Divisions became cut off and surrounded, the Soviet defenses in the Vladimir-Volynskiy area collapsed. The town itself was taken, and a strong German panzer group advanced along the highway to Lutsk.
Another German panzer force became engaged around Radekhov with the forward elements of XV Mechanized Corps under General Karpezo. The Soviet commander had to leave his motorized rifle division, the 212th, in Brody due to lack of transport. His 37th Tank Division and one tank regiment from the 10th Tank Division became delayed by marshy terrain. Only two regiments from the 10th Tank Division, under Maj. Gen. S. Y. Ogurtzov, one rifle and one tank, met the Germans at Radekhov. Moving around Ogurtsov’s unprotected flanks, the Germans advanced toward Berestechko, completely unprotected by Soviet troops.[3]
Meanwhile, the Sixth and Twenty-Sixth armies, while heavily engaged, were hanging onto their positions for time being. The Twelfth Army, guarding the border with Hungary along Carpathian Mountains, reported practically no enemy activity.
In the evening of June 23, the Military Council of the South-Western Front gathered to work on the counteroffensive plans. After a short situation report by General Purkayev, they began figuring out what assets could participate in the counteroffensive on June 24: the XV Mechanized Corps and one division from XXII Mechanized Corps, supported by 135th Rifle Division and 1st Antitank Artillery Brigade. The VIII Mechanized Corps was still on the march from Lvov, under constant air attacks. The IV Mechanized had been diverted to fight in its parent army’s area of operations. The IX and XIX Mechanized Corps were still at least two days away. The XXXI, XXXVI, and XXXVII Rifle Corps were at least four to five days away.[4]
As usual, Commissar Vashugin began spouting the offensive-minded philosophy demanding stronger attacks against the Germans. Purkayev soberly opposed him, pointing out that if they attacked right now, they would be committing their forces piecemeal. He insisted that it was absolutely crucial to maintain defensive posture for at least two more days, allowing three more mechanized corps and parts of two more rifle corps to concentrate for a large-scale offensive. Still, Kirponos supported Vashugin, and the argument was over.
Thus, the plan for the next day’s counterattack was worked out. The two-pronged attack would be aimed at Vladimir-Volynskiy in the north and Berestechko in the south. Three divisions were to advance on Vladimir-Volynskiy: 135th Rifle from the XXVII Rifle Corps and 215th Motorized Rifle and 19th Tank from the XXII Mechanized Corps. They were to be supported by the 1st Antitank Artillery Brigade. The initial time for the first large-scale counterattack by the Fifth Army was set for 2200 hours on the 23rd of June. However, the German aviation so severely hampered the advance of the 135th Rifle Division and the XXII Mechanized Corps that the offensive was postponed until 0400 hours on the 24th.