The three members of the Board were its president, Mr. Justice Bucknill, Air Chief-Marshal Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt, Inspector-General of the Royal Air Force, and the Naval member, Vice-Admiral Sir Hugh Binney.
Mr. Justice Bucknill said, "The Board's terms of reference are to inquire into the circumstances in which the German battle-cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, in company with the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen, proceeded from Brest to Germany on 12 February 1942, and on the operations undertaken to prevent them." The terms of reference were signed by Winston S. Churchill, Minister of Defence. The real objective of this solemn tribunal was to whitewash the Navy and the RAF and help restore confidence in Churchill's government.
It had no power to compel admirals to attend. Vice-Admiral Binney hoped to persuade the Admiral Commanding Submarines, Admiral Sir Max Horton, to give evidence before the Board on this question. For the Board was not satisfied that Sir Max had drawn enough submarines from other areas to deal with a possible break-out. Horton refused to appear, saying: "If I can't find out what is wrong in my command without setting up a panel of so-called experts, then I'll resign from the Navy and raise chickens." This attitude was typical of the autocratic autonomy which Service Chiefs claimed for themselves in this period of the war.
The inquiry was a long parade of senior officers offering excuses and lame justifications for their own part in the disaster. Most of the witnesses knew it. As a result of his report, Gerald Kidd was called before the Bucknill Tribunal. After his evidence, Admiral Ramsay said to him during lunch at the Senior Services Club, "It is a waste of time. You might as well turn round and go home. They are not even making any notes. All they want is a whitewash."
Coastal Command, responsible for reconnaissance patrols— "Stopper," "Line SE" and "Habo" — produced witnesses to explain why German battleships had been at sea fourteen hours before they were spotted off Boulogne. Their explanation? A blown fuse in "Stopper," a damp plug in "Line SE."
Sir Philip Joubert, who had his three squadrons of Beaufort torpedo bombers in the wrong place, explained, "The enemy broke out of Brest unobserved owing to the darkness of the night and the breakdown of radar."
The Board wanted to know why, when Victor Beamish sighted the battleships, he did not use his radio to warn Fighter Command. The Navy particularly criticized this hidebound inefficiency of Fighter Command. When Royal Naval warships sighted the enemy they were under orders to give instant information about his position, course and speed — as Nigel Pumphrey's MTBs had done. Admiral Binney, commenting on the practice of keeping quiet about sighting the enemy, said: "If a ship waited until returning to port before telling anyone it would be ridiculous."
Yet the Board's view was that Beamish made the right decision. In his case any blame attached did not matter, for a month later he was killed when his Spitfire was shot down in a dog-fight over the Somme estuary. His body was never found.
The fact that at the same time Sq. Ldr. Oxspring did break the silence rule and was ignored by 11 Group was carefully hushed up. Concerning No. 11 Group of Fighter Command, the Bucknill Tribunal said:
"Unfortunately No. 11 Group, who were responsible for the "Jim Crow" reconnaissance, were not sufficiently alive to the fact that the German ships might be coming out about that time. True, they knew that operation Fuller was in operation but some of the witnesses said they had not been informed that there had been any breakdown in the night patrols, and in consequence their minds were not especially directed to the possible significance of the radar plots; and they were slow to order investigation by additional reconnaissance. Had these plots been investigated as soon as their character came under suspicion, it is possible that the enemy Squadron would have been sighted an appreciable time earlier than it was."
If No. 11 Group had been efficient they could have given at least two hours additional warning. The weather was clearer then and bombers might have attacked successfully with armour-piercing bombs.
Wing-Commander Constable-Roberts reported that No. 11 Group had said they had supplied fighter escort when Esmonde had taken off. He was supported by the written report of Flt.-Lt. Gerald Kidd.
Kidd told the Tribunal that Manston informed him that the Swordfish had taken off and were circling the airfield. At the same time, Hornchurch reported that their fighters were over Manston. When Manston said there was no sign of the fighters, Kidd asked the woman on the end of the line at Hornchurch to speak to the controller. She said he was busy on the plotting table. When he said he wanted to check with the controller where the fighters were, the woman replied the controller did not know. When Kidd persisted, he was finally informed the fighters had failed to join the Swordfish.
This is when he began to be angry. Had Hornchurch told him the fighters were going to be late he would have tried to keep the Swordfish orbiting to wait for them. Admiral Ramsay had only permitted Esmonde to take off on his suicide mission because he believed five fighter squadrons were on their way to escort the Swordfish. But the Bucknill Tribunal ignored the fact that four squadrons failed to arrive in time.
It was apparent that after the Germans had successfully defied the might of the Royal Navy and the RAF there could only be excuses from the British services. As Hitler had foreseen, they had been unable to "conceive and execute lightning decisions." Bomber Command even made the typically bureaucratic complaint that their operations were limited because there had not been "reasonable notice."
Admiral Ramsay was one of the few who was open and honest. He frankly admitted he felt bitter at his own failure to anticipate more accurately the Germans' arrival in the Straits. Ramsay said, "The main feature which influenced all operations was the failure to detect the enemy heavy ships at daylight on 12 February. Had they been sighted then there would have been ample time for our main striking forces to get off and make attacks in the narrow waters of Dover Straits. We would have had maximum advantage, and would have been able to use our numerical and tactical air superiority, combined with accurate knowledge of the enemy's path on the radar plot. Failing other information during the night, a successful dawn reconnaissance to the westward of Dover Command would have given two hours extra warning of their approach.
"The main hope rested on the expectation that the passage would be made before daylight. This would have afforded the most favourable conditions not only for the Swordfish aircraft but also for coastal craft and destroyers. In the event, these forces had to attack in daylight without the advantage of potentially overwhelming fighter support which never developed. Little hope could be placed in daylight torpedo attacks from surface craft, for these now actually went to sea under much more unfavourable conditions than had been anticipated.
"Some measure of success from recently laid minefields had also been hoped for, but the enemy had employed a large number of minesweepers to search a selected route, although actually the heavy ships were known to have passed over two of them."
Like his air liaison officers, he was critical towards all three commands of the RAF — Coastal, Bomber and Fighter. His report was smothered in secrecy. No mention of it appears in the published records of the inquiry.
The Admiralty must take much of the blame. The Germans sailed triumphantly, untouched past Dover while the Royal Navy refused to move battleships out of Scapa Flow.