His complaint was echoed by most pilots. At some airfields the confusion remained until after dark. Late that evening one fighter pilot sergeant landed at Martlesham after a North Sea patrol and said in amazement, "What's going on? I have just seen a huge battleship." He had found himself over the battleships but did not know what they were — because he had still received no briefing.
The blame must lie right at the top between 11 Fighter Group Commander Air Vice-Marshal Leigh-Mallory and Coastal Command Chief Philip Joubert. Both of them were career officers of the old-fashioned type, slightly out of touch with the sudden emergencies of World War II air warfare. Leigh-Mallory was not personally very popular and many officers called him a "pompous, ambitious fuddy-duddy."
While the squadrons wrote their gloomy entries in the records one officer did more — Flt.-Lt. Kidd was as good as his word. He and Sq. Ldrs. Igoe and Oxspring were the three RAF officers who had realized instantly that the ships sighted were the German battleships.
Kidd sat up all night preparing a furious report attacking the whole British defence. He criticized the handling of the entire operation, particularly condemning the High Command. His letter read:
"I have the honour to request that consideration be given to the following views and to the alternative applications that follow them:
"The passage through the Straits of Dover of an enemy squadron in defiance of our sea and air power is tantamount to the infliction upon us of a major defeat. That defeat is the more serious in that it is in essence a naval one and follows closely upon the loss of the Repulse, Prince of Wales, Barham and Ark Royal. The confidence and hopes of Englishmen down the centuries has been focused upon our sea power. To us no joy is greater, no memory more lasting, than that of a naval victory and no bitterness, no loss of pride, can equal that which follows naval defeat. The effect on the public not only here but abroad of this latest successful challenge to our naval supremacy will be profound.
"It has been a common fault of ours in recent years to put too much blame on others, to put too much reliance on our friends, particularly the United States of America, and to give too little credit to our enemies for their power and their cunning. We have won victories over many in the past; we did not do so by belittling them and their efforts but by defeating them.
"Reverse has followed reverse in this war and after each, excuses have been made, 'The Norwegians and Dutch would not collaborate with us,' 'The Germans violated international law,' 'The Belgians betrayed us and the French deserted us;' Solium and Halfaya were described as places of no strategical importance, yet much British blood was shed in the attempt to recapture them. In Greece we were defeated because we had no airfields, in Crete we were driven out because the enemy operating from Greek airfields made Malemi and the other Cretan aerodromes untenable. Malaya was lost, it was stated, because of the defection of the Siamese. Why the need for all this humbug? The plain fact is that we are never ready anywhere, we do not organize, we do not plan ahead.
The wastage in manpower and in the national industrial effort has been and still is nothing short of a gross scandal.
"The inertia, that corrupt and sordid paralysis that gripped the members of the House of Commons when Baldwin first declared he would accept full responsibility' still prevails, and is to be found everywhere in the government of our affairs, it has crept through Government department after department and has seeped into the Services themselves. It has been likened to a dead hand, a hand that damps the ardour of the citizens, that numbs all effort and that is beginning to chill all hope itself. Let us rouse ourselves and grapple with realities while there is still time.
"Why did the German battle-cruisers get through? Let a straight answer be given and as much benefit as possible be derived from the occurrence. The answer is not that the plan to stop them was badly executed or that it miscarried; the real trouble is that there was no plan at all. We relied far too much on a hasty improvisation. The conclusions drawn from a day spent in the Naval Operations Room at Dover are as follows:
"(a) No adequate comprehensive plans were made to ensure destruction of the German battle-cruisers in the event of their leaving Brest. There is no excuse for this negligence on the part of the War Cabinet and on the part of those serving them.
"Plans should have been devised to provide against every conceivable contingency. Our Intelligence Service had given ample warning that the ships were about to leave and that it was probable they would sail up the Channel. At least seven destroyers had passed through the Straits of Dover on their way South to Brest during the three weeks immediately preceding the departure of the big ships. There had been increasing enemy shipping activity in the Straits of Dover prior to the 12th February 1942, and this activity, particularly noticeable in connection with minesweeping, reached its peak on the night of the 11th February. Three plans should have been made, one to cover the enemy convoy located moving west from Brest, another to provide for the enemy being located leaving Brest, or just having left Brest and proceeding east, and a third to be put into execution should the enemy succeed in making good his escape from Brest undetected and being located either by aerial reconnaissance or otherwise on his way up channel. These plans should have been sub-divided to guard against varying weather conditions. The attack, wherever it might take place and whatever the conditions that might prevail, should have been properly co-ordinated. Strict control over the parts played by the three Services should have been exercised and the maximum benefit derived either from the presence of the large enemy ships in narrow waters close to our air and sea bases or, if they went the other way, from their enforced absence from the protection of shore-based fighters. The fact remains that at no time was the enemy subjected to a really heavy and sustained weight of attack capable of impeding his progress.
"(b) There was no adequate aerial or sea reconnaissance, both of which should have been a matter of daily routine.
"(c) There was a lack of some properly appointed body whose duty it should have been to collect from all sources, assimilate and pass out to those concerned, information concerning the three ships or any one of them. The jamming by enemy interference of our radio location on the morning of the 12th and the reports of weather favourable to the enemy to effect a break-through might, if concentrated in the hands of such a body, have alone given a sufficient indication of the enemy's intentions. This body could have done invaluable work during the course of the action by making sure that all services, groups and units received the same information and that each knew what the other was doing. Had the Naval Staff of Dover known earlier of the circling plots seen by location stations, some action would in all probability have been then and there originated, which would have led to the discovery of the enemy squadron sooner than it was in fact made.
"(d) The presence of the ships was perceived at 10:45 a.m. and was at such extreme range that it was immediately concluded that if the ships were not the battle-cruisers, then it was something very exceptional and almost certainly worth attacking. No attack, however, was carried out until over an hour and three-quarters later, and then by very light naval forces only operating without air support.
"(e) This was the chance which Fighter Command had been waiting for for over a year, for there existed a state of affairs that they had done their utmost to provoke during that time, that is to say a large number of enemy aircraft flying well within the range of our fighters and at both a numerical and strategical disadvantage. Yet nevertheless the effort of our fighter squadrons was made far too late, and when it came it was badly directed, in so far as many of the squadrons failed to reach their objective, although it was being plotted by the most accurate means known to science. By the time the attack was made, much of the tactical advantage that had been ours had slipped away and we were forced to operate nearer the enemy's bases than our own.