First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Dudley Pound was insistent that he would employ his battleships in only the safest waters. He had his reasons, but this decision perhaps erred too much on the side of caution.
The Fleet Air Arm also faced a vital question. Why did twenty-four Swordfish remain on the ground at Lee-on-Solent that day? Official explanation — there was not a single trained pilot, observer or gunner at Lee-on-Solent. Was this true — or was it another bureaucratic answer?
The RAF command was equally to blame. After the Sword-fish attack, three hours elapsed before Coastal Command put every available aircraft into the air, throwing squadrons of torpedo bombers from Scotland to Cornwall into the battle — but too late.
The Tribunal sat for twelve days. Their findings reached the Prime Minister at the beginning of March 1942. When he read it, security descended like a fog blanket. Although it was claimed to bé a complete "answer" to any carping criticism, not even Members of Parliament were allowed to have more than minor information on the true facts.
The Bucknill Report, Command Paper 6775, was produced in Parliament by Deputy Premier Attlee on 18 March 1942. He stated in reply to a question that the report had been received, but its contents could not be made public since it contained information which would be of value to the enemy. He added, "The general findings do not reveal that there were any serious deficiencies either in foresight, co-operation or organization." The House was not satisfied. Neither was the Press.
Evidently deeply stung by the criticism, Churchill quoted to the House an Admiralty statement of 2 February 1942, ten days before the warships broke out: "At first sight this passage up the Channel appears hazardous for the Germans. It is probable, however, that as their heavy ships are not fully efficient they would prefer such a passage, relying for security on their destroyers and aircraft which are efficient, and knowing full well that we have no heavy ships with which to oppose them in the Channel. We might well therefore find the two battle-cruisers and the eight-inch cruiser with five large and five small destroyers, also say twenty fighters constantly overhead — with reinforcements within call— proceeding up the Channel. Taking all factors into consideration… the Channel passage appears to be their most probable direction if and when they leave Brest." Churchill said, "I have read this document to the House because I am anxious that Members should realize our affairs are not conducted entirely by simpletons and dunderheads as the comic papers try to depict."
The Report was not "tabled" until 1946. Even when the details which had been kept hidden for four years were revealed, they were not sensational. The determined smokescreen made sure that no details of the mishandling of the German break-out reached even the peacetime public. For the official account contains more misinformation and downright rubbish than most government documents. It is difficult to believe that some of the facts had been deliberately falsified even in such a perilous time as this mid-war period. But it is such a farrago of omissions and evasions that the tribunal must have skimped their inquiries.
The period in which this happened must be taken into account. It was right in the middle of the war. The British public were despondent enough about defeats from Dunkirk to Singapore without being dismayed further by revealing the full facts of the inefficiency which allowed the German battleships to sail unscathed past the cliffs of Dover.
The Report said:
"The Gneisenau and Scharnhorst were located at Brest after shipping raids on 28 March 1941. The 8-inch cruiser, Prinz Eugen, which left Norway in company with the Bismarck, joined the battle-cruisers in Brest after the loss of the Bismarck. She was first seen in dry-dock there on 4 June.
"A photographic reconnaissance on 29 and 31 January 1942 revealed the arrival in Brest of two destroyers, five torpedo boats and eight mine-sweepers.
"The Admiralty always maintained that the most likely and safest course for the battle-cruisers when they left Brest was to break up the Channel to German waters. They would either do this or they would break into the Atlantic. Or they might go to the Mediterranean to Genoa or go north about the British Isles to return to German waters.
"On 2 February the Admiralty reviewed the position and drew up an appreciation that the ships would most probably proceed up the Channel. This was supported by indications like the concentration of torpedo boats, E-boats, mine-sweepers and other light craft along the coast from Le Havre to the Hook.
"The strong possibility was that the enemy ships would seek to pass the narrows at Dover under the cover of darkness. The distance from Brest to the Straits is 360 miles. During the winter months they could leave Brest shortly before dusk and run up the Channel in the dark, reaching the Straits about dawn. Or they might leave Brest to lie up in Cherbourg next day to run the Straits the following night.
"The enemy's occupation of the continental seaboard from Norway to Spain had rendered the participation of our own heavy ships in the operation impracticable. [8]
"Concerning executive order Fuller, on 3 February the Admiralty ordered the C-in-C Nore to have six destroyers with torpedoes on six hours notice in the Thames estuary to operate under the orders of the Vice-Admiral, Dover. Two fast mine-layers, the Wekhman and the Manxman [9] were put on readiness and six Swordfish were sent to Manston. The submarine Sealion was ordered to join two submarines patrolling off Brest. Three squadrons of Beauforts were also put in readiness. One was at Leuchars, Scotiand, to operate against the Tirpitz at Trondheim. One squadron was at St. Eval in Cornwall. The third squadron was split up between St. Eval and Thorney Island, near Portsmouth. The Beauforts from Leuchars were ordered to Coltishall in Norfolk.
"From 10 February, 100 bombers were ordered to stand by and 11 Group of Fighter Command was also warned. [10] On 11 February two more German destroyers entered Brest, making four.
"On 11 February a photo reconnaissance showed all three ships out of dock and six destroyers in harbour.
"The submarine, H.M.S, Sealion, saw no big ships while she remained in the vicinity of Whistle Buoy until 19:00, and then withdrew on the tide from this most dangerous patrol. She surfaced south of Whistle Buoy and remained there until 20:35, but saw no enemy squadron. [11]
"On the night of 11/12 February 'Stopper' Patrol off Brest was ordered on a 12 hour patrol from 19:40 to 07:00 next day.
The first aircraft took off at 18:27; when it encountered a JU-88 it switched off the radar equipment, and when it switched on again at 19:20 the radar was unserviceable. It had blown a fuse which they could not repair, so they returned to base. The crew transferred to another aircraft and the patrol resumed at 22:38 and proceeded until 23:43. A third aircraft took over between 23-3(5 and 03:10. A fourth from 02:45 to 07:01. There was nothing seen, but there was a gap of three hours in 'Stopper' from 19:40 to 22:38.
"'Line SE Patrol was between Ushant and the Ile de Bréhat. It was ordered between 19:40 and 23:40 on 11 February. The aircraft reached its starting point at 19:36, when its radar became unserviceable through an obscure fault of unusual character which is still under investigation. It remained on patrol but reported the fault at 21:13 and was ordered to return. No relief plane was sent. If it were not for the technical failure of both their patrols they had an excellent chance of sighting the German squadron.