Throughout the night, fighting in the area of the VIII Mechanized Corps was sporadic. The Germans mainly limited themselves to air attacks and some local probes, while bringing up more units from their infantry divisions. Ryabyshev’s main body maintained a low profile, preparing for the breakout that was to happen after dark.
The breakout attack began at 2200 hours. Twenty KV-1s and T-34s from the 12th Tank Division charged along both sides of the highway, puncturing a hole in the thin line of German outposts. Lighter Soviet tanks and dismounted riflemen from the same division followed in the wake of heavy tanks and expanded the breach to over two miles.
However, the German defenses quickly came alive, and a heavy artillery barrage fell on the Soviet troops escaping through the narrow gap. Following the lead elements, Ryabyshev’s and Mishanin’s tanks raced south slightly apart. Ryabyshev remembered seeing Mishanin’s tank suddenly burst in flames. Mishanin was the only person to make it out of the tank. Wobbling, he ran into the darkness. This was the last time Ryabyshev saw General Mishanin. He was reported killed, and his body was not recovered.
Ryabyshev himself narrowly escaped Mishanin’s fate. After making it through the German artillery barrage his tank had its “turret jammed, cannon barrel damaged. We counted sixteen direct hits on the armor. Luckily… the vehicle could move under its own power.”
Other than subjecting the retreating Soviet units to running the gauntlet of artillery barrage, the Germans did not pursue, and the rearguard 7th Motorized Rifle Division was able to retreat in good order. As one unit after another appeared out of the darkness, Ryabyshev directed them to the new defensive positions north of Radzivilov.
Unbeknown to Ryabyshev, two divisions from the XXXVI Rifle Corps, the 140th and 146th, sat idle along the Ikva River, less than ten miles from both Ryabyshev’s and Popel’s groups. Both of these divisions, given halfway active leadership and adequate knowledge of situation, could have been used to link up with the VIII Mechanized Corps and create a significant threat to Dubno. None of this was done, and two invaluable rifle divisions sat on their hands as spectators.
Task Force Popel at Dubno, Corps Commissar N. K. Popel Commanding
Throughout June 29, German forces attempted to push Popel’s task force from the Dubno-Brody highway and relieve pressure on the rear echelons of 11th Panzer Division. Popel, occupying a narrow strip of land roughly six miles long and two miles wide, jammed between the Brody-Dubno highway and the Ikva River, from Ptycha to Tarakanov, was surrounded by four German divisions. The 44th Infantry Division was north of it, the 111th Infantry Division firmly held Dubno and extended southeast, the 16th Panzer Division was pressing from the south, and the 57th Infantry Division was coming up from the west.
Despite severe pressure, Popel’s men hung on to their positions. Halder noted: “The Russian VIII Corps is bottled up. Some of their tanks seem to have run out of fuel; they are being dug in and used as pillboxes.”[5] Offensive capability of the 34th Tank Division, which comprised the core of Popel’s task force, was spent in fighting during the previous day. Sounds of combat coming from less than twenty miles away led Popel to believe that the rest of the VIII Mechanized Corps was attempting to link up with him. However, by the time the rumble of artillery died down in the south after midnight, Commissar Popel realized that his group was on its own. There was still one communications truck with a radio available to Popel. Unfortunately, he was not able to raise any Soviet unit.
Popel’s force still numbered over ten thousand men, an overwhelming majority of whom came from the VIII Mechanized Corps. In addition, several small detachments from other units that became separated from their commands linked up with Popel’s task force. Fortunately, at least for the immediate future, there was food—a small warehouse with flour was discovered at the Ptycha railroad station, and Popel’s supply officers put the local peasant women to work baking bread.
While dashing itself to pieces against a tightening German ring, the VIII Mechanized Corps caused consternation at German headquarters:
Army Group South reports still heavy fighting. On the right shoulder of Panzer Group 1, behind the sector of 11th Panzer Division, a deep penetration by Russian Eight Armored Corps in our lines apparently has caused a lot of confusion in the area between Brody and Dubno and temporarily threatens Dubno from the southwest. This would have been very undesirable in view of the large dumps at Dubno. Also in battle zone of Panzer Group 1, enemy elements with tanks are still active behind the front, sometimes even covering large distances.[6]
XV Mechanized Corps, Col. G. I. Yermolayev Commanding
The situation of the XV Mechanized Corps was temporarily threatened by the German reserve 9th Panzer Division moving past the northern flank of the Soviet Sixth Army. Its path lay straight at the undefended left flank of the XV Mechanized Corps. Fortunately, this corps was given orders on June 29 to begin pullback.
The vulnerable left flank of the XV Mechanized Corps was held by the 8th Tank Division detached from the IV Mechanized Corps. It fought a sharp rear-guard action with fresh German units, allowing the rest of the XV Corps to slip through the narrow gap between the 9th Panzer Division in the south and several German infantry divisions in the north.
Task Force Lukin at Ostrog, Lieutenant General Lukin Commanding
Throughout June 29 and lasting through July 2, General Lukin’s force, supported by direct fire from the 404th Artillery Regiment and the Heavy Armored Train #31, continued clinging to the area immediately east of Ostrog. Two Soviet battalions which became surrounded in Ostrog were not able to break out and were wiped out by the Germans. Lieutenant Colonel A. I. Podoprigora, shattered by horrific casualties suffered by his 381st Regiment, shot himself.
JUNE 30, 1941
South-Western Front, Colonel General Kirponos Commanding
In the early hours of June 30, Colonel Bagramyan received a telephone call from Proskurov informing him that the headquarters of the South-Western Front successfully completed the move and were ready to resume operations. It was time now for Bagramyan and his small detachment to follow suit.
The rain, which was intermittent on June 28, now was falling in sheets, and the dirt roads outside Tarnopol became difficult to navigate. Luckily, Bagramyan’s small convoy soon hit cobblestone-paved highway, and the going, although bumpy, became easier. It was roughly sixty miles from Tarnopol to Proskurov, and they made it there without incident until Bagrmayan’s ZIS-101 car, a mix of cloned 1932 Buick and 1935 Plymouth, hit a washed-out patch of road and slid into a ditch. Not having any means to extricate the vehicle themselves, Bagramyan hitched a ride on another vehicle in his convoy after leaving his driver and several men to wait for help.
Once in Proskurov, an important hub of several major roads, and reunited with the rest of the headquarters staff, Bagramyan was brought up to speed on the situation of the Fifth Army. Liaison officers who returned from the various corps of the Fifth Army reported that orders about the offensive on July 1 had been distributed, and measures were being taken to prepare for the offensive. Despite being under heavy German pressure, the Sixth, Twenty-Sixth, and Twelfth Armies from the Lvov pocket were falling back in relatively good order and taking up positions along the Brody-Zolochev-Berezhany line.