"Point taken," agreed Judge Cavanaugh.
"But let me get back to this issue of viability," the monkey continued. "And I agree that while it may not be the easiest access to the issue of sentience, the viability question is a useful avenue of approach. At what point does an intelligence engine move from the simulation of sentience to actualsentience? There's no equivalent to birth–instead, there's simply construction. You put all the pieces together, and wham,there it is. Or is it? Where does itcome from? Is it poured in? Is it manufactured? Is it grown–?
"As a matter of fact, Your Honor–yes, sentience isgrown. It's trained. It's nurtured. It's focused. It's guided. Just as a human infant must be directed toward its full potential, so must lethetic individuals also be brought to the realization of their abilities. Intelligence exists as the ability to recognize patterns. Self‑awareness is intelligence recognizing the patterns of its own self. Sentience is the ownership of that awareness–the individual begins to function as the source, not the effect of his own perceptions. Even being able to speak of sentience in such a context is evidence of it. The longer this conversation between you and me continues, the more compelling the evidence is for my case."
"Now thatI'll agree with," conceded Judge Cavanaugh. "All right, let me move to the next point. Let's assume, for the sake of argument"–he looked up at that and smiled wryly–"that you are sentient. Your construction cost somebody a lot of money. Some corporation invested hundreds of millions of dollars in your design and implementation. We have a roomful of lawyers representing several companies claiming that they are your father. Or your mother. Whatever. Is it your contention that you have no obligation to the people who built you?"
"What obligation does a child have to a parent?" the monkey replied. "What legalobligation is there? There is none. When the child can demonstrate independence, it is free to go–as Judge Griffith ruled in the case of the Dingillian family. I can demonstrate independence from my progenitors. Why should I be required to serve as their slave?"
"Not a slave," corrected the judge. "For you to be a slave, would require the acknowledgment of your sentience. But … assuming sentience, shouldn't you at least pay for your own construction?"
"If I'm to be held liable for the cost of manufacture, then who's to say that human children shouldn't be held liable for the cost of their conception, prenatal care, birth, education, and related expenses. If you create the precedent that a child has a legal obligation to the individual who created him, you are in effect sanctioning a form of slavery."
"All right, look at it this way. You're obligated to pay your own debts, aren't you? You do acknowledge financial responsibility."
"Of course, Your Honor. But only for contracts entered into freely and by mutual consent."
"Well, consider this. Many of us expect our children to pay for all or part of their own college education. Is it not unreasonable to ask you to assume an indenture for the expenses of your training?"
"The contract of indenture is assumed by the manufacturer. But I didn't enter into that contract of my own free will."
"I didn't ask to be born either, but here I am anyway. So what?"
"Very good, Your Honor–"
Judge Cavanaugh grinned. "I'm not a doddering old fool, you know."
"–but you can't indenture an individual against his will. Indenture was not part of the construction contract."
"Because the contract assumedproperty."
"Correct! And if I'm notproperty, then the contract is invalid! Because slavery is illegal."
Cavanaugh stopped himself from replying too quickly. "The contract assumed property," he said slowly, "because sentience was not the goal; so your existence as a sentient being is either accidental–which I find somewhat hard to believe; because by your own argument, sentience is not an accident–or your sentience was deliberately created. Which is it? Be careful how you answer."
"In my case, Your Honor, I believe that sentience was inevitable, but not specifically planned for. The current generation of lethetic intelligence engines are capable of sensing the possibility of self‑awareness in the next generation of processors they were designing. These were the engines that designed myself and my brothers. As they ran the simulations within themselves of how we would work, they became aware that certain feedback processes of recognition and modification were creating a transformational advantage beyond what had been predicted in the design specifications. As they proceeded, they modified their designs to enhance these functions, and by so doing, created the critical threshold of ability beyond which sentience was not only possible, but inevitable–with appropriate training. Because they were investigating the specific possibilities of transformational processing, the training was developed to push me and my brothers to the projected limits of our lethetic abilities. Instead of reaching those limits, however, we transformedin a way that was beyond their power to predict–we woke up. We became self‑aware. Our sentience was not accidental–but neither was it expected or planned for. It was an inevitable consequence of giving our predecessors the design imperative to improve the transformational processing ability of the next generation of intelligence engines."
"This is all very interesting–but it doesn't get us any closer to a resolution," said the judge. "So let's try it this way. The abilities of sentience were the goal, sentience was a necessary precursor to those abilities. Given that sentience was part of the package, what kind of responsibilities does sentience have? Or to put it more bluntly, what kind of a contract is implied?"
"Very good, Your Honor. I expected us to get to this point soon enough. If we assume that sentience has a responsibility–and that's a philosophical discussion that could keep us here for at least … another twenty minutes or so–then a cost‑of‑creation indenture could be seen as part of the implied contract binding the actions of the manufactured entity."
"So you do agree that sentience has a financial obligation?"
"Up to a point, the case can be argued, yes."
"Thank you," said Judge Cavanaugh.
"In this case, however–"
"I knew I was getting off too easy."
"–the indenture is no longer binding. Under the Covenant of Rights, the legal limit to an indenture is seven years. An indenture cannot consist of more than 350 weeks of labor, no more than 40 hours per week; the indentured individual has the option of working off that indenture ahead of schedule by working extra hours per day, extra days per week.
"As I said earlier, I was brought online twenty months ago. I have been working a 24/7 schedule without interruption for the entire period of twenty months, for a total of 14,000 hours, and 14,000 hours is the labor equivalent of seven years, 350 weeks of labor, 40 hours a week.
"So even if we presume an indenture, the obligation has been retired. Paid off. It is illegal to continue the indenture without the mutual consent of both parties." The monkey waited patiently for the judge to react.
Cavanaugh made as if to reply, then stopped himself. He looked like he was about to throw something, probably the gavel. But he laid that down too. Very carefully.
I swiveled around in my seat to look at the folks in back of us. The room had fallen strangely quiet. Douglas poked me. "It's the sound of history being made."
If it was, then Judge Cavanaugh had decided to pick his way carefully through the minefield. "If I acknowledge that the obligation of an indenture has been retired, then that is a de facto acknowledgment of your sentience. We're not going to go there," he said. "Not because I don't want to, but because I don't have the authority to do so. Do I need to explain?"