The Germans heard him. The German B-Dienst listening service picked up his message, and informed Col. Adolf Galland at Le Touquet, that "A British radio message reports a large German naval formation consisting of three capital ships and about twenty warships is steaming towards the Straits of Dover."
At last the secret was out. The decision for giving the order to drop all attempts at disguising the operation lay with Galland. But he refused to be driven to rash measures by this alarming message. He continued to observe radio silence to keep the operation hidden from the British.
For he suspected that the RAF would not believe one lone message. The wisdom of his decision was proved by the fact that the first counter-measures were not taken by the British command for another hour. Galland says, "It appears the British gave no credence to the reports. They simply sent up another reconnaissance plane and ordered a full alert. An hour later, the second aircraft brought confirmation of the feat which had been regarded as impossible."
Meanwhile Oxspring and Beaumont were racing back to base. It only took them eight minutes to return to Hawkinge from over the German fleet. When Beaumont climbed out of his cockpit, he said thoughtfully to Oxspring, "You know, before I became a pilot I used to be in the RAF marine craft section on the Solent. I am certain one of those ships is the Scharnhorst, I saw her at a pre-war review. I recognize her superstructure."
Oxspring was immediately called to the phone in the briefing hut, where Controller Bill Igoe asked, "What's all this, Bobby?" He told him the story — not the least puzzling feature being the presence of two other unknown Spitfires, which no one could account for.
Igoe, who had been convinced for hours the German battleships were coming up the Channel, but no one had taken any notice, suggested Oxspring get on the phone to tell 11 Group at once. He said he would listen-in so as not to waste time repeating his information. While Oxspring was telephoning 11 Group, the Intelligence Officer sent for a book of silhouettes of German ships. The man sent on his bicycle to bring the silhouette, book stopped at the NAAFI for a cup of tea on his way back, wasting another precious fifteen minutes. When he did arrive Beaumont leafed through the recognition book until he came to Scharnhorst.
"That's the ship I saw," he said emphatically. He was certain that his memory of the tripod mast and superstructure of the Scharnhorst was correct. The only doubt was that as visibility had been obscured by rain, he did not have a very clear view. In spite of the fact his identification was almost certain most people, except Igoe, tended to discount Beaumont's theory.
When Oxspring and Igoe tried to speak personally to the Air officer commanding 11 Group, Air Vice-Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory, they discovered he was at Northolt reviewing Belgian air force units, and his staff officers would not interrupt him. The attitude of 11 Group was, "We are not going to bother the AOC. You saw some fishing boats. Send out another recce."
More and more convinced that it was the Scharnhorst, both Igoe and Oxspring asked for a message to be passed at once to Leigh-Mallory. When he was told that he was on parade and not available, Oxspring said, "I suggest you tell him. He'll be livid if he's not told." But no one did.
While they were frantically trying to pass a message to Leigh-Mallory, Beamish and Boyd were flying back to Kenley — much farther away than Hawkinge. As they preserved radio silence, another thirty-five minutes passed before they could confirm Oxspring's sighting.
Beamish landed at Kenley at 11:10 a.m., and also immediately tried to get on the telephone to Leigh-Mallory to tell him the news. He too was unsuccessful, but he told Biggin Hill. A few minutes later Igoe came back on the phone to Oxspring and said, "Group Captain Beamish with Wing-Cdr. Boyd were in the other two Spitfires. They confirm what you say. It is the Scharnhorst." At the same time, other evidence was building up. Five minutes after Flt.-Lt. Kidd had managed to phone Dover via Portsmouth, the radar at Fairlight just east of Hastings picked up two big ships at 67,000 yards in the vicinity of Boulogne. This was a record for that type of set — and it confirmed Kidd's plot.
When this report reached Wing-Cdr. Bobby Constable-Roberts, Air Liaison officer on Admiral Ramsay's staff, whose job was to keep in constant touch with Fighter Command's Number 11 Group and Coastal Command's 16 Group, he picked up the telephone and asked 11 Group for a special reconnaissance over the Boulogne area. Number 11 again refused, saying it was unnecessary. Constable-Roberts then telephoned to warn 16 Group at Thorney Island saying, "It might be our friends out in the Channel."
He suggested that the Beaufort Squadron at St. Eval, and 42 Squadron on its way from Leuchars to Coltishall, should be alerted and ordered to fly directly to Manston. But he had no authority to order it.
At 11:05 a.m., although the RAF and the Navy were still unconvinced these were the German battleships, Constable-Roberts telephoned Manston and told Lt.-Cdr. Eugene Es-monde to put his six Swordfish on readiness. This was the first decisive step taken by the British armed forces to intercept the Scharnhorst and Gneisenaus daring dash. It was made by a junior Wing Commander.
At 11:30 a.m., when the coast-watching radar set at Lydden Spout between Dover and Folkestone, picked up a plot at a range of 46,000 yards, Beamish was trying again to reach Leigh-Mallory, who was still unavailable. Three times a staff officer came to the phone, and each time Beamish refused to talk to him. It was nearly another half-hour before Leigh-Mallory eventually came to the phone. He was in a very bad temper at being pestered personally on the phone by a mere Group Captain — he was a very rank-conscious officer — but he began to listen carefully when Beamish confirmed Sergeant Beaumont's identification. Only then was Leigh-Mallory convinced and the RAF issued a signaclass="underline" "Group-Captain Beamish was with 'Jim Crow' so there is no doubt." It was 11:35 a.m. An hour had passed since Oxspring had radioed his first urgent warning from over the German ships in the Channel.
At the same time, Dover Command was officially informed of the break-out by telephone from the Admiralty War Room. Immediately, Constable-Roberts asked Number 11 Group for fighters to protect the Swordfish. Then he rang Esmonde at Manston and told him what he had done. Victor Beamish also telephoned from Kenley to the Manston commander, Tom Gleave, saying, "It's 'Fuller,' Tom!"
Although the day had started out with some sunshine, it turned progressively to cloud and rain as the German ships raced up the mine-free lane in the Channel. They were approaching the Straits of Dover and still the British had taken no measures to stop them. Navigator Giessler aboard Scharnhorst looked at his synchronized watch. It showed 11:45 a.m. Galland was still maintaining wireless silence. So messages could not be sent between the ships and the Luftwaffe pilots. A flag that now began to fly constantly on the ships was the yellow square flag of the aircraft alarm signal, billowing against a grey sky alive with patrolling Luftwaffe fighters.
By noon they were off Cap Gris Nez, and tracked constantly by British radar, they were entering the narrowest part of the Straits. Up to now they had only had a glimpse of the RAF and there was still no sign of the Royal Navy. On the bridge of Scharnhorst the unspoken question was: What about the British heavy guns guarding the Straits? Although it was difficult to hit a battleship sailing at thirty knots, it was not impossible. Shore batteries firing armour-piercing shells could cripple the biggest ship if they had enough warning — but Martini's German jamming and bad RAF reconnaissance had made sure the British did not receive it.