Soviet aviation, as attested by Gustav Schrodek, was continuing to operate a little more effectively. The IV Long-Range Bomber Corps under Col. V. A. Sudets was supporting operations of the South-Western Front. In the environment where Soviet fighter regiments took horrific losses, bomber aviation often had to operate without fighter support. This reflected in high casualty rates among bomber units: “The bombers flew without reliable [fighter] cover. Each time they were attacked by Fascist fighters and air-defense artillery. The [IV Air] Corps was suffering casualties, but time and time again the heavy planes would take to the air and fly east.”[7]
Several Soviet reconnaissance aircraft also managed to fly in daytime to the border and make it back with reports, a significant feat. Unsurprisingly, they reported continuous movements of follow-on German echelons crossing into the Soviet territory. Between 0700 hours and 1000 hours, reconnaissance flights also reported small German tank columns moving from Rovno area towards Ostrog.
Everybody at the headquarters of the South-Western Front by now realized how precarious situation at Ostrog was:
It was clear that if Task Force Lukin could not hold, the enemy will get far into the rear of the main forces of our Front. This threat concerned each of us. One thought underlined all conversations: the border battle was lost; the troops had to be pulled back to the line of the old fortified districts. But nobody dared to voice it out loud. Everyone understood that the fortified districts, located along the old state border, were still not ready to receive troops and provide a stiff defense.[8]
It was apparent that Stavka in Moscow evaluated the situation in the northern Ukraine along the similar lines. On this day, the Central Committee of the Communist Party created the State Defense Committee, GKO (Gosudarstvenniy Komitet Oborony). Josef Stalin, as expected, placed himself at the head of this newly created body, which now concentrated all the power in the USSR. Directives of the GKO became equal to laws and were to be obeyed and carried out by all individuals and organizations.
With the approval of the GKO, the Soviet High Command ordered Colonel General Kirponos to begin the withdrawal to the fortified districts deeper in Ukraine. These five districts, named after towns of Proskurov, Starokonstantinov, Shepetovka, Novograd-Volynskiy, and Korosten, represented the last chance of halting Army Group South before it reached Kiev. The withdrawal was to be accomplished by July 9.
Colonel Bagramyan remembered that staff officers at the headquarters of the South-Western Front could breathe easier. Everyone understood that withdrawal was necessary several days ago, but, he reported,
Those of us who had frequent contact with the Front commander during these days understood clearly that demands of [latest] orders—to withdraw to the line of old fortified districts—completely mirrored [Kirponos’] intentions. Only Kirponos’ inherent servility, some special convictions in not questioning orders, did not allow him to ask Moscow by himself about permission for such a pullback.[9]
Kirponos’ command group now feverishly set to planning for withdrawal. Before, the attack of the Fifth Army on July 1 was treated as an unnecessary evil—a sacrifice to the demands from Moscow. Now, the Fifth Army would be attacking to pin down the German advance, allowing the main forces of the South-Western Front begin their withdrawal.
While the strike force of the Fifth Army, namely the 41st Tank Division, would launch its lonely attack, other units would begin the pullback on staggered timetable. The XV Rifle Corps of the Fifth Army in the north and the Twelfth Army in the south were still located much farther west than the rest of the forces of the South-Western Front. These formations were to begin their retrograde movement during the night of June 30–July 1. The Sixth and Twenty-Sixth Armies were to move in their turn the next night. The retreat was to be conducted in stages, with each army defending intermediary positions in order to ensure smooth pullback and to slow down pursuing Germans.
One of the major difficulties facing the Soviet withdrawal was lack of strength in-depth. Kirponos, Purkayev, and Bagramyan clearly realized that if Germans pursued aggressively, which they were sure to do, any breach in the Soviet lines could lead to encirclement of other retreating formations. There were practically no reserves left to plug the gaps. While Purkayev and Bagramyan wanted to slow down the rate of retreat in order to allow Soviet forces to leap-frog one another on the way east, Kirponos insisted on withdrawing as fast as possible.
As an intermediate solution, each army was instructed to conduct a phased withdrawal as it saw fit. The Front-level reserves were to be formed from depleted IV, VIII, and XV Mechanized Corps, which received withdrawal orders a day earlier, and two rifle divisions from the XLIX Rifle Corps. Around midnight, the finalized orders, maps, and instructions were signed, and liaison officers were sent out to deliver them to their respective commands.
Bagramyan writes:
Before the war, why hide the sin, we were mainly practicing offensive operations. And to such an important maneuver as retreat, we did not assign appropriate significance. Now we were paying for it. Commanders and headquarters ended up being insufficiently prepared to organize and carry out retreat maneuvers. Now, during the second week of the war, we had to basically re-learn the most difficult science—the science of retreat.[10]
Below are excerpts from the situation overview section of orders issued in the evening of June 30 by Colonel General Kirponos to the forces of the South-Western Front:
1. Mobile enemy units, after fierce fighting, captured the area of Dubno, Ostrog, Rovno.
2. Armies of the South-Western Front are withdrawing by July 9th, 1941, to the line of Korosten, Novograd-Volynskiy, Shepetovka, Starokonstantinov, and Proskurov fortified districts; where, anchored on these fortified districts, [they] will organize a determined defense by field forces, paying particular attention to artillery and anti-tank means.
3. The 5th Army—previous composition, plus 196th Rifle Division of the 7th Rifle Corps.[11] While continuing cooperation with the 6th Army to liquidate the breakthrough in Rovno direction, organize strong defenses along the first line of Novograd-Volynskiy fortified district. The right flank of the army is to begin the withdrawal to the line of Sluch River. The withdrawal is to begin with nightfall on July 1st, 1941. [It is] to reach the line of Sluch River by morning of July 5th, 1941. The intermediate line of Styr River, Chartorysk, Tsuman, Klevan to be reached by midday on July 2nd, 1941, the intermediate line of Antonovka railroad station, Goryn River, Kostopol, Goryn River to be held until July 4th, 1941.[12]
After these orders were sent out, Kirponos listened to the report by General Sovetnikov, his deputy in charge of fortified districts. According to Sovetnikov, only Korosten, Novograd-Volynskiy, and Letichev fortified districts could be considered combat ready. They were occupied by small but permanent garrisons composed of machine-gun and artillery units. Upon arrival of field units, their defensive capability would rise drastically. As far as the other fortified districts were concerned, they were neither combat ready nor had sufficient garrisons and would have to be practically rebuilt anew.
Sovetnikov was seconded by chief of engineers of the South-Western Front, Gen. A. F. Ilyin-Mitkevich, who was in charge of reconstruction of the old fortified districts. He mentioned that even though the bunkers and strong-points were being taken out of mothballs, there were no weapons for them. Ilyin-Mitkevich expressed hope that the retreating field units would be able to deploy their organic weapons there.[13]