"On 12 February morning two Spitfires over Boulogne sighted E-boats leaving harbour. Under the standing order not to use wireless telegraphy, they immediately returned to base to report.
"Two Spitfires took off at 10:20 to sweep from Boulogne to Fecamp. Fifteen miles from Le Touquet, Sq. Ldr. Oxspring sighted 20–30 vessels in convoy. He landed at Hawkinge at 10:50 and the information was passed to Dover and 11 Group. [12]
"Sgt. Beaumont, who was with Sq. Ldr. Oxspring, said he saw a vessel with a tripod mast and superstructure. When handed a book of German silhouettes he picked out a German capital ship.
"At 10:42, unconnected with the shipping reconnaissance, Group Captain Victor Beamish and Wing-Cdr. Boyd, when attacked by Messerschmitts, flew right over the German squadron. They observed WT silence until they landed at 11:09 and informed intelligence at 11 Group Fighter Command.
"At 10:00–10:15 surface vessels appeared on the radar detector set at Beachy Head. There were telephone delays and the line was engaged, which held up the transmission of the information which did not reach Dover until 10:40. At 10:50 enemy shipping was detected by radar at Fairlight and passed to Dover.
"The Swordfish were ordered to be airborne at 12:20 to carry out an attack at 12:45. The rendezvous for their fighter escort was 12:25 over Manston. Owing to unforeseen delays the fighters did not get there in time.
"Two squadrons from Biggin Hill Wing arrived at Manston late and proceeded towards the target. Hornchurch Wing also missed the Swordfish at Manston and they searched over Calais without success. At 12:00 six Swordfish accompanied by ten Spitfires left for the target. Ten miles off Ramsgate German fighters appeared and battled with the Spitfires.
"On the morning of 12 February there were 36 serviceable Beauforts available. There were seven planes of 217 Squadron from Leuchars in Fife, 14 of 42 Squadron at St. Eval, 15 of 86 and 217 Squadrons, except for three which were sweeping the Bay of Biscay, from Thorney Island. Four of them which were in an advanced state of readiness proceeded to Manston at 13:40 led by Pilot Officer Carson, but they arrived too late to rendezvous with the fighters. When they reached Manston, owing to the large number of aircraft circling the base, the Beaufort formation split up. [13] Having obtained a fix, Carson reached the position of the German battle-cruisers at 16:40. Visibility was bad and he dropped his torpedo at 1,500 yards but was damaged by flak. A second pilot found the Germans at 18:00 and attacked.
"The two reamining Beauforts of the original four circled the aerodrome for some time and landed at Manston and set off again. Shortly after 15:00 they found the Squadron and at 15:40 their torpedoes were observed running. The three other planes left at Thorney Island flew to Manston and at 15:00 set course for the target. The visibility was so bad they made their attack singly and one was destroyed by fighters or anti-aircraft fire.
"The Leuchars squadron was delayed because of a snowbound aerodrome but 14 serviceable Beauforts eventually arrived at Coltishall at 11:45. Three were without torpedoes and arrangements were made to send them to Coltishall but they did not arrive in time. Two had engine trouble, leaving nine which were ordered to Manston to pick up a formation of Hudsons who were to attack as a diversion. They arrived at Manston at 14:53 and accompanied by five Hudsons set off for the target at 15:34 [14]. Owing to the bad visibility they became separated and the Hudsons bombed the ships before the torpedo attacks began. Two Hudsons were lost.
"At 16:04 the Beauforts sighted the German ships and attacked in one flight of six and one of three. Seven torpedoes were dropped but heavy anti-aircraft fire prevented observation of results. [Nothing said about the near-sinking of Pizey's flagship HMS Campbell.]
"The St. Eval detachment. At 12:20 Beauforts from St. Eval were ordered to Thorney Island. Then they were ordered to rendezvous at Coltishall by 17:00 to pick up fighter escort. At 17:01 they picked up ten fighters over Coltishall and set course for the German Squadron. At 17:41 they were over the estimated position of the ships. At 18:05 they saw German mine-sweepers. Visibility was only 100 yards and it was raining heavily. The formation split up and lost sight of each other and darkness prevented their chance of effective action.
"Destroyers. The destroyers stationed at Harwich were Campbell, Vivacious, Mackay, Whitshed, Worcester and Walpole. They were all 20 years old.
"At 11:56 Captain Pizey in Campbell the flagship set off. At 15:17 Pizey saw two large ships on his radar at nine and a half miles. At 15:43 he came under heavy fire from the German ships. But they fired their torpedoes and Worcester fired her torpedoes from 2,400 yards. She was badly hit by the German shells and set on fire but managed to limp back to port.
"At 11:27 242 bombers set off and continued to fly throughout the afternoon. Thirty-nine attacked, 188 failed to find the ships and fifteen did not return. Twelve aircraft succeeded in laying mines which eventually damaged the Gneisenau and Scharnhorst. [In fact, the damage was done by mines laid much earlier.]
"Fighter Command. 11 Group had 21 Spitfire squadrons and four Hurricane squadrons. Also three squadrons from 10 Group and six squadrons from 12 Group took part in the battle. In all thirty-four fighter squadrons launched the most intensive fighter attack. Most of the attacks were launched at 14:05–15:05 to cover the Beaufort torpedo attacks. Out of a total of 398 fighter planes, 17 were missing."
The Beport then set out its conclusions.
"Co-ordination of plans. Was there any lack of proper contact between services and command? It must be remarked that there is such a thing as too much co-ordination. If the Germans came up the Channel the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff predicted it would be A simple battle — all forces should be thrown into action at the earliest possible time.'"
Then came a small note of criticism:
"Co-ordination was not entirely successful. For example, in the provision of escorts for the Swordfish. But later co-operation between the commands seems to have been complete [unfortunately, too late]. In these circumstances we have no suggestion to make for improvements of arrangements which already exist for the purpose of ensuring adequate liaison and co-operation between services and commands, which in our opinion proved on the whole to be satisfactory. There is no lack of evidence of co-operation or the will to co-operate.
"It must also be admitted that in addition to the short notice when information was received on the presence of the German ships they were to some extent caught by surprise. The general opinion of those dealing with the problem was that they would pass through the Straits at night. In addition, it must be remembered that an attack by destroyers or a handful of MTBs in broad daylight against capital ships, not themselves under heavy fire, was an adventure hitherto hardly regarded as justifiable.
"The Air Ministry, in receipt of the message that the German ships were in the Channel, sent to Fighter and Coastal commands this message: 'Scharnhorst and Gneisenau reported in Channel sixteen miles west of Le Touquet at 11.05. Plus abnormal enemy air activity. Maximum available forces to be employed as early as possible to destroy the enemy ships and aircraft. 'This unique opportunity to be exploited to the utmost.'
"After spending 15 days on this inquiry this Board is impressed by the countless acts of gallantry that came to their notice and the evident determination of all our forces to press home their attacks."
12
He had given the alarm over the radio at 10:20 a.m., half an hour earlier, and no one in 11 Group took any notice.