—The 5th Army, minus XXXVI Rifle Corps, capitalizing upon success of the VIII Mechanized Corps, go onto offensive and reach with its left flank the Styr River, securing river crossings near Lutsk.
—The XXXVI Rifle Corps at 1200 hrs on 06/28/41 go onto offensive with immediate objective, capitalizing upon success of the VIII Mechanized Corps, reach the line of Mlynov-Bakuyma-Kozin.
—The V Cavalry Corps (headquarters and the 14th Cavalry Division), going onto offensive at 1200 hours, by the end of the day reach the area of Teslukhov-Khotyn-Kozin.
—The XXXVII Rifle Corps (141st and 139th Rifle divisions) advance at 0800 hours and by the end of 06/28/41 reach the line of Boldury-Stanislavchik-Polonichna.
—The XV Mechanized Corps to continue with already-defined mission. By the end of the day to be in vicinity of Berestechko. To be ready to repel possible enemy mechanized attacks from north and northwest and support the VIII Mechanized Corps in destroying enemy groups of forces which broke through beyond Ikva River.[6]
Simultaneous with the above-mentioned formations, the VIII Mechanized Corps was diverted from its push on the city and sent east: “The VIII Mechanized Corps, after securing the line of Ikva River behind it, attack the enemy moto-mechanized units operating east of Ikva River in the direction of Ostrog. After destroying the enemy, rally by the end of the day in the areas of Zdolbunov, Mizoch, Ozhenin.”[7]
However, all the planning was conducted in the most generous outline, often not even being aware of location of formations that were to participate in the offensive. Their situation report released around 0800 hours on June 28 reflected the dearth of concrete information: “Situation of the Fifth Army is being clarified.” “There is no information about situation of VIII and XV Mechanized Corps.”[8]
After Kirponos, Purkayev, and Bagramyan arrived at this decision, Kirponos delegated Bagramyan to inform Vashugin and Khrushchev about it. In doing so, Bagramyan found out shocking news:
After picking up the working copy of a map and my notes, I went to see N. S. Khrushchev. He was unusually sad. [He] listened to my report and without hesitation approved the planned efforts. Finding out that I was going to see Vashugin next, Nikita Sergeyeevich [Khrushchev] bitterly said: “Don’t go. No need to report to him any longer. For [Vashugin] the war is over.” Vashugin shot himself. He was an honest, uncompromising, energetic human being, but too excitable and easily hurt. The burden of disaster broke him.[9]
It was probably not too difficult for Bagramyan, writing his memoirs years later, cushioned by passing years, to give a less scolding description of Vashugin. In reality, it was quite possible that the staff officers at Kirponos’ headquarters suddenly were able to breathe easier without Vashugin’s menacing presence. Vashugin quite clearly realized that he was directly responsible for putting Ryabyshev’s VIII Mechanized Corps out of action and trapping a large portion of it with Popel near Dubno. He did one decent thing and shot himself.
Around 2200 hours, first Bagramyan and then Kirponos were called to the telegraph machine on direct line to Moscow. The upper echelon continuously demanded news:
One after another requests for information…. We could feel that Stavka was worried about the situation of our Front…. For several minutes the telegraph was clicking off the questions: “What is going on at Dubno, Lutsk, Rovno? How far did enemy tanks penetrate those regions? Where is Potapov? Where is his 15th Rifle Corps? What are results of the counteroffensive by 8th and 15th Mechanized Corps?”[10] There wasn’t much that Bagramyan or Zhukov could report about Potapov’s 5th Army: “Since 2400 hours on 06/27/41 command group and headquarters of [5th] Army lost communications with [their] units, subjected to strong enemy mechanized attacks. 15th Rifle Corps—situation not clarified; 27th Rifle Corps—situation not clarified; 22nd Mechanized Corps—situation not clarified.”[11]
Fortunately, the pullback of the three Soviet armies defending the Lvov salient and Hungarian border was proceeding in relatively orderly manner. In conclusion, Kirponos reported: “Overall, the South-Western Front feels itself to be sufficiently capable to continue further struggle. The enemy mechanized group of forces operating in the area of Ostrog presents the biggest threat to the South-Western Front. The unclear situation on the right flank deepens the overall unfavorable position of the Front’s right wing.”[12]
Zhukov continued pressing Kirponos about not letting up his offensive, once advising him to “use all of Lukin’s mechanized forces” in the counterattack against the German forces. Kirponos had to explain to Zhukov that both tank divisions of Lukin’s V Mechanized Corps already departed for the Western Front. The only tank force available to Lukin was a tank regiment belonging to the 109th Motorized Rifle Division.[13] However, Kirponos himself did not know that this tank “regiment” was in reality about a score of light tanks, mainly belonging to Lukin’s reconnaissance battalion.
After midnight of June 28–29, Bagramyan’s deputy, Lieutenant Colonel Zakhvatayev, returned from his information-gathering trip to Potapov’s Fifth Army. It was a dangerous and arduous endeavor. Between Kirponos’ headquarters in Tarnopol and Potapov’s headquarters northeast of Rovno, a great number of Soviet and German units were fighting in close quarters, often intermixed. On the return leg of his trip, Zakhvatayev’s plane was damaged by flak and forced to land. Luckily, Zakhvatayev was uninjured and, commandeering a truck, returned to Tarnopol, making a wide loop east through Shepetovka.[14]
The news delivered by Zakhvatayev wasn’t encouraging. The XV Rifle and remains of the XXII Mechanized Corps abandoned Kovel and were moving east across Stokhod River. The XXXI Rifle and IX Mechanized Corps plus the 135th Rifle Division from the XXVII Rifle Corps were defending approaches to Rovno, while the XIX Mechanized Corps was already pushed back to the very suburbs of Rovno.[15]
Kirponos and his senior officers did not know that Zakhvatayev’s report was already outdated. By this time fighting mostly died down on June 28, the Soviet forces abandoned Rovno and fell back almost fifteen miles to the east bank of Goryn River. This river became a rough temporary demarcation line between Soviet and German forces.
Potapov’s Fifth Army was still pulling into the river bend north of Rovno along the Stokhod River. The XXII and IX Mechanized and XXXI Rifle Corps, along with the 1st Antitank Artillery Brigade, held the river line down to the Rovno-Novograd-Volynskiy highway. The XIX Mechanized and XXXVI Rifle Corps extended south almost to Ostrog. From there, full of gaping holes were the lines of The VIII and XV Mechanized and XXXVII Rifle Corps to Brody.
However, with the XXXI, XXXVI, and XXXVII Rifle Corps coming up on line, the area between Goryn River east to the Stalin line was stripped of Soviet reserves. In the case that Germans broke through at Ostrog and raced on to the plum prize of Kiev, the Nineveeth Army under Gen. I. S. Konev was ordered north into the Kiev Fortified District.
Mechanized Corps, Maj. Gen. K. K. Rokossovskiy Commanding
After abandoning its attack on Dubno the previous day, Major General Rokossovskiy’s IX Mechanized Corps was stubbornly defending the Lutsk-Rovno highway in the area of Klevan against the determined efforts by German 14th Panzer and 25th Motorized Infantry Divisions. The terrain in this location favored defense: