General Horn reviewed the revised intelligence summary, less than two hours old, and clearly saw, through 20–20 hindsight, how they had missed calling this one. With so many of the limited intelligence assets in the region oriented on the Soviet deployment and the joint Soviet-Cuban-Libyan exercise, one seemingly insignificant man easily slipped by. The report started with a summary of sightings of a known Egyptian extremist, Muhammad Sadiq. A terrorist who had learned his trade in Lebanon, Sadiq had become a prominent leader in the pan-Arabian fundamentalist movement and, with connections in the Egyptian military, was considered to be a dangerous man. He was spotted in Tripoli, Libya, on 12 November after being out of sight for six months. The CIA tracked him: he was next seen in Cairo on 15 November, then on 29 November at the international airport in Rome, transferring from a plane just arriving from Tripoli to one headed for Cairo. After that, he fell out of sight again until today, when his body was identified by the Egyptian military at Cairo West. The CIA had shared this information with the Egyptian Government but not with CENTCOM, since it was a CIA and FBI matter that did not concern the military.
The next item in the summary described the increased readiness status of Libyan air defense search radars. Both the U.S. 6th Fleet and the U.S. Air Force operating out of Italy had monitored the increased activity by Libyan air defense not associated with the Soviet-Libyan exercise and forwarded their findings, separately, to the U.S. European Command; sanitized versions of the summary were provided to the Italian military, but not the Egyptian military. Because this information was strictly military in nature, it was not immediately passed to the CIA.
The final item, provided by the Egyptian military, identified three of the terrorists killed in the aborted assassination attempt as Libyan. Evidence to corroborate this claim, including a picture of one of the men standing with the Libyan head of state, was enclosed.
There was no doubt in General Horn's mind that the Egyptians were doing their damnedest to build a case against Libya. He had four questions that needed to be answered, and he put them to his crisis action team. First, why were the Egyptians building a case against the Libyans? Second, what would the Egyptians do if and when they blamed Libya? Third, what immediate actions, if any, should U.S. forces in the region take? Fourth, what actions, if any, would the Soviet and Cuban forces in Libya take?
Though there were no immediate threats to the American President or to U.S. forces, the presence of U.S. forces in Egypt and Soviet/ Cuban forces in Libya were factors that complicated the entire situation. If the United States unilaterally withdrew its forces, it might send a false signal to both the Libyans and other terrorist groups, as well as to the Soviets. In doing so, it would present the image of a nation easily frightened by acts of terrorism and willing to abandon a friend. Such a move would also allow the Soviets a free hand to use its forces to influence the situation as it saw fit. Finally, if the Egyptians retaliated and the U.S. forces were left in place, it would appear that the United States was sanctioning the actions of Egypt — actions that the United States might not be able to control — and was prepared to back Egypt, even if it meant confrontation with the Soviets. Any way he and his staff looked at it, Horn came up with a no-win situation for the United States, unless both the Americans and the Soviets could defuse the situation and quietly draw down their own forces simultaneously.
Horn put the summary down, leaned back in his chair, and turned to his operations officer. "Jim, where is the President now?"
Opening a folder that contained a revised itinerary, the operations officer looked at his watch, "then down the list. "He should be having dinner with the ambassador right now. The Egyptian president was to have been in attendance but excused himself."
His face still expressionless, Horn turned to his intelligence officer. "What about troop movements? Any reported activity on either side of the border in the Western Desert?"
The intelligence officer replied without referring to his notes. "Movements? No, not yet. But the entire Western Military District is on full alert, with the rest at a higher state of readiness. Air Force personnel have been recalled from leave. In addition, six guided missile boats and one frigate left Alexandria less than two hours ago. Libya has taken similar measures. Forces involved in the joint Soviet-Cuban-Libyan exercise have stood down and commenced redeployment to assembly areas south and west of Tobruk. Right now, each side has only a handful of aircraft and vessels in position and ready to pounce. We do not, however, have any indication that they will. Neither side appears to be really ready to do anything substantial."
Leaning forward, Horn continued his interrogation of his intelligence officer. "Okay, Edgar, I want your no-bullshit best guess what you expect to see happen in the next forty-eight to ninety-six hours."
For a moment there was silence. Then the intelligence officer answered, carefully considering his words. "I expect that the Egyptians will begin by building a case against the Libyans via the media. The photos and information on Sadiq provided to us is just the beginning — probably an attempt to get us to help spread the hue and cry. While the PR campaign is building, the Western Military District will be quietly reinforced, probably from units of the 1st Army. When world opinion has been sufficiently whipped up in their favor, the Egyptians will move."
The intelligence officer stood up and walked over to a map on the wall. Picking up a wooden pointer hanging from a string next to the map, he continued, pointing to the locations as he spoke. "I expect some type of limited retaliation, much like what the Egyptians did in 1978.1 see ground forces striking out at the Kufra Oasis and occupying it for several days before withdrawing. In the north, I see a combination of ground attack and commando operations aimed at destroying or damaging the oil fields at Sarir, Awjiah, Natora, Gialo, and Harash. We can expect naval operations along the coast, either limited landings or perhaps commando operations, aimed at destroying the refinery at Tubra, which we call Tobruk. It will take the Egyptians five days to stage their forces, four to five to do what they want, then three to pull back and dig in on their own side of the wire fence." Putting the pointer back onto its hook, the intelligence officer turned to Horn. "If we see no movement of 1st Army units in the next forty-eight hours, odds are the Egyptians will do nothing. If, however, they begin to move, the first crossing of the border will occur within ninety-six hours from that time."
Horn thought about that for a moment. "Why the 1st Army? Why not the 2nd Army? That's Egypt's best equipped and best led."
The intelligence officer pointed to Israel on the map with his finger. "Despite the Camp David agreement and years of peace, Israel is still seen as Egypt's greatest and most immediate threat. If the retaliation against Libya is only going to be a punitive raid, then it would be foolish, militarily and economically, to expose their rear by removing forces from the Sinai and moving all that equipment the entire length of Egypt. It would be much cheaper and put far less wear and tear on the equipment if units of the 1st Army are used. Also, the combat service support for the units in the Sinai are all layered to support operations in the east, not the west." The intelligence officer paused for a moment to allow Horn to consider what he had just said. "Having said that, if there is a sudden flurry of diplomatic exchanges between Egypt and Israel before Egypt begins to move any of its forces, then we may see movement of units from the Sinai to the Western Desert. That movement would mean a major war, not just a raid."