in his vice-president, Aleksandr Rutskoy, as president. Weapons were then handed out to civilians to defend the parliament building, known as the "Russian White House". On September 25, troops and militia loyal to Yeltsin surrounded the
building. On October 2 there were armed clashes between troops and supporters of the parliament, who had begun to fill the streets of Moscow. On October 4, Yeltsin declared a state of emergency in Moscow. Shortly thereafter, tanks began firing on the parliamentary building, leading to the surrender and arrest of everyone inside, including Rutskoy. The way was now clear for elections to a new parliament and a referendum on a new constitution in December 1993, which was duly carried.
Yeltsin's new constitution gave the president vast powers. The president appointed the prime minister, who had to be approved by the Duma, the lower house of the new Federal Assembly, and the president could issue decrees that had the force of law as long as they did not contradict federal or constitutional law. The president was also given the power to dismiss the Duma and call for new elections. The prime minister was the vital link connecting the president with the Federal Assembly. Although the prime minister was accountable to the Federal Assembly, in practice he could not remain in office without the confidence of the president - as became clear under the premiership of Chernomyrdin.
In trying to implement Yeltsin's economic policies, Chernomyrdin had steered a middle course between those favouring privatization and other free-market reforms and those advocating the continued support of inefficient Soviet-era state enterprises. He cultivated improved relations with the fractious Congress and brought inflation under control, while Anatoly Chubais and other reformers in the Cabinet oversaw the privatization of the industrial and commercial sectors of the economy. When Yeltsin won re-election to the presidency in 1996, he retained Chernomyrdin as prime minister. In March 1998, however, Chernomyrdin lost his post when
Yeltsin dismissed the entire cabinet, ostensibly for failing to implement reforms energetically enough, and installed a new leadership team to carry out ongoing economic reforms. Chernomyrdin himself had probably also offended Yeltsin by acting too independently and appearing to groom himself to succeed Yeltsin as president.
In the first two Dumas (elected in 1993 and 1995), the Communist Party of the Russian Federation was the single largest party, though it was never close to enjoying a majority. As it had inherited the infrastructure of the dissolved CPSU, it had the most effective nationwide organization. Other parties found it difficult to operate outside the major urban areas. Party loyalties were weak, and deputies jumped from one party to another in the hope of improving their electoral chances. Worrying to many was the success of the ultra- nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, which captured nearly a quarter of the vote in 1993 (though its share of the vote declined thereafter). Nevertheless, despite hostile and even inflammatory rhetoric directed towards Yeltsin and his foreign policy, Zhirinovsky's party generally backed the executive branch. Throughout the 1990s hundreds of parties were founded, but most were short-lived, as their appeal was based solely on the personalities of their founders. The liberal party of acting prime minister Yegor Gaidar, Russia's Choice, floundered once Gaidar was forced out of government at the end of 1992. Chernomyrdin's party, Our Home Is Russia, suffered a similar fate soon after Yeltsin dismissed Chernomyrdin as prime minister.
Despite the public hostility between the Duma and President Yeltsin, compromises were usually hammered out behind the scenes. Yeltsin used the threat of dissolution to secure the
Duma's support for his presidential bills, and deputies could never be confident of re-election in view of the voters' disgust with politicians. During Yeltsin's second term, some deputies tried to initiate impeachment proceedings against him, but they were defeated by the many legal obstacles to such a move.
Throughout the political turmoil of the 1990s, the weakened Russian state failed to fulfil its basic responsibilities. The legal system, suffering from a lack of resources and trained personnel and the absence of a legal code suitable for the new market economy, was near collapse. Low salaries led to a drain of experienced jurists to the private sector; there was also widespread corruption within law enforcement and the legal system, as judges and police officials took bribes to supplement their meagre incomes. The country's public services were also under severe strain. Because of a lack of resources, law- enforcement agencies proved unable to combat rising crime. As medical services collapsed, life expectancy declined and the population started to shrink.
Another consequence of the political and economic changes of the 1990s was the emergence of Russian organized crime. This has taken various forms, including the drug trade and the black market. Armed robbery has been particularly popular and easy because of the widespread availability of arms supplied to nationalist movements by those seeking political destabilization of their own or other countries. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, official Russian crime statistics had identified more than 5,000 organized-crime groups responsible for international money laundering, tax evasion, and assassinations of businessmen and politicians. Throughout most of the Yeltsin administration, shoot-outs between rival groups and the assassinations of organized-crime or business figures filled the headlines of
Russian newspapers, and created further disillusionment among Russians over the course of economic and political reform. The explosive rise in crime shocked most Russians, who had had little direct experience of such incidents in the Soviet era. The assassinations of well-known and well-liked figures, such as human rights advocate Galina Starovoytova, served to underscore the Yeltsin regime's inability to combat crime. The open warfare between organized-crime groups had diminished by the end of the Yeltsin era, not because of effective state action but because of the consolidation of the remaining criminal groups that had emerged victorious from their bloody struggles.
Economic Reforms
The new Russia faced economic collapse. In 1991 alone, gross domestic product (GDP) fell by about one-sixth, and the budget deficit was approximately one-fourth of GDP. The government of Mikhail Gorbachev had printed huge amounts of money to finance both the budget and subsidies to factories and on food at a time when the tax system was collapsing. Moreover, the price controls on most goods had kept their supply well below the levels demanded. By 1991 few items essential for everyday life were available in traditional retail outlets. The entire system of goods distribution was on the verge of disintegration. Since the central-command economy had existed in Russia for more than 70 years, the transition to a market economy proved more difficult for Russia than for the other ex-communist countries of Eastern Europe. The reformists had to balance the necessities of economic reform with the vested interests that had become extremely powerful under communism.
Although Russia's manufacturing sector was one of the world's largest, it was also very inefficient and expensive to support. It was heavily geared toward defence and heavy industrial products. The industrial managers and workforce, though highly educated, lacked the skills needed by a market- based consumer-led economy, and would therefore have to be retrained.