At the end of the day as Lutsk was abandoned, Colonel Kalinin’s 131st Motorized Rifle Division waited until the last organized Soviet unit retreated across the river, then blew up the bridge. Casualties were heavy. Even though Kalinin’s division absorbed small groups of retreating soldiers from other units, they were nowhere enough to make good his losses.[12]
Strugglers and survivors of the XXII Mechanized Corps began arriving in the positions of the IX Mechanized in increasing numbers. One of them was Maj. Gen. Kuzma A. Semenchenko, whose 19th Tank Division was shuttered in the fighting the previous day. As already mentioned in the previous chapter, this attack cost the 19th Tank Division all the regimental commanders hors de combat. Semenchenko himself, narrowly escaping a brush with death, was quite depressed, telling Rokossovskiy the story of the defeat of the XII Mechanized Corps. He was closely echoed by an unidentified regimental commissar from the same corps. Never one to mince words, Rokossovskiy pointedly told the two officers to stop whining, find their units, and rejoin them. In his memoirs, Rokossovskiy did not actually name Semenchenko, stating that this was “commander of a tank division from XXII Mechanized Corps.” It is easy to establish Semenchenko’s identity, however. There were two tank division commanders in the XXII Mechanized Corps, colonels Semenchenko and Pavlov. Since Pavlov’s 41st Tank Division was still at Kovel on June 25, this disheartened division commander had to be Semenchenko.[13]
Still, Rokossovskiy realized that the XXII Mechanized Corps suffered heavily, and morale was low among its survivors. He was very explicit in describing one episode of his interaction with the survivors:
In the area of Klevan we gathered many [such] sad-sack warriors, among whom were many officers. Majority of these people did not have weapons. To our shame, they all, including the officers, removed their rank insignia.
In one such group my attention was caught by an elderly man sitting under an elm, whose appearance and bearing did not resemble that of a common soldier. A young female medical orderly was sitting next to him. Addressing the sitting men, roughly one hundred in number, I ordered the officers to come to me. Nobody moved. I approached the elderly [man] and ordered him to stand up. Then, addressing him as an officer, I asked for his rank. His forced reply of “colonel” was said so indifferently and his demeanor so arrogantly challenging that I almost exploded at the sight of him and his tone of voice. Pulling out a pistol, I was ready to shoot him where he stood. Apathy and grandstanding immediately left the colonel. Realizing the likely outcome of this, he fell to his knees and began begging forgiveness, swearing to wash off his shame with blood. The scene was not the most pleasant one, but that’s how it happened.
I ordered the colonel to gather all the [stragglers] by morning, organize them into a detachment, and personally report to me in the morning of June 26th. My orders were carried out. The newly formed unit numbered over 500 men. They were all used as replacements in the motorized rifle units of the corps.[14]
XIX MECHANIZED CORPS, MAJ. GEN. N. V. FEKLENKO COMMANDING
While its two advance companies were operating east of the Ikva River, the main body of XIX Mechanized Corps was approaching its assigned areas of operations around Rovno in two echelons, mounted and dismounted. All the working tanks, combined into one regiment per tank division, as well as other elements of the corps that could be transported in trucks, constituted the first echelon. Everybody else, marching on foot or with the horse-drawn vehicles, made up the second echelon.
The units available to Major General Feklenko for the attack on the 26th hardly resembled a mechanized corps. His 213th Motorized Rifle Division and the motorized rifle regiments of the tank divisions, being essentially the regular foot-slogging infantry, hopelessly fell behind, needing at least two more days to catch up. Feklenko’s meager artillery, whatever could be towed by truck, tractor, or horse, straggled as well.
The two tank divisions, the 40th and 43rd, suffered such horrendous attrition during the march that each division had to be combined into a provisional regiment. Thus, Major General Feklenko would be attacking on the morrow with the equivalent of roughly two tank regiments, unsupported by infantry or artillery. However, orders given to him from above continued to refer to his formation as a full-strength mechanized corps.
VIII MECHANIZED CORPS, LT. GEN. D. I. RYABYSHEV COMMANDING
In the morning briefing on June 25, acting chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Tsinchenko (a week before the war, Chief of Staff Colonel Katkov went on leave), outlined their mission for the next day. The VIII and XV Mechanized Corps were to form a mobile group and attack the southern flank of the advancing German armor force.[15]
The XV Mechanized Corps under Major General Karpezo was to attack from Toporov area (approximately twenty-five miles west of Brody) towards Radekhov and Berestechko. A division of fighter aircraft, which failed to materialize, was allocated to support Karpezo’s attack. While the right flank of the 15th Mechanized and the left flank of the 8th’s were supposed to be in contact with each other, so far the command group of the 8th Mechanized was not aware of XV Mechanized Corps’ exact location. There was no neighbor on the right and wasn’t going to be one. The area over which the two corps were to advance was wooded and swampy, very unfavorable for tank maneuvers. There were four small rivers running across the axis of advance: Slonovka, Syten’ka, Styr, and Plyashevka. Although narrow, they had wide, muddy banks.
During the meeting, Tsinchenko reported about dozens of vehicles, broken down, damaged by enemy, out of gas, that were abandoned along the roads leading to Brody. Along with the vehicles, they had to leave people behind to repair and salvage whatever possible. Hinting at desertion, Popel writes: “Some commanders could not always account why people were missing.”[16]
Especially hard hit by mechanical breakdowns were the older vehicles, like the five-turreted T-35 tanks. According to Ryabyshev:
Large numbers of older tanks broke down and could not reach the staging area. T-35 tanks, for example, were all left behind on the roads. The flame-thrower tank battalion (T-26s) of the 24th Tank Regiment/12th Tank Division arrived far from full strength. Other older tanks were left behind as well. By this time we found out about major defects in KV tanks. Their brake belts, due to frequent turns during protracted continuous movement, would overheat and break down.[17]
Ryabyshev and his senior staff officers faced a daunting task of planning a major offensive with limited information available. He wrote:
There was no enemy in Brody, but neither were our troops. We did not receive any information about the enemy from [South-Western] Front HQ. There was no information either about the neighbors on the left and right. We did not know with whom we [would] be cooperating and which air units [would] be supporting corps combat operations. However, we received reports from our reconnaissance, sent out when we were still on the march. When we consolidated information by midnight on June 25th, we reached conclusion that in the area of proposed corps’ offensive, the enemy, covering its main tank force operating in the Lutsk-Rovno-Kiev directions, took up defenses along the Ikva River facing east and along the Sytenka River facing southeast. By this time additional reconnaissance reports informed us that to the right and left of the Brody-Berestechko road, along the east bank of Sytenka River, 212th Motorized Rifle Division from Maj. Gen. I. I. Karpezo’s 15th Mechanized Corps took up positions and made contact with the enemy.[18]