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Conclusion

Accordingto S. F. Platonov's classic account ofthe Time ofTroubles, the social groups at both the top and bottom of Russian society lost out at the expense of the middle strata. The old princely-boyar aristocracy was totally discredited, first by Vasilii Shuiskii's attempt to establish an oligarchic regime and then by the boyars' collaboration with the Poles. At the other end of the spectrum, the cossacks and the fugitive peasants and slaves who swelled their ranks also suffered a defeat with the suppression of Zarutskii's movement. The 'middle classes' - the ordinary servicemen and the more prosperous townsmen, who liberated Moscow from the Poles and elected Michael Romanov as their tsar at the Assembly of the Land - emerged victorious.[378] Recent scholarship has, however, questioned several of Platonov's conclusions, contesting in particular his claim that the position of the old aristocracy was significantly weakened as a result of the Troubles.[379]

Perhaps the most remarkable consequence of the Time of Troubles was the fact that the autocratic monarchical system survived more or less unchanged from the late sixteenth century, with no significant new restrictions on the power of the tsar. It is highly revealing that the conflicts of the early seven­teenth century were fought out under the banners of competing claimants for the throne, rather than of competing types of monarchy. Of course the various candidates represented different styles and systems of rule; but they all based their claims to the throne on their legitimacy as the 'true' tsar rather than on any programme of social or political reform. The basis of legitimacy was contested (hereditary versus elective), but not the autocratic nature of monarchical rule itself. The dynastic crisis of 1598, occurring as it did in a system based on hereditary succession, gave rise to the First False Dmitrii; and his triumphs in their turn inspired new pretenders. The proliferation of cossack 'tsareviches', however, and the killing and looting committed by their followers, served to discredit pretence in the eyes of most ordinary Rus­sians. After the Time of Troubles, no further Russian samozvanets was able to obtain the type of broad social support which had accrued to the first two False Dmitriis: later pretenders who achieved any significant backing did so almost exclusively from the lower classes, and from cossacks and peasants in particular.

unlawful seventh wife'. It is quite possible that Godunov was hatching some kind of plan to dispose of the tsarevich and his kin.27 But if he had intended to murder Dmitrii, May 1591 was not the most appropriate time to make the attempt. In April and May there was worrying news that the Crimean khan was preparing to invade, and things were not entirely calm in the capital in the spring of 1591. In general we do not have sufficiently strong arguments either to reject or to confirm the findings of the report of the Uglich investigation, and the question of the circumstances of Tsarevich Dmitrii's death remains an open one.

In May 1592 the court ceremoniously celebrated the birth of a daughter - Tsarevna Fedos'ia - to Tsar Fedor and Tsaritsa Irina. But the tsarevna died on

25 January 1594, before her second birthday (see Table 11.1). Her death clearly

revealed that the ruling dynasty was facing a crisis, and it made the question of the succession urgent. The Godunovs blatantly promoted their claims to the throne. From the middle of the 1590s Boris began to involve his son Fedor in affairs of state. But Boris Godunov was not the only candidate for the throne. His former allies, the Romanovs, stood in his way. Their advantage lay in the fact that Tsar Fedor himself had Romanov blood (from Tsar Ivan's marriage to Anastasiia Romanovna). As Fedor's brother-in-law, Boris Godunov could not boast a blood relationship with the tsar. Gradually the Romanovs advanced themselves at court and acquired influential positions in the duma. Around them there gathered a close-knit circle oftheir kinsmen and supporters. From

27 Dzhil's Fletcher, OgosudarstveRusskom (St Petersburg: A. S. Suvorin, 1906), p. 21; cf. Berry and Crummey, Rude and Barbarous Kingdom, p. 128.

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378

Platonov, Ocherki [4th edn], pp. 429-33.

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379

A. P. Pavlov, 'Gosudarev dvor v istorii Rossii XVII veka', FOG 56 (2000): 227-42; Dunning, Russia's First Civil War, pp. 461-80.