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As we already know, the VIII Mechanized Corps was to retreat behind the XXXVI Rifle Corps, which was in defensive positions along the line of Kremenets-Podkamen. Ryabyshev wrote in his memoirs that this officer, Gen. V. P. Panyukhov, did not inform him about the reasoning behind the order, merely stating that the VIII Mechanized was to be in reserve of the South-Western Front. Panyukhov did not have any information about progress of his neighboring XV Mechanized Corps, nor about the IX and XIX Corps.

Ryabyshev immediately sent out his own liaison officers to his divisions. His main concern was to reach his units before they continued their offensive. He did not have functioning radio communications with his divisions, and everything depended on how fast his liaison officers would get the word out.

As already shown, the 12th Tank Division received their instructions in time and began pulling back, albeit under heavy air attacks. Ryabyshev was shocked when Popel informed him that the 7th Motorized Rifle and 34th Tank Divisions did not get the word about the pullback and remained in place.

The tremendous efforts which Ryabyshev’s divisions had to expend in order to pull back were in vain. Shortly before 0700 hours, another liaison officer from the South-Western Front headquarters arrived at their impromptu command post at the side of the road with another set of conflicting instructions. The VIII Mechanized Corps was to renew the offensive, push Germans out of Dubno, and defend the city until relieved!

Incredulously, Ryabyshev and Popel attempted to question this officer, Col. A. N. Mikhailov, who apparently did not have much information to share. Shrugging off questions by the two men, Mikhailov quickly beat a retreat and raced off to find the XV Mechanized Corps, evidently with the same instructions.

These two conflicting sets of orders received by the VIII Mechanized Corps, even though puzzling, could be explained by the fact that command of the South-Western Front still operated in the environment of limited and late information. Knowing that the attack of the northern pincer, by the IX and XIX Mechanized Corps, was defeated, Kirponos and his command group possibly assumed that the southern pincer, the VIII and XV Mechanized Corps, were defeated as well and ordered them to pull back. Then, finding out that the VIII Mechanized Corps actually made good progress, ordered the two southern corps to turn around and continue the offensive. Off course, this is only a possible explanation, since Colonel General Kirponos’ reasoning died with him in September of 1941.

Ryabyshev and his staff began making preparation for the renewed attack lacking any concrete information about the overall situation:

Who were our neighbors on right and left, what will be their course of action—was unknown to me. In this case, it would be difficult for me, as the corps commander, and my staff, to make appropriate decision. We needed to know where the enemy was, what was he doing, what are his intentions and numbers. But we did not have that information. This was characteristic of the first days of war. Orders coming from Front’s headquarters, due to lack of needed information, not always reflected the current situation, which due to the fluid character of combat actions was changing hourly.[40]

Taking into consideration distance to their objective and condition of his corps, Ryabyshev knew that he would not be able to start his mission at least until 0200 hours on June 28.

Around 0900 hours on 27th, Ryabyshev gave orders to commander of 6th Motorcycle Regiment, Col. T. I. Tributskiy, to scout out enemy dispositions. The divisions were to concentrate at their staging areas by 0200 on June 28. They were to be deployed in two echelons: the two tank divisions in the first and the motorized rifle division in the second. He assigned the 12th Tank Division the main task of taking Dubno by attacking along the Brody-Dubno highway. The 34th Tank Division was to secure the left flank of the 12th. The 7th Motorized Rifle Division was to follow up and exploit the 12th Tank Division’s expected progress.[41]

As General Ryabyshev was poring over maps and situation reports, his adjutant announced that visitors from the South-Western Front headquarters were arriving. He remembered an uncomfortable, to say the least, scene that unfolded:

I stepped out of the tent and saw several cars. The first one already stopped. The Member of the Military Council of the South-Western Front, Corps Commissar N. N. Vashugin, was inside. Adjusting [my] cap, I hurried up to him with a report. Vashugin’s tired face was unfriendly:

“Why did you not carry out orders about advancing on Dubno?” interrupting me, [Vashugin] curtly asked.

I tried again to make my report.

“Quiet! This is treason!”

“Comrade Corps Commissar,” interrupted Brigade Commissar N. K. Popel, standing next to me. His voice was calm and decisive. “You can demand that the order be carried out. But you need to hear us out, too.”

[Vashugin] glared angrily at Popel. Then, glancing at a wristwatch, in calm tones ordered [us] to report the situation and decision to continue fighting.[42]

When Ryabyshev reported his situation, stating that his corps would not be able to resume the offensive until the next morning, Vashugin blew up.

“What?!” exclaimed [Vashugin]. “Make an immediate decision—and forward!”

“With what, forward?” I asked. But he did not hear my question.

“I am ordering you to immediately begin the offensive!” Vashugin demanded again.

“I consider it a crime before Motherland to commit [my] forces into combat piecemeal. This means useless suicide. At most, some partial units could not attack today until after 1400 hours.”

“Good,” agreed [Vashugin]. “I can accept the last suggestion. Make it happen!”[43]

In his descriptions of the same encounter, Commissar Popel is a lot less charitable towards Vashugin than Ryabyshev was. Here’s Popel’s depiction:

[Vashugin] walked directly at Ryabyshev, trampling bushes with his highly polished boots. When he got close, looking up at [Ryabyshev], in a voice tense with fury, he asked:

“How much did you sell yourself for, Judas?”

Ryabyshev was standing at the position of attention in front of [Vashugin], confused, not knowing what to say; we were all were looking at [Vashugin] in confusion. Ryabyshev spoke up first:

“Comrade Corps Commissar, if you would hear me out…”

“You will be heard by military tribunal, traitor. Right here, under this fir, we’ll hear you out, and right here we’ll shoot you.”[44]

Vashugin’s threat was not an idle one. Among the entourage accompanying Vashugin, Popel recognized the prosecutor and the chief of military tribunal of the South-Western Front. Vashugin even brought along a platoon of soldiers. Knowing that his fate was tied to Ryabyshev’s, Popel made an attempt to save both of their lives:

I could not contain myself any longer and took a step forward:

“You can accuse us all you want. However, you have to hear us out.”

Now the torrent of curses fell upon me. Everybody knew that [Vashugin] hated being interrupted. But I had nothing to lose. I used his own tactic. This was not an intentional action; the fury guided me:

“It is still to be determined, what was the reasoning of those who ordered us to cede to the enemy territory which we took in combat.”

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40

Ryabyshev, 25.

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41

Ibid., 26.

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42

Ibid., 27.

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43

Ibid., 27.

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44

Popel, 137.