The XXIV Mechanized Corps was the weakest and the least combat-capable mechanized corps available to commander of the South-Western Front. Approximately three quarters of its enlisted personnel were brand-new recruits, large portion of whom have not yet completed their basic training. At the start of the war, the XXIV Mechanized Corps had roughly 220 tanks, all of which were the older models. Over forty of them, or almost 20 percent, were the old two-turreted T-26s.
This corps, having virtually no wheeled transport, had been moving up on foot since June 24 towards Kremenets, a distance of almost seventy miles from their garrisons around Proskurov. The later stages of its road march was conducted under heavy pressure from German aviation.
While XXIV Mechanized Corps was still a day away, its commander, Maj. Gen. V. I. Chistyakov, an old friend of Bagramyan’s, stopped by to chat with his friend. Chistyakov was less than enthusiastic about his corps’ combat worthiness: “Our corps is far from what I would like to see. We just began its formation. We have not yet received new tanks, there aren’t any trucks…. Therefore, my friend, if you hear that we don’t fight the best, don’t judge us too harshly. You need to know that we’ll do all that we can.”[1]
Towards the end of the day, staff of the South-Western Front received news of Ryabyshev’s VIII Mechanized Corps reaching the immediate vicinity of Dubno. Rejuvenated by these encouraging news, Kirponos ordered counterattacks to continue on June 29. Not knowing the true situation of the IX and XIX Mechanized Corps, he sent them instructions to push again towards Dubno to link up with the VIII and XV Mechanized Corps advancing from the southwest. The two southern mechanized corps were to be supported by the XXXVI and XXXVII Rifle Corps as well as the 14th Cavalry Division belonging to the V Cavalry Corps. Task Force Lukin was to plug up the eastern direction.
Overall, the situation around Rovno was still sketchy. The IX and XIX Mechanized Corps, after suffering severe casualties during the two previous days, were not in any condition to renew the offensive. The good news from the VIII Mechanized Corps quickly soured once Kirponos’ staff found out that Popel’s group was bottled up near Dubno.
Bagramyan later wrote that it seemed that the Soviet High Command in Moscow began doubting South-Western Front’s ability to halt the German panzer thrust:
Apparently Stavka no longer counted on us to destroy the main thrust of Army Group South and fight through to the border. This was witnessed by a telegram demanding to inform commanders of 87th and 124th Rifle divisions, which were supposed to be still fighting surrounded near the border, of an order: “Abandon equipment after burying it; and with light weapons fight through the woods towards Kovel.”[2]
Looking at the orders for the two surrounded divisions, the Stavka did not hope that they could rejoin the Fifth Army. It was trying to save any survivors by directing them north to Kovel, away from main fighting. Of course, neither Stavka nor Kirponos’ staff knew that 124th Rifle Division no longer existed and that the handful of survivors from the 87th Rifle Division was already heading east. Miraculously, approximately one thousand men from this division were able to rejoin the Fifth Army in July.
At the same time as the Soviet High Command was attempting to direct the survivors of the two surrounded division to Kovel, the Soviet XV Rifle Corps was falling back from it in good order. This corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. I. I. Fedyuninskiy, managed to disengage from the forward German units and was crossing to the eastern bank of Stokhod River. His 45th and 62nd Rifle Divisions, while suffering heavy casualties during the past several days, still remained combat capable. The 16th Rifle Regiment, the only unit from the surrounded 87th Rifle Division to break out, constituted the corps reserve.[3]
Once behind Stokhod River, the XV Rifle Corps had a chance to catch its breath, while Fedyuninskiy and his staff had an opportunity to review the events of the past week and sum up the lessons learned. In his memoirs, Fedyuninskiy was critical of the overall Soviet performance:
Enemy aviation and commando groups put communication centers and lines out of action. There weren’t enough radios in [various] headquarters; and, besides, we were not accustomed to using them. Mobile means of communications suffered severe casualties and, in a fluid, rapidly changing environment, turned out to be of little use. All of this led to orders and directives reaching the [addressees] late or not at all. This was the cause of the piecemeal nature of our counteroffensive, disruption in cooperation between branches of service.
Particularly poorly carried out was cooperation between infantry and tanks. This was especially apparent on June 24th, when we undertook a counterattack in the Lyuboml area. Commander of the 41st Tank Division, Colonel Popov, displayed indecisiveness. He was mainly “worried” about preserving equipment and not about the most effective ways to utilize it in the developing situation.
We poorly conducted reconnaissance of the enemy, especially at night.
Communication with neighbors was often lacking, especially when often nobody would even try to establish it. The enemy, taking advantage of this, would infiltrate into our rear and attack units’ headquarters.
Despite enemy air superiority, camouflage measures during road marches were poorly carried out. Often troops, vehicles, artillery pieces, field kitchens would converge on narrow roads. The fascist aircraft conducted quite painful strikes on such bottlenecks.
It is necessary to also note that [our forces] initially did not sufficiently appreciate significance of engineering work. There were instances when soldiers did not dig foxholes due to low expectations of individual commanders, often due to lack of entrenching tools. Situation with entrenching tools was so bad that in some units soldiers used helmets instead of shovels.[4]
Throughout all of June 28 there was only one radiogram from the Fifth Army. Even this one message that got through did not carry any useful information, just a routine notification of changing location of its headquarters.
Bad news continued raining down. Two senior officers from 12th Tank Division, Regimental Commissar V. V. Vilkov and Col. E. D. Nesterov, reported that a significant part of Lieutenant General Ryabyshev’s VIII Mechanized Corps was fighting surrounded just south of Dubno. While these two men were making their report:
Vashugin walked in during the conversation. We noticed how he turned pale, but nobody attached any significance to it. We thought: the man simply feels bad for the setback, for which he was partially responsible [emphasis added]. Nobody could have guessed what kind of blow this represented to him. Not waiting for the end of the conversation, Vashugin left.[5]
Despite the obvious inability of his Front to continue the offensive, Kirponos nonetheless ordered to proceed. Hopes now were pinned on Potapov’s Fifth Army, plus the XXXVI Rifle Corps and Task Force Lukin, with whatever aviation assets could be scraped up. Below are the excerpts from order disseminated on June 28, 1941: