Looking at the combat reports which we received from him, it was obvious that the command of the 6th Army did not even approximately know situation of its neighbors. Corps commanders, out of contact with the army headquarters and not receiving regular information about neighbors’ situation, were acting without cooperation, on their own responsibility.
In order to plug up this serious development, Kirponos committed his last reserves—the two rifle divisions of the XLIX Rifle Corps and the XXIV Mechanized corps. The XXIV Mechanized Corps set up its positions in the area of Volochiysk, directly across the Tarnopol-Proskurov highway. The XLIX Rifle Corps took up positions along the line of Yampol-Teofil-Ulyanovo.
The Nineteenth Army, which was supposed to occupy and defend the immediate vicinity of Kiev, was ordered north to Byelorussia.[9] In case the Germans would achieve a significant breakthrough at Tarnopol and head for Kiev, orders were sent to the military commandant of Kiev garrison to take rapid measures in manning and arming the Kiev Fortified District. Nikita S. Khrushchev departed Kirponos’ headquarters in order to personally oversee preparations to defend Kiev.
Muzychenko’s Sixth Army was in dire straits, its planned orderly withdrawal disintegrating into a series of desperate rear-guard actions and breakouts from encirclements into which the front lines of the Sixth Army fractured. The IV Mechanized Corps under Maj. Gen. Andrey A. Vlasov conducted a series of stubborn rear-guard fights, allowing various parts of the Sixth Army to fight their way clear. The XXXVI Rifle Corps, along with the 14th Cavalry Division, after suffering heavy casualties, finally broke out of its encirclement and headed for the Yampol area, attempting to link up with the left flank of the IVIX Rifle Corps. The XXXVII Rifle Corps was barely hanging on to its positions in the area of Noviki-Ivachuv. The VI Rifle Corps and the 3rd Cavalry Division were surrounded in the area of Tarnopol, and there were no news from them. A counterattack of the 10th Tank Division from the XV Mechanized Corps temporary slowed down the Germans at Tarnopol. The rest of the XV Mechanized Corps continued retreating from the city. The Twelfth and Twenty-Sixth armies were falling behind the Sixth Army, creating another gap, this one on the left flank of the Sixth Army. Approach of the Germans towards Proskurov itself forced Kirponos to order evacuation of Front’s headquarters to Zhitomir.[10]
Task-Force Lukin, Ostrog
While the attack of the Fifth Army allowed its rear echelons orderly retreat and prevented the Germans from conducting their own offensive operations, the outcome of the border battle was clear. At Ostrog, the makeshift task force under General Lukin, bled dry after accomplishing all that it could, was at its strength’s end. It was now not the question of “if” the Germans could break into the operational maneuver areas east of Ostrog, but “how soon.” Behind Lukin lay almost-undefended Shepetovka with its convenient highway and railroad nexus.
Still, Gustav Schrodek readily admitted that his 11th Panzer Division continued to have a difficult time with Lukin’s group:
During the afternoon of July 1, the 11th Panzer Division was still in the tough, embittered fight defending the Ostrog bridgehead. As a strong thunderstorm turned all roads into a morass, the raging four-daylong tank battle between Dubno and Werba came to an end. All enemy attacks broke down despite Russian partial materiel superiority of tank equipment and willingness to fight despite bloody losses.[11]
At this critical time, General Lukin was called away by Moscow to rejoin his Sixteenth Army on the Western Front. Bagramyan described the effect Lukin’s recall had on his task force: “At this time we realized that everything was hinging on willpower and energy of this man. He was gone, and his heroic depleted group, which for a whole week pinned down huge enemy forces, practically ceased to exist as a military formation. Its component units were absorbed into the Fifth Army.”[12]
Bagramyan further noted that Kirponos was planning to replace Lukin’s group with the VII Rifle Corps, which was being transferred from the Southern Front. However, two rifle divisions of this corps did not arrive in Shepetovka area in time. The XLIX Rifle Corps under command of Maj. Gen. I. A. Kornilov, one of the last available reserve units, was ordered to proceed in all haste from Volochiysk, east of Proskurov, to take up positions in the Izyaslav and Starokonstantinov fortified districts.
On July 2 Lt. Gen. D. I. Ryabyshev’s VIII Mechanized Corps arrived in Proskurov. The retreat there was conducted under difficult conditions along the road from Tarnopol. The march was led by the 7th Motorized Rifle Division, followed by the corps headquarters and rear echelons, with the rear brought up by the battered 12th Tank Division.
Ryabyshev recorded one episode of the aftermath of an attack by German aviation:
Enemy dive bombers periodically appeared in the air. After dropping bombs, they would fly along the column, strafing it with machine guns. Our planes were nowhere to be seen. The whole burden of fighting the enemy aircraft fell on antiaircraft artillery and machine guns. After noon, a column moving ahead of us suddenly stopped. Five, ten minutes went by, and we were still standing.
We could hear shell explosions. Sensing something wrong, I hurried forward in my KV and soon saw four burning trucks loaded with shells. These shells would explode, terrifying the poor refugees. It was impossible to go around these vehicles: an impassable swamp stretch for almost a mile to the right and a relatively high hill with steep slope rose up to the left. There was no time to wait until the vehicles would completely burn out and shells stop exploding. Only the tanks would be able to climb the mountain; the wheeled vehicle would not have made it. The column could not remain on the road for long—the enemy bombers could return at any moment. Before I had a chance to make a decision, I heard from my driver:
“Quickly, Comrade General, close your hatch!”
I lowered myself into the turret and closed the hatch tightly. KV, picking up speed, charged the burning vehicles. The distance rapidly shrunk. Another moment—and tank hit with its armored chest one truck, then second one, third one…. The vehicles flew in all directions. The shells stopped exploding. The traffic jam disappeared.
In the heat of the moment, I bawled out the driver for his risky stunt, totally without my consent. At a later date I appreciated his initiative and bravery and was sorry that I did not put him in for an award. At that difficult time, under the influence of difficulties and failures, the ability to appreciate bravery became numb.
After liquidating the traffic jam, the troops and refugees continued on. I decided to reach the head of the 7th Motorized Rifle Division’s column, but it wasn’t that easy. The enemy aviation constantly bombed us. Vehicles and refugees’ wagons were constantly breaking down. The infantrymen… would push into the ditches the damaged vehicles, wagons, dead horses and continue the march.[13]
Shortly before Proskurov, Ryabyshev’s column linked up with column of wounded which Popel sent out with Pleshakov.
After making his report to General Purkayev, Ryabyshev received his next set of orders—to move to Kazatin to rest and reorganize. With great difficulty, Ryabyshev and his staff officers managed to cobble together a train and load his 134 tanks and 5 tractors.[14]