For several minutes Boldin and the political officer discussed the matter in Russian. Though the political officer was uneasy about doing so, Boldin and Nafissi agreed to suspend offensive operations after reaching the line specified by Nafissi. For his part Boldin knew that there were only two Egyptian divisions deployed along the coastal road. Those two divisions were insufficient for a counteroffensive. According to his operations officer, at least six divisions would be needed. It would be ten to fourteen days before the Egyptians could muster that force in the Western Desert. The deliberate buildup of combat power and stockpiling of supplies, necessary for a prolonged offensive much like that of the British in 1942, would take weeks. The weak American division, covering the entire area from Sidi Ibeid to the depression, would be hard pressed to secure the southern flank. Spread as it was, it would be useless in any offensive operations.
Since it was nothing more than a simple adjustment of the front line, Boldin insisted that he had the authority to make that decision. Militarily it was a sound decision. It would be foolish to leave the Libyans hanging out in the desert in positions that could not be defended. The political officer disagreed but, in this case, deferred to Boldin's judgment. The line Nafissi proposed was, after all, nearly the same one at which Rommel had held the 8th Army for months. So Boldin agreed to let Nafissi press on a little further. If he got out of hand, Soviet forces in Halfaya could always turn off his supplies again.
Now, with the Russian helicopter safely away, Nafissi returned to his bunker. He had to finish his final orders to his commanders in Egypt. In sealed orders Nafissi instructed his two division commanders to mass their forces and break through the new Egyptian line. Once they were through, Alexandria was only sixty miles away. Another battlefield defeat, followed by the appearance of Libyan forces in Alexandria, would be more than enough to bring down the Egyptian government. It had to be. It was Nafissi's last hope.
To a casual observer, the mounds of dirt, strips of cloth, and lengths of string spread across the sand were meaningless. To Captain Harold Cerro, his XO, his first sergeant, and the platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, and squad leaders of his company, they represented North Africa. Gathered around the captain's sand table, the leadership of B Company listened as Cerro reviewed the main points of the operation. Once he was done, each platoon leader would brief Cerro on how their platoons would perform their assigned tasks.
Using a section of antenna, Cerro pointed to each part of the sand table, identifying the terrain feature it represented. "Here, we have the coast of the Mediterranean in the north, and here, in the south, the Qattara Depression. Jebel Kalakh is here, Ras el Kenayis here." Cerro stopped and looked around the group. Everyone was listening and paying close attention. Their taut faces masked the wide spectrum of emotions, fears, and apprehensions that soldiers carry with them into battle. In the past, at times like this, Cerro would always attempt to relieve the strain with humor. Since his return from Sudan, however, he found little amusement in the growing war. Even if he had been so inclined, there was little in their upcoming operation that lent itself to humor.
"Our mission is to establish a blocking position here, where the coastal road and the railroad climb the high ground just south of Ras el Kenayis. We are to hold there, blocking traffic going back to Libya, until relieved by the 3rd Brigade, 16th Armored Division."
Cerro drew a line in the dirt west of the rock that represented Jebel Kalakh. "That brigade will cross a line of departure here, at 0600 hours, 21 December. That coincides with our insertion here." Cerro moved his pointer to the coastal road south of Ras el Kenayis. He then traced the route the 3rd Brigade would follow. "We expect that maneuver to take, at a minimum, twelve hours. Link-up between our airhead and the armored brigade will come no sooner than 1800 hours 20 December. Should the Libyans turn to block or attack the 3rd Brigade in the flank, one or both of the Egyptian divisions will attack the Libyans on or south of the coastal road. Any way you look at it, the Libyans will be between a rock and a hard place. In this operation, we have to be the hard place fighting any-and everyone that comes our way."
Pointing to blocks of wood with the numerals 1, 2, and 3 painted on them, Cerro showed where each of the platoons would go. The company would deploy between the railroad and the road near and on top of the escarpment that rose up from the coastal plain south of Ras el Kenayis. The other companies of the battalion were deployed on either side of Cerro's on the escarpment. A Company would be on the left, C Company to the right. The five platoons of the antitank company were divided between the three line companies, with Cerro's company getting two of them. These two platoons, each with four TOW antitank guided-missile launchers per platoon, would provide his companies long-range antitank capability. Six organic Dragon antitank guided-missile launchers and over two hundred single-shot AT-4 light antitank rocket launchers would provide medium-and short-range antitank firepower.
The other two infantry battalions of the brigade were deployed to the south, bent back to the west and almost to the coast west of Cerro's position. A Marine battalion, attached to the brigade for this operation and landed by the 6th Fleet twelve miles west of Cerro's position, completed the perimeter. They, like Cerro's battalion, would establish blocking positions on the coastal road where it descended off of the escarpment down to the coastal plain. One Marine infantry company, reinforced with a Marine tank platoon and traveling in LAV armored personnel carriers, constituted the brigade reserve. Located in the center on the coastal road, this reserve force would go wherever the Libyans threatened a breakthrough.
In addition to the weapons organic and attached to Cerro's company, fire support would be available from several outside sources. The brigade's eighteen-gun 155mm howitzer battalion, reinforced with a six-gun Marine battery, would eventually provide the bulk of the artillery support. The brigade, however, lacked sufficient helicopters to move itself in one lift. Four lifts, each taking over two hours, would be needed to move the entire brigade's combat power into the airhead. The artillery battalion was slated for the third lift. As a result, its guns would not be in place, ready to fire, until 1000 hours, four hours after Cerro's unit was on the ground. During that initial period, naval gunfire would provide artillery support. The USS Clancy, a Butterworth class destroyer, would be in direct support of Cerro's battalion. The battleship USS Kansas would also be on call to provide additional support as needed.
Attack helicopters, U.S. Army Apaches and Marine Corps Cobras, were also available as needed, should Cerro's unit be the target of a major Libyan counterattack. They would operate from a forward rearm and refuel point established in the center of the brigade's airhead or defensive perimeter. Finally, aircraft from the carrier Hornet provided both close air support and MIG cap, or air superiority.
Finished with his initial briefing, Cerro signaled the 1st Platoon leader to commence his brief back. Squatting down and balancing himself on the heels of his boots, Cerro listened as each principal leader in his company briefed him. He was interested in more than a simple regurgitation of the information he put out. Each platoon leader was expected to explain in detail how he would prepare and organize his platoon and position to accomplish its mission. Cerro mentally checked off each item as the platoon leader discussed the execution of his tasks. Whenever it was appropriate, Cerro made corrections or asked a question if the platoon leader said something that didn't make sense. In this way he made sure that all of his leaders understood their mission, had a plan for executing it, and understood what the other platoons in the company were doing. Only when he was satisfied that everyone understood his role and the roles of the other units in the company did Cerro release them.