Colonel Galland had brought up 280 aircraft for the air umbrella. Fuel reserves were held ready at French coastal airfields and new temporary air strips had been laid out. The liaison between Ibel's Luftwaffe officers aboard the ships and the fighter cover had been fully and finally tested. General Martini's powerful radar installations strung along the English Channel coast were ready to paralyse the British radar by jamming.
It looked as if they were to have the best conditions — a strong tidal current running with the ships. The meteorologist also predicted low cloud and haze along the Channel.
With everything prepared and the weather forecast proving ideal, Ciliax decided to go ahead. At noon he called Captains Helmuth Brinkmann of Prinz Eugen and Otto Fein of Gneisenau to join Captain Kurt Hoffmann and himself in the Admiral's cabin aboard Scharnhorst.
Once again he reiterated to them the importance of following Group West's instructions to the letter. There was little chance any of them would not do so as these secret orders appealed to their temperament. They were a model of meticulous planning with little scope for personal initiative. Ciliax said, "It is a bold and unheard of operation for the German Navy. It will succeed if these orders are strictly obeyed. There is no margin for interpretation. They must be adhered to at all times. Ships will sail in the following order— Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen—with escort forces taking station outside harbour in accordance with their instructions.
"Do not seek combat, but only engage the enemy if the operation cannot otherwise be carried out. The task of proceeding eastwards quickly is paramount."
Then he ordered champagne and they drank to the success of "Operation Cerberus." After the toast he said farewell to his commanders and wished them good luck before they returned to their ships'
Despite his champagne toasts to the operation's success, Ciliax remained privately pessimistic. He had not changed the view he expressed in his memoranda to Admiral Saalwächter. He did not mind the fact that Group West's orders left him no room for manoeuvre, but he privately thought the operation had at best only a chance of partial success.
So that afternoon after the Captains had left, he sat down and wrote the following entry in his log:
"I want to take this opportunity to make the following observations to give my point of view upon the completion of preparations so long planned. I no longer regard the withdrawal from Brest as absolutely necessary. The danger from the air is not so great now we have flak fighters, camouflage, barrage balloons and artificial fog.
"It also appears that the enemy has come to the same opinion. Although his air-force still comes over by day and night, the flak defence in its full strength, supported by the fog apparatus, considerably reduces the effectiveness of attack.
"Random hits are of course possible and must be taken into account, but this is really only a matter of chance. Therefore Brest must be regarded as a usable base in its present state of defence, especially taking into consideration that the shipyards are able to meet all possible requirements. Long-term missions such as were undertaken in the spring of 1941 cannot be mounted again, but local sorties can be carried out in co-operation with the Luftwaffe or with U-boat reconnaissance. These can lead to noticeable successes against north-south convoys and in the sea area west of Gibraltar.
"Against this, we must reckon all the imponderables inherent in sailing through the Channel. If the break-out in the Channel does succeed we must reckon with damage which the ships concerned will suffer. This may mean they will only be operational again after a considerable time.
"I do not venture an opinion as to the strong strategic threat to the Norwegian zone. Accordingly, I cannot give a judgement as to the necessity of the defensive operational role of the ships on the Norwegian coast and in the North Sea.
"In this situation the decision of the Führer is clear and unequivocable. We now have to be employed in a new role. But it must be stated that operating from a base without repair yards, such as Trondheim or Narvik, will bring with it very great dangers. Transfer of the battleships to be repaired in German ports brings the possibility of danger, and in air defence none of the Norwegian ports equal Brest. Aircraft-carriers could approach and long-distance bombers attack, since the local Luftwaffe forces in Norway have not got the same defensive capacity.
"Heavy enemy forces now being held down will be reduced particularly in the North Atlantic and on the main convoy routes to Gibraltar. The move from the Atlantic port of Brest will have an unfavourable effect on the strategic position, freeing enemy forces for redeployment in the Mediterranean and the Far East. Against this, the occasional operations in the Norwegian zone will produce different defensive problems hard to solve. If the enemy really attacks Norway with heavy forces we can no longer reckon with our own superiority. On the extended coastline, it will be impossible to give a decisive warning of the approach of an invasion fleet or to intervene effectively against landings.
"Even small raids cannot always be hindered and the pressure of the British to attack our heavy ships will not let up. From the beginning the employment of our surface forces has always been offensive. In spite of the numerical inferiority of our ships, they gave us success because the unexpected led us to our objective. This principal is now being given up and the battleships employed in a defensive task, which means that the initiative will remain with the enemy.
"In conclusion I would like to express the hope that the decision to evacuate our heavy ships with great difficulty from the Atlantic position will find justification in the future development of the war situation."
A few hours after writing this dissenting report he put to sea as ordered by the Führer.
As darkness fell on the evening of X-day, 11 February 1942, the warships' boiler-room fans roared as steam pressure was raised. At 6 p.m. the usual rush before leaving port prevailed on all ships. The order was given: "Prepare to proceed on exercise." The orders were to carry out exercises between La Pallice and St. Nazaire during the 12th, and return to Brest the following night.
This was the "secret" order given to the ships, the destroyers, and the port authorities, as tugs with their red, green and white navigation lights fussed across the harbour ready to tow the big ships from their berths. Boats were lowered and landed to the yard. Telephone, steam lines and other connections with the shore were disconnected. Everyone except a few senior officers believed they were preparing for a night exercise due to start at 7:30 p.m. At 7:25 p.m. the German ships had doubled their mooring ropes in readiness for slipping, and hauled in the hawsers from the tugs. The weather was fine with a fresh northerly breeze.
The binnacle light glowed in the darkness revealing shad-owy figures moving on Scharnhorst's bridge. They were Captain Hoffinann with his navigating officer Helmuth Giessler. "Sir, it's seven-thirty p.m.," a signalman reported to the Captain who gave an order for the mooring ropes to be lipped. Tugs began to churn the water.
Signals from Scharnhorst were about to blink sailing orders when the Brest sirens howled. The RAF had arrived. Within seconds, the alarm bells—Glöcken—were ringing in the ships, it was a nerve-racking situation. The battleships were lying with steam up and tugs alongside. Worse still, in order not to interfere with fire control and gunnery practice on the pre-prended "exercise," the elaborate camouflage netting had been removed and rolled up on the jetty. This left the ships at the mercy of flashlight bombs from BAF planes. To avert this dangerous situation, artificial fog was hastily churned out by dock-side apparatus. Everyone began choking as they breathed in the filthy stuff. Captain Brinkmann on the bridge of Prinz Eugen took a mouthful of the fog and had a paroxysm of coughing.