The 37th Motorized Rifle Regiment, following in their wake, crossed the Styr River in vicinity of Bordulyaki-Stanislavchik. However, poorly supported by Soviet artillery, it suffered casualties around 60 percent. Both commander of the regiment Major Shlykov and his deputy Major Shwartz were killed. “Positions occupied by 37th Motorized Rifle Regiment along the southern bank of Styr River in area of Bordulyaki-Stanislavchik are littered with dead and wounded. The 37th Motorized Rifle Regiment is severely demoralized.”[22]
In his report on the events of the day, Colonel F. G. Anikushkin, commander of the 37th Tank Division, wrote:
I ordered Captain Kartsev, temporary in command of the 37th Motorized Rifle Regiment, to evacuate all the wounded during the night and offer them necessary help, to pick up the dead and bury them in the area of Zbroye, take detailed head count of the regiment, collect all weapons and ammunition, reorganize the regiment, and hold river crossings at Bordulyaki and Stanislavchik, not allowing the enemy to cross to the southern bank of Styr River.[23]
Summarizing the events of the day, Colonel Anikushkin requested one pontoon-bridging battalion to assist him in river crossings, over-optimistically stating that while the 37th Motorized Rifle Regiment was no longer combat capable, the division overall could still carry on its mission. He sent up a word of caution: “The combat materiel, due to its incorrect employment from 22nd to 28th of June, 1941, is beginning to fail in large numbers due to its technical condition and requires evaluation.”[24]
By nightfall, positions of the 10th Tank Division, raked by enemy fire from three directions, became untenable, and Colonel Yermolayev shifted it east to link up with the 37th Tank Division. Both divisions became bogged down between the two rivers, Ostruvka and Styr. Around midnight, Colonel Yermolayev permitted them to return to their starting positions.
The 8th Tank Division, fighting on the left flank of the XV Mechanized Corps, was not able to take Okhladov village, suffering heavily from concentrated German artillery fire. Despite not being able to make any headway in its own sector, this division allowed the 10th and 37th Tank Divisions to pull back to their original morning positions on the Radostavka River.
The 212th Motorized Rifle Division of the XV Mechanized Corps not only was not able to attack, it was even pushed back by Germans.
Task Force Popel, Southwest of Dubno
Daybreak of June 28 found Commissar Nikolai Popel’s task force spread out from Ptycha village on the Brody-Dubno highway to the Dubno suburbs, a distance of approximately ten miles. Popel spent a restless night preparing his unit for inevitable counterattacks. While he seemed quite sure in his memoirs about occupying Dubno, most likely Popel’s force was in possession of some outlying suburb of the town, possibly the Maliye Sady township, roughly three miles from Dubno. The city itself was solidly under German control.
During the previous day’s fighting, his forces severely depleted their ammunition and fuel stocks. Some of the men defending positions around Ptycha village were down to ten to fifteen rounds per rifle. The tank crewmen from disabled vehicles were almost completely unarmed. Some of the Soviet riflemen gave up their bayonets so that tankers would have at least a modicum of weapons. A makeshift Dubno militia company formed from the town’s Communist Party and civil officials was likewise poorly armed.
The area south and southwest of Dubno became a quagmire of small groups of men from various formations blundering from one confused fight to another. In the early morning, commander of the 27th Rifle Regiment, Col. Ivan N. Pleshakov, stumbled in, accompanied by an aide and a commissar from a cavalry battalion from 14th Cavalry Division. This unidentified commissar informed Popel that during the night, a column of trucks bearing ammunition, fuel, and lubricants attempted to get to Dubno from Kremenets. It was turned back by some well-meaning cavalry officer, who did not know that Popel was near Dubno.
Despite Popel’s fears, no serious efforts were undertaken against his force by Germans throughout the day. The Soviet attack was more effective than they realized. According to Gustav Schrodek: “Situation at Dubno became critical in the evening of June 28. Utilizing the available forces, including drivers and clerks, Russian attacks were repelled on the outskirts of town…. Until the situation in the rear was resolved, naturally, there was no thought of further advance by 11th Panzer Division.”[25]
VIII Mechanized Corps, Lt. Gen. D. I. Ryabyshev Commanding
In the early morning of June 28, the 7th Motorized Rifle Division under Colonel A. V. Gerasimov again tried to break through the German defenses along Plyashevka River, but was unsuccessful. By noon, Mishanin’s 12th Tank Division joined the 7th, but all attempts to link up with Popel’s group failed.
Around 1300 hours, the 7th Motorized Rifle Division, under Ryabyshev’s direct control, now only six miles from Popel, reached Plyashevka River. However, they could go no farther. German antitank defenses stopped the depleted Soviet units cold, and in some places they undertook successful local counterattacks.
German historian Werthen described an episode of this battle from the viewpoint of the 16th Panzer Division:
The main body of the enemy continued moving towards Kozin, later turning east. Only the 2nd Bn from 64th Motorized Infantry Regiment, reinforced by 11th Company of the same regiment; one company from 16th Antitank Battalion; and one battery of 88mm gun were destroying the enemy in the woods north and south of Tarnovka. The infantry companies took up initial positions on the edge of Tarnovka. 8th Company of 64th Motorized Infantry Regiment under Oberlietenant Muus attacked towards Ivani-Pusto village, with the objective to catch the enemy in a “vise” from the east. The soldiers from this company had a tough time fighting against a heavy Russian tank. These tanks constantly moved from one firing position to another, suppressing infantry and postponing the capture of the village. Still, approximately a battalion of Russian forces were caught in a “vise” and thrown back. However, they soon counterattacked with tanks, and the 64th was forced to return to initial position. Tarnovka was shaking from explosions of anti-tank grenades, homes were burning, all possible weapons were turned to destroying the tanks. The wind was spreading smoke and soot. One heavy infantry gun managed to knock out two medium tanks. The 5cm anti-tank guns were useless even at distance of 400 meters. More and more steel columns were entering Tarnovka, but soldiers of 16th Panzer Division held on tenaciously. One 88mm anti-tank gun in half an hour destroyed four tanks. When the attack was repelled, dead and wounded picked up, and smoke cleared, we could count 22 knocked-out tanks on the battlefield.[26]
Ryabyshev’s scouts reported the arrival of additional German units. Besides the 16th Motorized and 16th Panzer Divisions, the 75th and 111th Infantry divisions were now committed in the area of operations of Soviet VIII and XV Mechanized corps.
Germans began pressing their attacks harder, and the two weak Soviet divisions of the VIII Mechanized Corp were forced to go on the defensive. While German artillery pounded the forward Soviet positions and panzers and infantry pressed frontally, the German aviation was working over Soviet rear echelons. Taking advantage of the absence of virtually any interference from the Soviet air forces, the German aircraft pounded Soviet positions. Ryabyshev wrote: