The only other faint note of criticism was contained in this paragraph:
"Apart from the weakness of our forces, the main reason for our failure to do more damage to the enemy was the fact that his presence was not detected earlier and this was due to a breakdown of night patrols and the omission to send out strong morning reconnaissance. All operational orders said they would pass through in darkness."
It is a collector's piece of officialese and double talk. Nearly 700 fighters and bombers — the entire force at the disposal of the RAF — had been flung into the battle without success because they were too late and completely unco-ordinated. Thirteen young Fleet Air Arm pilots had been sent uselessly to their deaths. Twenty-seven young sailors had been killed and eighteen seriously wounded aboard the destroyer Worcester when she took on a German battleship and cruiser single-handed — a piece of pitiful heroism which need never have happened if the Navy had brought in bigger ships.
Security was so rigid that hundreds of other young RAF pilots took off with no idea what they were looking for. One RAF squadron leader had reported by radio that German battleships were in the Channel — and been ignored. Another officer, a group captain, had not even broken radio silence in spite of the great urgency. Some RAF torpedo planes, taking off in confusion, had attacked and nearly sank our own destroyers. RAF night reconnaissance patrols over the Channel returned and were not replaced, leaving a gap of three vital hours. Except for hitting three mines, the battleships reached Germany untouched under the noses of the most battle-experienced air force and navy in the world.
The unpalatable truth which Churchill dared not reveal to the angry and disturbed British public was that some of his service chiefs had proved themselves tragically incompetent. For Hitler had been right. The carefully prepared German dash uncovered a lack of liaison and organization. Looking back, it makes one apprehensively wonder what might have been the outcome if the Führer had gone ahead with his plans to invade Britain.
The break-out of the battleships was a supreme example of meticulous German planning and efficiency defeating the hasty last-minute improvisations of the British.
Perhaps the main trouble was the short-sighted arrogance on the part of the British forces. Admittedly there were disasters against the Japanese in the East. But the Army had escaped miraculously from Dunkirk and the RAF had won the Battle of Britain. The Royal Navy had a centuries-old tradition of paramountcy behind it. The Admiralty simply did not regard a German dash up the English Channel as a serious possibility. Hence their pitiful dispositions. In the case of the newer service, the RAF at this time of the war reckoned to have the Luftwaffe on the run. They were flying an increasing number of fighter sweeps over France and every night mounting an even more devastating bomber offensive over Germany.
This somewhat smug attitude in all services as well as the petty rivalries, even among commands, were the basic reasons for the disasters of the day. But how could Churchill tell the nation that — particularly as it included incompetence at his beloved Admiralty?
Fighter Command Chief Sir Sholto Douglas commented later: "At the time I was at a loss to understand the reluctance of the Royal Navy to have units of the Home Fleet ready to send out into the North Sea. The prizes to be gained in an action with ships of the importance of the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau and the Prinz Eugen would have been worth bringing some of our bigger ships into action in time to intercept the German warships while they were still at sea. As it was, the enemy warships got away with it, even though they did hit some mines which failed to do more than slight damage, and they all made the safety of their home ports."
The Germans had their complaints too. German Navy Chief, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, was equally critical of the Luftwaffe. He wrote in his report:
"The Navy opinion was that with sufficient air defence the big ships could remain stationed in Brest even if British battleships were stationed at Plymouth and Portsmouth. The Luftwaffe could have considerably eased the task of the German ships by attacking British air bases. But as was constantly shown the Navy was dependent here upon the goodwill of the Luftwaffe.
"Numerous reports about the air attacks on Brest deeply impressed the Führer. He followed them continuously with concern and did not look with any favour on the operations of the big ships. This feeling, without doubt, was reinforced by Göring, who emphasized to the Führer again and again that there was just no sensible way to protect the big ships in Brest against air attack. In fact it did not lie in Göring's power nor in his wish. He therefore robbed us of a chance to do something worthwhile in convoy raiding.
"At the end of 1941, when the question of the transfer of the ships to the North Sea came up, the Führer produced a number of arguments for stationing the ships in Norway. Many reports of landings in Norway by the British in the spring played a considerable part in his case. Added to this, the ships in Brest were being damaged and remained inactive. When the question of a break-out was looked into, the Iceland passage was deemed unfavourable because the British, noting the absence of the ships from Brest, would have enough time to bring out their Home Fleet and concentrate it in the North Sea. Therefore if it were to come to a break-out, it must be through the Channel which would bring surprise. At the beginning of 1942, when we prepared to sail through the Channel, we hoped that the break-through might not be noticed by the enemy, but we were also prepared for a short sharp battle and an exchange of shots."
XIV
BUT WHO REALLY WON?
In spite of the whitewash of the Bucknill Tribunal some officers were secretly sacked or posted away. Admiral Ramsay was not a scapegoat as he had gloomily predicted — but a lot of other people were. They were not sacked, as that would have undermined public confidence, but kicked upstairs to harmless jobs. One of them, Air Marshal Sir Philip Joubert, C-in-C of Coastal Command, was removed to Mountbatten's staff in Ceylon with the backwater job of Director of Information and Civil Affairs. Others known to be hostile to the official "whitewash," were posted away. Wing-Cdr. Constable-Roberts was exiled to Scapa Flow, but managed to get a squadron in North Africa shortly afterwards.
Gerald Kidd applied to go on the Dieppe raid, but instead had a message to report for what he regarded as a "stooge job." As he had heard a rumour that he would never get another operational job as a result of the report he had put in, he sent a letter to Air Vice-Marshal Leigh-Mallory to protest about being posted away without explanation. He said, "There is a rumour that there are orders I am not to be involved in any further operations along the south coast. I want to protest against this."
He also requested to see Leigh-Mallory. Much to Kidd's surprise, he agreed to see him one evening at 11 Group at Uxbridge. His manner was unfriendly as he said, "What do you want, Kidd?" Kidd replied, "Why have I been taken off the Dieppe raid?"
Leigh-Mallory said abruptly, "Sit down, Kidd." He then produced a copy of his report and said, "This is balderdash, bunkum and bilge. I strongly resent being ordered by the Air Council to answer a letter from a junior officer."
Kidd replied stiffly, "I am sorry, sir, that you regard it that way. But the facts are correct. I wrote it after what was to me a tremendous shock and a great sense of personal loss."
Leigh-Mallory repeated, "I want to make it quite clear that I resent a junior officer criticizing me."