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Kidd answered, "It is not intended as a criticism of you. It is a general criticism."

In clipped tones, Leigh-Mallory said, "Take paragraph E., which reads, "This was the chance which Fighter Command had been waiting for for over a year… nevertheless, the effort of our fighter squadrons was made far too late and when it came it was badly directed, in so far as many of the squadrons failed to reach their objective.'

Kidd replied by drawing his attention to the fact that his report made it clear there was "no lack of courage and desire to defeat the enemy."

Leigh-Mallory said, "I agree with everything except the paragraph that affects me. We could have won a resounding victory, but I could get no co-operation from Joubert of Coastal Command. It was as if we were fighting a different war."

Having made this astonishing confession to a junior officer, he became suddenly genial. The interview ended on friendly terms, when he introduced Kidd to his staff over a drink. He also promised to promote him — and kept his word.

There were several other echoes of the day's defeat. At Biggin Hill Fighter Base, Flt.-Lt. Cowan Douglas-Stephenson always kept a personal log giving details of every event that happened on the airfield from the condition of the runways to individual take-offs. He said, "I was posted shortly afterwards to Hornchurch. Later when I returned to Biggin, I found the pages from Saturday, 3 January, to Wednesday, 25 March, 1942 had been cut out with a razor blade. Why? Every other entry was intact."

Stephenson is still convinced this was a deliberate act by someone in authority to lose the record of what took place at one of Britain's most vital fighter airfields that February day. They cut out a much larger section so that the excision of 12 February would not appear too obvious.

Barely a month after the break-out on 17 March 1942, the London Gazette gave details of RAF awards for the action. They included a DFM (Distinguished Flying Medal) to Hudson pilot, Flight Sergeant J. W. Creedon of 407 Royal Canadian Air Force Squadron, "who made a daring low-level attack on a German destroyer escorting the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. Creedon came out through cloud to 400 feet and sighted a destroyer directly below him. Diving through fierce flak to 200 feet he released his bombs which straddled the German warship. As he turned away to climb back into the clouds, he was attacked by a JU-88. But when Creedon's rear-gunner opened fire with his turret guns the German sheered off."

For his gallant single-handed attack Pilot Officer Carson of 217 Squadron received the somewhat inadequate decoration of the DFC (Distinguished Flying Cross). The London Gazette also announced other RAF awards to 42 Squadron. They included the award of the DSO (Distinguished Service Order) to the other man who flew off without waiting for orders, Sq. Ldr. Cliff, and the DFC to Pilot Officer Archer. Pilot Officer Pett was also awarded a DFC.

The London Gazette said, "The King has been graciously pleased to approve the following awards in recognition of gallantry displayed in flying operations against the enemy. On the afternoon of 12 February 1942, a force of Beaufort and Hudson aircraft carried out an attack on enemy naval forces, including the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, off the Dutch coast. In the face of harassing fire from screening destroyers, the attack was pressed home with the utmost determination at very close range. Although it has not been possible to assess the damage, owing to the extremely poor visibility, it is believed that several hits were obtained. The operation, which demanded a high degree of skill and courage, reflects the greatest credit upon the following officers and airmen who participated.

"Squadron Ldr. Cliff was the leader of the formation, a squadron of Coastal Command Beaufort torpedo bombers, which delivered a formation attack on one of the two larger ships. Hudsons of the RCAF also took part in the attacks. Three Beauforts and two Hudsons were lost.

"At least two hits are believed to have been scored by Squadron Leader Cliffs squadron and the crews of the other Beauforts saw torpedoes running towards the target, as they turned away into the mist and drizzle with flak bursting round them and enemy fighters on their tails. Because of bad weather it was difficult to find the convoy and only good navigation brought them to the right spot. For some, the first indication that they had arrived came from flak bursting near them fired from unseen ships."

There seems little doubt that to cover their own unforgivable inadequacies, Coastal Command rushed to recommend as many medals as they could to the courageous pilots.

The Navy also gave medals to its heroes, as well as the posthumous VC awarded to Lt.-Cdr. Esmonde, all the Sword-fish survivors were decorated. The four sub-lieutenants, Brian Rose, Edgar Lee, Charles Kingsmill and "Mac" Samples, were all given the DSO. The only surviving rating, Gunner Donald Bunce, was awarded the CGM (Conspicuous Gallantry Medal).

The five destroyer captains who took part in the action against the battleships were also given decorations.

Captain Mark Pizey of HMS Campbell was made a C. B. (Commander of the Bath), Captain J. E Wright of HMS Mackay was given a bar to his DSO, and a DSO went to Lt.-Cdr. R. Alexander (Vivacious), Lt.-Cdr. W. A. Juniper (Whitshed) and Lt.-Cdr. Colin Coats (Worcester).

The Germans awarded medals for their side of the battle. Both Captain Hoffmann and Admiral Ciliax were awarded the Knight's Cross. One of Germany's highest awards, it is only given to someone who already has the Iron Cross, 1st and 2nd Class. Ciliax was awarded the Knight's Cross because he had been the commander of Operation Cerberus. His task was to carry out the detailed orders of Naval Group West in Paris and he had done that well. Captain Otto Fein of Gneisenau, who had commanded the squadron for most of the voyage, received nothing.

The sailors had no illusions about Ciliax's conduct during the battle. Someone composed a ribald song about him which was sung to a popular tune on all the ratings' mess-decks. Soon the rude song penetrated to the wardrooms.

The captains of the three ships tried to stop this song being sung. Captain Helmuth Brinkmann of the Prinz Eugen came out with the direct command "This song is not to be sung." But this was one order the well-disciplined German sailors never obeyed.

While the controversy still raged, Churchill for once remained totally out of sympathy with the British public. Although certain RAF officers like Joubert were quietly shunted aside, he refused to make any open criticism of the Navy's conduct of the battle.

This was understandable in wartime because — like The Times editorial — it would only add to the Germans' joy. But he consistently refused to criticize them later in either speeches or his published works.

This was obviously due to the fact that as a former First Lord of the Admiralty in both World Wars he had a special, almost blind, affection for the Royal Navy. Yet, unlike the German Führer, he was a "sea animal," and his naval strategic sense in the long run proved better than Hitler's.

Churchill stated after the war: "Viewed in the after-light and in its larger aspects the episode was highly advantageous to us." His view proved to be the correct one. The battleships, effectively bottled up in German ports, meant the threat to the Atlantic which had existed so long as they remained in Brest had disappeared.

One man who agreed with him was Grand-Admiral Raeder, head of the German Navy, who commented, "It was a tactical success but a strategic defeat."

The Channel battle was not a total defeat for Britain. The German battleships, although they achieved victory, soon ended their careers as fighting ships.