We were forced to gather information ourselves. Staff officers headed by General Maslov quickly adapted to the seemingly impossible situation in which we found ourselves and were able to provide us with the necessary information. But this was accomplished at a steep price—many staff officers were killed while carrying out their missions.
Judging from disjointed reports, we were somewhat able to piece together what was happening in our direction. We did not know what was happening on the other sectors of the South-Western Front. Apparently, General Potapov was not in a better situation. During the time I commanded the 9th Mechanized Corps, his headquarters were not able to assist us in these matters even once. Besides, communications with him were cut most of the time.[6]
Despite being proud and satisfied with performance of his own corps, Rokossovskiy realized that he was not faced with the main German thrust. He was very frank in his memoirs: “It is difficult to imagine how we would have performed if we would be facing the main German attack.”[7]
Attack of the Southern Group: VIII and XV Mechanized Corps
While the threat posed to the German Dubno group of forces by the Soviet southern mechanized group was much greater, it was defeated piecemeal in a similar fashion. Unlike the Soviet northern group of forces, the southern one was facing more German infantry divisions, with their higher antitank defense capabilities. Also, the terrain over which the VIII and XV Mechanized Corps were to advance was more difficult to navigate. Between the starting point of Toporov to Berestechko and Dubno, there were five small rivers, running along the northwest to southeast axis. Although small, these rivers had muddy banks and swampy valleys, some of them over a mile wide. There was a dearth of suitable fords and bridges capable of bearing tanks.
After overcoming natural obstacles, Soviet tankers were faced with bristling antitank defenses of German infantry divisions. To make the matters even worse, German air attacks in this area were especially effective, causing great damage and confusion among Soviet mechanized columns strung out along narrow dirt roads.
The XV Mechanized Corps was slotted to move onto Berestechko, with the VIII Mechanized advancing on Dubno on its right. The left flank of the XV Mechanized and the right flank of the VIII were unsupported.
XV Mechanized Corps, Maj. Gen. I. I. Karpezo Commanding
On June 25, Major General Karpezo did not think that the 10th Tank Division of his corps was in any shape to participate in the offensive on the 26th. Still, working feverishly during the night, the command cadre of this division cobbled its remains into some sort of readiness for the attack.
The corps’ motorized rifle division, the 212th, would not be participating in the offensive, protecting Brody in a semicircle extending from northwest to northeast. The 8th Tank Division from the IV Mechanized Corps, assigned to reinforce the XV Mechanized Corps, was still a full day away, around Busk.
Even within this one corps, there was little, if any, cooperation between divisions, and they operated independently. The 10th Tank spent most of the day in local counterattacks. The 37th Tank Division was able to conduct a more telling offensive, but in the end was brought up short.
Both divisions would carry out their counterattacks with their ten KV-1s in front ranks, covering their lightly armored brethren. Still, in a battle between armor and armor-piercing shells, the heavy projectiles of German corps-level artillery, greatly aided by the versatile 88mm air-defense guns used in direct-fire role, carried the day, and the Soviet tankers suffered heavily from punish-ingly accurate antitank fire.
Russian historian A. V. Isyaev quotes memoirs of former Capt. Z. K. Slyusarenko, then-commander of the 1st Battalion, 19th Tank Regiment of the 10th Tank Division:
The enemy shells could not penetrate our armor, but damaged treads, knocked off turrets. A KV went up in flames to my left…. My heart skipped a beat: “Kovalchuk is burning!” I can not help this crew at alclass="underline" twelve other vehicles are charging ahead with me. Another KV came to a halt: a shell knocked off its turret. KV tanks were powerful vehicles, but sorely lacking in speed and maneuverability.[8]
In addition to extremely effective German artillery, the XV Mechanized Corps was subjected to heavy German air attacks. The slow-moving Soviet artillery was hit hard on approaches to forward positions. Without their support, the Soviet tank units lacked sufficient firepower to deal with German field artillery.
Dearth of Soviet infantry was also severely felt. Between the two attacking Soviet tank divisions, there were barely four motorized rifle battalions. Attacking without close cooperation from the Soviet armor, the rifle battalions took heavy casualties and could not provide close support for the tankers. Without infantry support, the Soviet tanks could not hold on to their hard-won gains and were forced to pull back at the end of the day.
Around 1800 hours, a particularly punishing air strike was delivered upon the command post of the XV Mechanized Corps. While personnel losses were minor, one of the casualties was the corps commander, Major General Karpezo.
A bizarre episode is connected to his wounding. After debris from the explosions stopped raining, Karpezo’s body was discovered amid wreckage of his command post. One of the doctors examined Karpezo and pronounced him dead, and he was promptly buried by headquarters personnel. Several minutes after the commander’s body was buried, corps commissar Ivan V. Lutai arrived at the command post.
Hearing upon Karpezo’s death and burial, Commissar Lutai, a close friend of Karpezo, flew into rage. Pulling out his pistol and screaming like a mad man, Lutai demanded that Karpezo’s body be dug up so he could see for himself that his friend was indeed dead. Cowed staff workers quickly unearthed Karpezo’s body. When he was examined again, shocked officers discovered that Karpezo was breathing.
As Karpezo was quickly evacuated to the rear, his deputy, Col. G. I. Yermolayev, took over command of the XV Mechanized Corps. Later Karpezo recovered from his ordeal; however, he was never again sufficiently healthy for a line command. He toiled in obscurity in several rear-echelon postings for the rest of the war, quietly retiring in 1950s. Lutai himself did not survive the war, being killed in a cauldron battle in September 1941 east of Kiev.
With nightfall, attack of the XV Mechanized Corps petered out, and Colonel Yermolayev ordered it to pull back. At the end of the day the XV Mechanized Corps numbered 260 tanks, most of them in the 37th Tank Division. Among them, 44 tanks were the new KV-1 and T-34 models, still a very respectable force. The XV Mechanized Corps started the war with at least 733 tanks. Now, four days later, it was reduced to approximately 35 percent strength.
VIII Mechanized Corps, Lt. Gen. D. I. Ryabyshev Commanding
Because of the limited capabilities of the XV Mechanized Corps, the lion’s share of fighting in the southern sector fell to Ryabyshev’s VIII Corps. As mentioned previously, this corps was one of the strongest among Soviet mechanized formations. Aggressively led as well, this corps achieved the most success on June 26. Marching and countermarching over the previous several days and covering approximately four hundred miles along poor roads cost the VIII Mechanized Corps dearly. Out of roughly nine hundred tanks in the corps at the beginning of the war (sources vary from 858 to 933), approximately 50 percent were left along the routes of march, broken down, damaged by air attacks, or out of fuel.