At 1500 hours, the 20th Tank and 10th Motorized Rifle regiments, carrying out mission of capturing Radekhov, went onto attack in the direction of Radekhov-Sokal. The 10th Artillery Regiment by this time was [still] on the march, since at the time of sounding of alarm it was in the camps at Yanov, and the 19th Tank Regiment, due to difficulties experienced on the march, did not reach staging areas and did not take part in the attack. Attack of the motorized rifle and 20th Tank regiments (each without a battalion), without artillery support, and faced with clearly superior enemy forces deployed in an advantageous position, was unsuccessful.[19]
Besides bringing only partial forces to bear, commander of the 10th Tank Division, Maj. Gen. Sergey Y. Ogurtzov, conducted the attack in the most unimaginative manner. Wave after wave, the Soviet tanks crested the hill, and they went down into a dip, all the while exposing vulnerable sides and underbellies to German artillery fire. Then, coming out of the low ground, the Soviet tanks exposed their thinly armored undersides for the second time. Even the T-34 tanks, not having their equal among the 15th Panzer Regiment, were neutralized by concentrated German point-blank fire, heavily supplemented by the versatile 88s. The fight at Radekhov demonstrated what would be a major recurring factor during the next week of fighting—Soviet armor attacks, unsupported by their own artillery, dashing themselves to pieces in front of German antitank defenses.
The other tank division of the XV Mechanized Corps, the 37th, was already within twenty miles of Radekhov by 1400 hours when it was intercepted by corps commander Karpezo and sent chasing ghosts. Commander of the 37th Tank Division, Colonel F. G. Anikushkin, later described the events:
Commander of 15th Mechanized Corps, Major General Karpezo, informed [me] that in the vicinity of Adama there were up to 100 enemy tanks and ordered the 37th Tank Division to [destroy them]. Reconnaissance was sent towards Adama, and the tank regiments were turned 90 degrees from their routes of march…. It later turned out that there were no enemy tanks in the vicinity of Adama. The tank regiments, after delaying for five–six hours in Adama vicinity, continued [their] previous mission. This resulted in 37th Tank Division not being able to reach its staging area in time.[20]
Had Karpezo utilized his motorcycle regiment in its proper reconnaissance role, he would have quickly established the fact that there were no German tanks in the vicinity of Adama. Instead, he immediately diverted a whole tank division in reaction to rumors. As the result, close to 250 tanks of the 37th Tank Division which could have altered the outcome of the clash at Radekhov did not reach the town until early morning of June 24.[21]
The Germans claimed forty-six Soviet vehicles destroyed at Radekhov, while losing only one of their own tanks damaged beyond repair.[22] Here, a curiosity in reported losses is demonstrated. The Germans reported as lost only those tanks that were damaged beyond repair. The Soviets claimed any German tank disabled on the battlefield as a kill. However, since the Germans, at least in the beginning of the war, generally remained in possession of the battlefield, they were able to evacuate and repair their damaged combat vehicles. On the same note, since the Soviets retreated from the same battlefields, their damaged tanks were irretrievably lost to them.
Still, in this situation, both sides’ estimates of Soviet losses were close. While the Germans claimed forty-six destroyed Soviet tanks, just the Soviet 10th Tank Division stated losing twenty-six tanks, including six T-34s. We need to remember that besides the 10th Tank Division, a task force of the 32nd Tank Division from the IV Mechanized Corps fought at Radekhov as well. Given people’s tendency of lowering their own losses and inflating those of the enemy, German claims seem reasonable. On the other hand, 10th Tank Division’s claims of destroying twenty German tanks look a little high.
As the black, oily smoke still rose from the destroyed Soviet armor near Radekhov, the Germans did not rest on their laurels. Reinforced by the 2nd Battalion of the 15th Panzer Regiment, the 110th Infantry Regiment raced on and by the end of the day established a bridgehead on the Styr River, approximately fifteen miles east of Radekhov.
JUNE 24, 1941
Vladimir-Volynskiy and Lutsk Direction
Being late for the attack the previous evening, the morning of June 24 found the 135th Rifle Division deployed two miles east of Voinitsa, a small village located roughly halfway between Vladimir-Volynskiy and Lutsk. Its commander, Maj. Gen. F. N. Smekhotvorov, while preparing for the attack, did not posses information that Germans were already flowing around both flanks of his unit. Smekhotvorov’s division was deployed on the north-south axis across the Vladimir-Volynskiy–Lutsk road, its left flank resting on the Lokachi village. Behind the 135th, a powerful Soviet artillery task force was taking up its positions astride the road leading to Lutsk. This task force consisted of the 1st Antitank Artillery Brigade, the 406th Artillery Regiment of the XXVII Rifle Corps, and the artillery from the 135th Rifle Division, all headed by the chief of artillery of the Fifth Army, Maj. Gen. V. N. Sotenski. Opposing the Soviet forces were the German 298th Infantry and 13th and 14th Panzer divisions.
The two divisions from the XXII Mechanized Corps, the 19th Tank and 215th Motorized Rifle, had a busy night moving into attack positions. They were subject to constant German air strikes and mechanical breakdowns, which were severely draining the Soviet offensive capability. Part of the route of the two divisions took them cross-country, through the marshy wetlands unsuitable for mechanized formations. The 19th Tank Division was the closest to their assigned positions, but still late. The 215th Motorized Rifle fell hopelessly behind the timetable. Therefore, attack on Vladimir-Volynskiy was postponed from 0400 hours until the time both divisions would be ready to go. Moreover, commander of the XXII Mechanized Corps, Major General Kondrusev, became separated from his command and moved forward with the headquarters element of the 1st Antitank Artillery Brigade.
However, the time for the Soviet attack came and went at 0800 hours, and the 14th Panzer Division, supported by aviation, preempting the Soviet forces, attacked the 135th Rifle Division and pushed it three miles east. There, the advancing Germans ran into defensive positions of two artillery battalions from the 1st Antitank Artillery Brigade. The furious fire of the Soviet gunners finally halted German advance. Still, while stopped in the center and on the northern flank, the Germans began working around the southern flank of Soviet positions.
Around 1300 hours, the 19th Tank Division finally arrived in the woods north of Shelnov. This division only had forty-five operational tanks and twelve armored cars remaining after losing vehicles on the march due to German air strikes and mechanical breakdowns. They were combined into a provisional regiment. After a short preparatory artillery barrage and supported by the 135th Rifle Division, the provisional tank regiment went into the offensive. By 1630 hours the Soviet troops forced the enemy to fall back towards the Voinitsa-Lokachi line.
But the Germans were not done for the day yet. Around 1800 hours they hit back at the 135th Rifle and 19th Tank divisions and mauled them. The 19th Tank Division was particularly severely brutalized. The butcher bill of senior commanders was particularly impressive: Lt. Col. B. G. Bibik, commander of the 37th Tank Regiment—taken prisoner; Lieutenant Colonel Samsonov, commander of the 38th Tank Regiment—killed in action; Lieutenant Colonel Sokolin, commander of the 19th Motorized Rifle Regiment—mortally wounded. The division commander, Major General Semenchenko, suffered a light arm wound and narrowly escaped death after his tank was knocked out. The mauled 19th Tank Division broke, and people began streaming back in disorder, sweeping division’s rear echelons along with them. Panic and despair afflicted not just lower enlisted. Many officers were affected just as badly as their subordinates and were unable or unwilling to rally their men. When division was finally rallied and shaken to order on June 26, it mustered only four tanks, four cannons, and two under-strength motorized infantry battalions.[23] However, while the 19th Tank Division was spilling its lifeblood into marshy ground at Voinitsa, its sister 131st Motorized Rifle Division, assisted by some of Moskalenko’s gunners, arrived south of Lutsk and stabilized the situation. The action was costly, leaving Major General Kondrusev, commander of the XXII Mechanized Corps, hors de combat.