Egypt's enemies were not the only ones watching the Egyptian strike. The RWRs of the Egyptian aircraft detected a search radar coming from the north. That signal belonged to an American E-3 Sentry AWACS flying out of Italy. The larger and more capable E-3s had been flown in to supplement the U.S. Navy's E-2 Hawkeyes still operating off the decks of the 6th Fleet's carriers. The Americans, like the Soviets, were watching and reporting. Though they were not directly linked into the Egyptian air defense command, as the Soviets were linked into the Libyan system, the information gathered by the Americans would eventually find its way into Egyptian hands.
From the northeast, at a range of two hundred miles, the signal of an American-built E-2 Hawkeye flown by the Israeli air force was also detected. Like the Americans, they were merely watching and taking notes. Unlike the Americans, who for the most part viewed the conflict with a mild interest, the Israelis knew that they had a vested interest in what was going on. Information gathered by the Israeli E-2 on this and other Egyptian strikes would be studied in great detail. The tactics, attack profile, and results would be analyzed and used in the training of Israeli pilots in preparation for the day when they would have to defend themselves against just such an attack, perhaps against the same pilots.
Finally, from the east, the signal of their own American-built E-2 was detected by the Egyptian Mirage 2000s. Loitering above Mersa Matruh, the Egyptian E-2 AWACS monitored the strike force and the response of the Libyan air defense to the impending attack. Shortly after passing through one thousand meters in altitude, the Egyptian controller aboard the E-2 Hawkeye reported Libyan aircraft on an intercept course with the Mirages. In a calm, almost casual voice, the air control officer on the Egyptian Hawkeye updated the Egyptian strike force on the posturing of eight Libyan MIG-25M Foxbats west of the strike force.
Armed with a combination of four Soviet-built AA-6 Acrid and AA-8 Aphid air-to-air missiles, the MIG-25Ms were interceptors, hunting for the Egyptians. Through the use of automated uplinks, the Libyan ground-based search radar now locked onto the approaching Egyptian aircraft and fed course, range, and altitude information directly to the pilots of the MIG-25Ms. In this way the pilots of the MIG-25Ms would be able to close with the Egyptian aircraft without switching on their own search radars, thus exposing themselves to electron countermeasures or worse. Instead, the MIG-25Ms would approach their targets, designated by the ground controllers, until the MIGs were within one hundred nautical miles of their targets. On order, they would accelerate, switch on their radars, and lock onto their target. At that range, the powerful onboard continuous wave, or CW, radar of the MIG-25M used to illuminate the target for the air-to-air missile would be able to bum through any electronic jamming the Egyptians might use to break the radar lock. When semiactive radar homing, or SARH, air-to-air missiles were locked onto the MIG's CW radar reflections bouncing off the illuminated target, the pilot fired. When firing a SARH missile, the MIG pilot had to continuously illuminate the target with the MIG's radar until the missile impacted. If radar lock was not possible, then the pilot had the option of closing with the target and using his two heat-seeking missiles. Because a heat seeker homes in on the hot spots of an aircraft, the pilot could break away once he had launched the missile.
The appearance of the MIGs was expected but still disquieting to the Egyptian pilots. The natural reaction for the pilots of the Mirage 2000s was either to turn and evade or to turn and attack the MIGs. This, however, was not their assigned task. Their targets were the search and acquisition radars of the ground-based air defense systems in and around Tobruk. The MIGs belonged to a flight of American-built F-16 fighters.
Once he was satisfied that he had all the information necessary for the setup, the Egyptian air controller over Matruh began to issue orders. His first was to the crew of an American-built EC-130H electronic warfare aircraft. He ordered it to commence the jamming of the Libyan ground-based search radar that was providing data to the MIG-25Ms. Using power sources not available in smaller aircraft, the electronic warfare operator in the EC-130H found the frequency of the Libyan radar and switched on his jammer.
The reaction was predictable and immediate. The Libyan pilots, suddenly denied data from the ground station, panicked momentarily. They called for instructions, holding fast to the last course ordered. Two hundred miles to the southeast, in a bunker outside Tobruk, the radar operator at the ground station began to hop from one frequency to another in an effort to find one that was not jammed. One hundred and fifty miles further east, the EW operator on the EC-130H had also begun hopping frequencies, following the Libyan radar operator and frustrating his efforts to find a clear frequency.
The air control officer aboard the Hawkeye, satisfied that the ground station had temporarily lost control of the situation, next ordered the F-16s into action. Tracking the MIG-25s, he computed a plot that would allow the F-16s to intercept the MIGs well before they were in position to interfere with the Mirage 2000s. This information was passed on to the flight leader of the F-16s, who turned onto the intercept course and began to close at the prescribed speed.
Around the periphery of the electronic battlefield, the Russian, American, and Israeli AWACS watched as best they could, for the fight for the airwaves also affected their radars. On the ground, unable to find a clear radar frequency, the Libyan air defense commander ordered the MIG-25Ms to continue to close with the Egyptians and use their own radars to find and shoot down the enemy. Reluctantly, the Libyan MIGs continued to stumble forward, blindly, looking for the Egyptian Mirage 2000s somewhere to the east. The Mirages, on order from the controller aboard the Hawkeye, had changed both course and altitude, removing themselves from danger and clearing the way for the F-I6s, now screaming in from the northeast.
Sure that he had to be within range of the Mirages, the flight leader of the MIGs ordered his pilots to activate their radars. This order assisted the four F-16s. Coming on line, they made a slight turn, accelerated, and drove for the MIGs. From the Ilyushin 11–76, the Russians attempted to warn the Libyan ground control officer of the impending attack.
The warning, garbled through translation from Russian to Arabic in the heat of battle, confused rather than clarified the situation. Only the last part of the message, stating that F-16s were attacking, came through clearly to the air defense commander at Tobruk. Taken by surprise at the sudden appearance of F-16s, he ordered the antiaircraft batteries to switch on their acquisition radars. The acquisition radars immediately illuminated the F-16s, the Mirage 2000s, and the MIGs. To the east, the EC-130H detected the new radars and began to jam as many of them as possible.
Seeing that time was running out, the F-16 flight leader ordered his aircraft to fire, then break off the attack. The Mirage 2000s, their ECM pods on, turned toward the active acquisition radars and began to launch antiradiation missiles at the Libyan radars. The MIG pilots, lost and confused, suddenly found themselves under attack from an unexpected quarter. Reacting to the new attack, they turned toward the F-16s and fired heat-seeking air-to-air missiles at their attackers. On the ground, the harried air defense commander, unable to get a clear picture of what was happening, ordered his surface-to-air missile batteries to open fire. The commanders of the firing batteries, also unable to sort out who was who, began to fire at any target plot that appeared.
At one battery, a Soviet advisor watched a surface-to-air missile race down its launch rails. Once free of the rail, the missile sprinted skyward, followed by a tongue of flame and a plume of white smoke. The young captain, who had served in the Red Army for six years without ever seeing a live missile launched, stood and watched in awe. When the missile was lost from sight, he turned to the Libyan captain commanding the air defense battery and asked what he had fired at. Still watching the sky where the missile had disappeared, the Libyan shrugged his shoulders. "I do not know. But wasn't it beautiful?"