In the afternoon, corps’ commissar Nikolai Popel drove to the vicinity of Toporov, attempting to find the headquarters of the XV Mechanized Corps, and located it after spending several hours bouncing around deep-rutted roads. Upon arrival there, Popel was struck by how different the command posts of the two corps looked.
The VIII, not yet subjected to severe bombardment and precise German artillery strikes, still established its command post as it did before the war by setting up their white canvas tents. Karpezo’s headquarters, on the other hand, had already undergone two severe air attacks and adapted the dugouts and slit trenches. Popel recalled a female typist who worked in a slit trench, placing her “Underwood” typewriter on the trench’s top lip. Upon hearing the whistling of the incoming German artillery shells, she would pick up her typewriter and duck down into the trench.[19]
Lieutenant General Karpezo, his commissar Ivan Vasilevich Lutai, and Popel conferred about the upcoming attack. Popel was shocked to find out that on the 26th, only one division from the XV Mechanized Corps could participate in the attack. Karpezo’s other two divisions suffered such heavy casualties during the previous three days that they could barely hold their defensive positions. In conversation with Popel, Karpezo expressed his concern that the headquarters of the South-Western Front was not aware of his situation and was giving him a mission as if for a full-strength corps. He was right.
During the night of June 25–26, Maj. Gen. T. A. Mishanin conducted a local counterattack using the motorized rifle regiment from his 12th Tank Division. He managed to eliminate a small German beachhead on the southern, Soviet-occupied, side of Slonovka River and set up several observation posts on the northern, German, side of the river. Despite expending large amounts of energy, Mishanin recon patrols could not find out locations of German main defensive positions or their strength.[20]
Also late at night, Ryabyshev’s staff was able to establish direct contact with the 212th Motorized Rifle Division under Major General Baranov from Karpezo’s corps.
Headquarters of this unit informed us that the division was located on the right flank of the 15th Mechanized Corps, whose troops were in combat contact since the beginning of the war with the enemy paratroopers in the area of Radekhov. After eliminating several airborne groups, the corps became involved in combat with enemy’s tank group, which penetrated our border…. Forces of the 15th Mechanized Corps were forced to go on the defensive along the line of over forty miles.[21]
Lieutenant General Ryabyshev was forced to plan his attack based on fragmented information. Headquarters of the South-Western Front did not pass down any usable information about the enemy. No liaison officer from the air force fighter division showed up, and there was no telephone or radio contact with it, either.
Even though the received information did not create a clear picture about the enemy, it still allowed us to more or less get our bearings and begin preparing for combat. Working on the plan for the upcoming battle, I took into consideration that the enemy is not occupying fortified defensive positions and decided to suddenly attack the forward Hitlerite units at dawn of June 26th and, continuing with the offensive, by the end of the day reach the line of Volkovye-Berestechko-Mikolayev. Each division commander received a concrete and clear mission. The corps was deployed in one echelon; the 34th Tank Division was to advance on the right, with the mission of breaching the enemy position in the sector of Sytno-Sytenka River. The 12th Tank Division, advancing in the center, was to breach the enemy in the sector from Sytenka River to Leshnyuv. On the left, acting in concert with the 212th Motorized [Rifle] Division and securing corps’ left flank, the 7th Motorized [Rifle] Division will begin its advance.[22]
XV MECHANIZED CORPS, MAJ. GEN. I. I. KARPEZO COMMANDING
The XV Mechanized Corps spent most of June 25 engaged in heavily see-saw fighting and was unable to prepare for the next day’s offensive. The 10th Tank Division under Maj. Gen. S. Y. Ogurtzov experienced particularly heavy fighting.
Around 1600 hours, Major Govor, chief of staff of the 20th Tank Regiment, led a task force of fifteen tanks in a local counterattack. They ran straight into strong German antitank defenses and were brutalized, losing eleven out of fifteen tanks, including four new T-34s and seven light BT-7 machines. Personnel losses in this task force were heavy, with Major Govor himself missing and presumed dead.
The Germans continued pressing 10th Tank Division, slowly flowing around its flanks. In order to improve its position, 10th Motorized Rifle Regiment counterattacked, supported by several tanks from 20th Tank Regiment and two batteries from 10th Howitzer Regiment. The attack was bloodily repulsed, resulting in one rifle battalion being completely gutted.
While 10th Tank Division was spilling its lifeblood, its sister 37th Tank Division was slowly moving towards Radekhov. They were advancing practically blind, being unaware of locations of the main German positions near Radekhov. Karpezo ordered its commander, Colonel Anikushkin, to locate the enemy and find fords on the Radostavka River.[23] By the end of the day, its two tank regiments were in position.
The 212th Motorized Rifle Division fought several small clashes with the German reconnaissance elements moving south from Leshnov.
SITUATION AT THE END OF JUNE 25
The suddenness of the German attack and their rapid advance, coupled with heavy Soviet losses, produced many cases of breakdown in morale among the Soviet troops. While on the move to their new command post during the night of June 25–26, the command group of the Fifth Army witnessed a disorderly retreat of units from 135th Rifle and 19th Tank Divisions from XXII Mechanized Corps and 460th Artillery Regiment of XXVII Rifle Corps.[24] Only personal involvement by Potapov and other officers from the army headquarters halted the flight of men and vehicles and prevented the spread of panic, which was beginning to also affect the 131st Motorized Division of the IX Mechanized Corps.
The Military Council of the Fifth Army immediately took quick and severe measures to reestablish discipline and combat-effectiveness of the affected units. All the roads to the rear were blocked and actively patrolled to prevent desertion. A collection point was set up in the woods north of Tsuman in order to process individuals and small groups which were found wandering around in the rear of the army. After two or three days of reorganization and mental and moral fortification, they were sent back to their units.
In addition to administrative measures, the Military Council of the army, starting on 26th of June and later, issued a series of directives and orders dealing with steps to be taken to increase discipline and morale of the troops. These directives pointed out that the communists and Comsomol members do not take the leading roles in fighting, do not oppose the panic mongers, and often desert themselves. The directives immediately demanded to turn over the deserters, cowards, and panic-mongers to the military tribunals. Communists and Comsomol members were to take a leading role in the struggle and lead by example; there was to be only one slogan for a communist: death or victory. The party bureaus which could not prevent the unauthorized withdrawals were to be disbanded, and the communists who could not reestablish order in their units were to be held accountable.[25]