The southern pincer would be comprised of the 10th and 37th Tank divisions of the XV Mechanized Corps. Both forces were not in communication with each other and would be attacking on their own timetables.
After finalizing the plan, Colonel Bagramyan brought it to Kirponos’ office for final approval. He found a grim atmosphere there. In addition to Kirponos, Purkayev, and Vashugin, two more people were there. Chief of General Staff Colonel General Zhukov and Member of Military Council Nikita Khrushchev had just returned from their inspection of the situation closer to the border.
Bagramyan’s entry interrupted Zhukov lambasting Kirponos for what he considered the latter’s lackluster efforts to bring sufficient forces to bear on the German panzer and mechanized group of forces. Zhukov was particularly upset that Kirponos allowed the commander of the Sixth Army, I. N. Muzychenko, to use the powerful IV Mechanized Corps in local fighting, instead of shifting it north to support the XV Mechanized Corps.[5]
By the end of June 23, 1941, despite stubborn resistance by the Soviet forces, the Germans achieved significant inroads, up to forty miles, into the Soviet territory. The nightfall found the 14th Panzer Division halted in the woods three miles northwest of Voinitsa, with orders to reach the Styr River in the area of Lutsk on June 24. The 298th Infantry Division was firmly in control of Vladimir-Volynskiy. The 44th Infantry Division, after leaving few units pinning down the remains of the 87th Rifle Division, moved off to within six miles southwest of Voinitsa. The 299th Infantry Division was moving through a small town of Lokachi in the direction of Lutsk. The freshly committed 13th Panzer Division, leapfrogged them, also moving to Lutsk. Another follow-on unit, the 16th Panzer Division, was advancing on Radekhov in the wake of hard-charging 11th Panzer.
Kovel Direction
Throughout the night of June 22–23, commander of the XV Rifle Corps, Col. Ivan I. Fedyuninskiy, continued receiving disturbing reports about increasing German activity along Brest-Kovel road. Especially disturbing was news that a significant number of German tanks were descending upon his right flank. However, none of these reports were true. Paralyzing “tankophobia” afflicting the Soviet troops in the early days of the war made the ever-present German motorcycle scouts and armored reconnaissance cars to be major panzer formations. Lacking his own effective reconnaissance assets, Fedyuninskiy had not way of verifying the false reports. Therefore, he kept the bulk of his reserve 41st Tank Division and 104th Rifle Regiment aimed at defending the Kovel area from the threat that wasn’t there.
Fedyuninskiy was in an unenviable position. Knowledge that he was responsible for holding the right flank of the entire South-Western Front weighed heavily on him and robbed the colonel of the ability to interpret the events unfolding to his front. The real threat was in the center of his position, along the railroad tracks leading from Chelm to Lyuboml. Realizing that Germans had punched gaps between and in their units, both commanders of Fedyuninskiy’s rifle divisions spent the night preparing for their counterattacks in order to eliminate German penetration of their lines.
During the night, virtually no resupply reached Timoshenko’s 62nd or Sherstyuk’s 45th Rifle divisions. However, the 253rd Rifle Regiment from the 45th Division finally arrived during the night and took up positions for the attack in the morning. Colonel Timoshenko, commanding the 62nd Rifle Division, having his units widely scattered, was forced to put his reconnaissance, combat engineers, and signal battalions in line to fight as infantry. Intent on maintaining even a semblance of linkup with the 87th Rifle Division from the XXVII Corps to his south, Timoshenko kept a strong group of his forces at Mosyr. This group, as mentioned previously, composed of his 123rd Rifle Regiment and two artillery regiments, remained idle in its positions throughout June 23.
The 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment from the 41st Tank Division was deployed between the two divisions, partially linking them together. This regiment, which fought as part of Fedyuninskiy’s corps throughout June 22, was composed mostly of almost-untrained recruits and suffered disproportionately heavy casualties. With the commitment of the 253rd Rifle Regiment, the only immediately available reserve was a makeshift battalion of border guards. These men, survivors of destroyed outposts, gathered around the core of the 98th NKVD Border Guards Detachment and formed themselves as the reserve behind the 45th Rifle Division. However, numbering only several hundred men, the heaviest weapons in their possession were a dozen light machine guns salvaged from their destroyed blockhouses.
At 0900 hours on June 23, both rifle divisions began their counterattack after a short preparatory artillery fire. The short duration of supporting fire was not intentional. Within ten minutes, German aircraft located Soviet artillery positions and subjected them to severe bombardment. A majority of XV Rifle Corps’ artillery was put out of action. Those that survived ceased fire so as not to invite deadly German reply.
The infantrymen of the XV Rifle Corps were supported by two companies of tanks from the 41st Tank Division attacking in the area of operations of 45th Rifle Division. When the Soviet tanks were within two hundred meters of the enemy’s positions, Germans met them with practically point-blank artillery fire. The soft-skinned T-26s were brutalized. Lieutenant Bochakoshvili, commanding one of the tank companies, ordered his unit to pull back after losing seven tanks in quick succession. By the time his company returned to its starting position, Bochakoshvili had only three tanks left. The other company suffered similar fate. After their attack halted, both gutted tank companies numbered five tanks out of thirty-two they started with. Later in the day, dismounted tank crewmen were organized into a makeshift rifle company, armed mainly with pistols and light machine guns removed from disabled tanks and lacking bipods. Because of their black tanker uniforms, they were nicknamed the “black infantry.”[6]
The two weak Soviet rifle divisions did not fare any better. The attack of the 45th Rifle Division faltered almost immediately, except on its left flank, where its 61st Rifle Regiment made minor initial progress, pushing Germans back about a mile before running out of steam in face of mounting casualties. Advancing on its left flank, the 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment also made a good showing before being similarly halted.
South of the Chelm-Lyuboml railroad, the 62nd Rifle Division made only a token attempt to counterattack. Immediately met with withering artillery and machine-gun fire, Colonel Timoshenko’s division halted and treaded water in place throughout the day, absorbing heavy casualties in the process.
In their turn, the Germans counterattacked their counterattackers. The 62nd Infantry Division slammed into both Soviet divisions with a vengeance. Very soon the Germans recovered the ground lost in the morning and began pushing the Soviets east. By the end of the day, the XV Rifle Corps held the line roughly ten miles east and paralleling the border. Its south wing around Mosyr, the relatively quiet sector of Soviet lines, remained slightly forwards. Germans expanded the gap between the 45th and 62nd Rifle divisions to almost four miles wide and ten miles deep.
The Soviet counterattack did have some small measure of success, however. During the day’s fighting, the pressure on the surrounded 1st Battalion, 306th Rifle Regiment, and the 201st Machine-Gun Battalion lessened, and the survivors of both units managed to fight their way out of the encirclement. A two-train detachment of Soviet armored trains significantly contributed to the day’s fighting, alternatively supporting the Red Army riflemen in attack and retreat.