A further ruse to put them off the scent was the organizing of a fancy dress party at a hall ashore. It was getting round to the traditional German masked carnival before Lent — Fasching. Not only were members of the German women's services in Brest all organizing their Fasching costumes, but a number of French officials and their families were invited to this party.
Captain Hoffmann went out of his way to tell the German women at Brest that he hoped they would make this "Fasching" a success. Women always have new frocks for Fasching and Hoffmann urged them, "Go ahead. Buy the material!" Later he was to add with a chuckle, "But we had our Kostüm Ball at sea."
Further to confuse the enemy, names of officers invited to dine with Admiral Saalwächter in Paris on 11 February and attend a shooting party to be given by him the next day at Rambouillet were collected in the wardrooms of the three ships. The hunting party was to be an elaborate affair. With all the formality of peacetime, Admiral Saalwächter sent out printed invitations to thirty selected officers in Brest,' and they accepted the invitations to dine with him in Paris at 8 p.m. on Wednesday, 11 February. To lend even more authenticity, sporting rifles were obtained and ostentatiously brought on board. Many of the French people ashore were aware that this party was to be held.
Another stratagem was the boarding of a detachment of the Naval Coastal Guns with their 20-mm quadruple mounted guns. Each detachment wore grey army uniform, but instead of the usual army buttons they had gold buttons with anchors on them. As these were shore-defence gun crews, which did not go to sea, it was hoped enemy agents would take their presence on board as a sign that the battleships would remain permanently in port. They were in fact extra flak guns intended to be used against the RAF in the break-out.
Although the final plan became known as Operation Cerberus, six code names were also applied to it at various stages to confuse British agents.
While these secret preparations went on, the RAF were still very active. On 1 February, an air attack destroyed 300 German seamen's billets in Brest, but there were no casualties.
Next day, Admiral Saalwächter issued a six-page Operation instruction from Paris. They were sent to Ciliax, Ruge, Captain Bey, commander of destroyers, and Luftwaffe Col. Galland.
The instruction was headed:
"Task: Break-through the Channel by the Brest Group—Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen under the command of the C-in-C Vice-Admiral Ciliax. Homewards in the new moon period. The task is to be executed, even if on the day of the issue of the code-word only one battleship is operational. "Forces Participating:
"Ships: Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Prinz Eugen—in Brest. "Destroyers: Beitzen, Jacobi, Ihn, Schoemann, Z25, Z29—in Brest.
"Torpedo Boats: 2nd Torpedo Flotilla with T.2, T.4, T.5, T.11, T.12—in Le Havre.
3rd Torpedo Flotilla with T.13, T.14, T.15, T.16, T.17—in Dunkirk.
5th Torpedo Flotilla with Kondor, Falke, Seeadler, Iitis, Jaguar—in Flushing. E-Boats: 2nd, 4th, 6th Flotillas.
"With respect of navigation, the most favourable period for executing the task extends from the 10th to the 15th of February. Earliest period for setting-off is the 10th of February.
"Commanders of Torpedo boats, E-boat-Flotillas, Channel Coast and Commandant of the Sea Defence Pas de Calais are receiving sealed orders which are to be opened at the last moment.
"Should proceeding to sea be delayed for a short time by air attack, the Task is to be put into operation. If the delay is more than two hours do not proceed. Report immediately to Group West. Proceed again after new issue of code-word.
"Should the Squadron leaving Brest on a correct west course, or in the direction of Ushant on a north-westerly course be recognized by enemy aircraft alter course. Then fresh start of the under-taking on the basis of new code-word issue.
"Should the Squadron be discovered by the enemy after passing Ushant on a north-east or easterly course, hold on.
"The decision rests with the C-in-C or with Group West. It will be based on messages picked up by the Interception of Enemy Messages Air Warning Service (B-Dienst). Group West is to be speedily advised about any move to return by the Squadron so that all other ports involved can be instructed accordingly and the secrecy of the project securely maintained.
"C-in-C of Western Security Forces: The Commander-in-Chief of Western Security[2] proposes distribution of security vessels. Assistance in case of breakdown included. Running in to ports of refuge is to be allowed for. The Commander-in-Chief[3] and the air fleet will be instructed by Group West about the distribution.
"The Destroyer Flotilla Leader has to provide according to the weather situation: On the deadline night a feint undertaken by an E-boat group in the vicinity of Dungeness-Beachy Head.
"Coastal Batteries: The long-range batteries in the Pas de Calais Sea Commandant's sector are receiving orders to hold down by their own fire, as much as possible, any enemy batteries which open fire on the Squadron. The coast will be informed about the undertaking as far as is necessary under sealed orders.
"Harbours of Refuge: The ports of Cherbourg and Le Havre are provided as ports of refuge in the Group West sector. Moorings and berth descriptions were handed out to the C-in-C. No special preparations for receiving the ships are being made. The Channel coast will not receive instructions for freeing the mooring berths until X-night.
"Holding back through Breakdown: If a ship, destroyer or boat, drops out or reduces speed in consequence of the effects of enemy action, or of technical trouble, the Squadron is to continue to go ahead without stopping. The C-in-C will dispatch vessels suitable to the position that has arisen, in support.
"Vessels will be brought up as quickly as possible by the C-in-C of Western Security according to the position.
"As a general principle, the ships should strive to continue the progress eastwards, so long as their speed is not hopelessly reduced.
"Any ships damaged that are capable of movement, are to try by all means to reach the nearest harbour of refuge."
By the first week in February Paris had detailed all the forces necessary to cover the three battleships. The destroyers and torpedo boats were all lying in their allotted ports.
Ciliax had to carry out the operation as Group West had decided in. their secret instructions. He had his share of the detailed planning and was responsible for carrying it out— and if anything went wrong he was the man who would be blamed.
But in spite of the busy, cleverly disguised preparations, one nagging fhought persisted in Ciliax's head. Was noon the most favourable time for them to sail through the maximum danger zone, the Straits of Dover?
English coastal radar stations were thought to have a range of less than thirty-five miles and as they steamed up the Western Channel they might be out of range. But radar detection would not matter as they sailed through the narrow Straits off the French coast for, if the weather was fine, they would be clearly visible to watchers with telescopes on the Kent cliffs.
The Royal Navy and RAF were certain to launch a mass attack in the Straits of Dover. Group West planners summed up the Dover position like this: "At first glance it appears tempting to pass this point at night under the cover of darkness. Yet this would have the disadvantage that the ships would have to leave Brest in the forenoon and steam through the Channel in broad daylight. It would give the British air reconnaissance warning in good time. They will not only get ready their torpedo and bomber aircraft and MTB flotillas in the Straits, but might also bring their large units from Scapa Flow. Our presence at night is certain to become known so we must go through there in daylight when we can best defend ourselves."