Tom Clancy: The doctrinal move of the sea services to specialize on the littoral regions has been going on for some time now and the force seems to have adapted well. Can you please tell us your views on how the transition from a "blue water" Navy to an inshore focus has gone?
Admiral Johnson: The transition has gone extremely well, though the Navy has always concentrated on that mission to some degree. You have to remember that the majority of the world's capitals and much of its population reside close to the shores of the world's oceans. Because of that, the Navy has always been tasked for littoral warfare. We kept the littoral missions at the forefront of our planning and preparation throughout this century.During the Cold War years that mission was somewhat overshadowed by open ocean missions. With the demise of the Soviet Union, what we call" blue water" missions have declined in importance somewhat. Overall, I think we're ideally tasked to meet the challenges of the new century with the force that we have today and the force that we're building for tomorrow. This includes systems like the land attack destroyer variant of the SC-21 escort design that we're currently designing.
Tom Clancy: So does this mean that the mission of the U.S. Navy in the 21 st century is going to be like that of the Royal Navy in the 19th century? In other words, showing the flag, keeping the peace, and letting the locals know that we're there?
Admiral Johnson: There's certainly a lot of that in our future plans. I think that the way that we would describe our mission in the Navy is that we plan to shape the environment or battle space. We will do that through forward presence. I might also add that we will do that while carrying the full spectrum of weapons, sensors, and other tools that we need, so that the national leadership does not have to wait for the action to be joined. That is critical because, as I like to say, there is no substitute for being there.The Navy has to be there and ready to trigger whatever kind of response might be required by a rapidly developing situation. That response might be little, it might be big. In one context we're the enabling force for follow-on units, and in another we're the striking power all by ourselves for whatever might be going on in a particular area. Our mission is always situational. There are times when we'll do port visits and paint schoolhouses. That's a part of our job. But we are also ready to kick somebody's ass if that's required. So to that degree, your Royal Navy analogy is quite valid.
Tom Clancy: One major change in how the military is doing business today compared to the past is that, unlike the CNOs of just a decade ago, you don't actually command ships and planes anymore. Under Goldwater-Nichols, the various branches of the military and their assets are combined into organization "package" forces for regional commanders in chief [CinCs] to use as required by the National Command Authorities. Under the new system that came into effect in the late 1980's, the world has been divided into regions and warfare specialties, with a joint unified command and a commander in chief [CinC] assigned to each. The CinCs package forces into joint task forces [JTFs], which are the basic working unit of joint warfare. Could you tell us a little about how that process works?
Admiral Johnson: As far as the Navy goes, I'm the "organize, train, and equip guy." I get the forces ready by making sure that the Navy is well staffed, that our personnel know what they're doing, and that the machinery to support them is of the right kind and in good working order. At the appropriate time, I turn over these forces to the warfighting CinCs. While those ships and aircraft are assigned to numbered fleets and squadrons, we often have to package them in some rather unique ways, depending upon the situation and the requirements.
Tom Clancy: By that do you mean contingencies like Haiti back in 1994? I recall that you stripped two big-deck aircraft carriers of their air wings, and replaced them with a couple of aviation brigades with helicopters and troops from XVIII Airborne Corps.
Admiral Johnson: Well, since I was the Deputy Joint Task Force [JTF] Commander and naval component commander of that operation, let me give you my two cents' worth on how that all worked out. It was really interesting and, I might add, the right thing to do for that situation. I was the commander of the Second Fleet at the time, and was looking at new ways to use carriers. I took some abuse from some of my Naval aviation pals at the time, who said, "Well, there you go, Johnson. You've sold naval aviation down the river. Next thing you know you'll be putting army helicopters on aircraft carriers."The truth of the situation is that I was not threatened by that at all. If you look at what the Navy and our joint service partners were asked to do in Haiti, and you put it into the context of that particular place, at that time, against that threat, and that total scenario, what we did was damned near perfect. It really was. Almost as close to perfect as you can get. Now, the next time, in a different place and situation, doing something like that may be the dumbest idea in the world. For Haiti, though, converting the carriers was as "right on" as anyone could have asked.
Tom Clancy: Once the need for the helicopters during Operation Restore Democracy was finished, how long did it take to get the regular air groups back on board and operating normally?
Admiral Johnson: Well, let me square you on this whole process. The Eisenhower [CVN-69] had the aviation brigade from the 10th Mountain Division, and the America [CV-66] had the folks from the Army's 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment at Fort Campbell. When we were ready to change back to normal, here's what happened. First the helicopters and their personnel cleared off to the Haitian mainland, and Eisenhower turned away. I was there, and watched this with my own eyes. The carrier battle groups left Port-au-Prince harbor, motored out past the island of Guni, and before they left the operations area, both had "trapped" their Tomcats, their A-6 Intruders, and their E-2C Hawkeye support aircraft. By the time that they headed north, both carriers had fully reconstituted air groups, and made the transit home mission-ready. It was a great use of carriers, in my view.
Tom Clancy: So would you say that one of the real challenges of this post-Cold War transition has been trying to adapt the minds and thinking of people in the Navy to new ideas and concepts? Making people say "Why not?" as opposed to "Are you out of your mind?"
Admiral Johnson: Absolutely. It's hard to adjust to change. And we're all guilty of resisting it sometimes, as it turns out. I'm as bad as the rest of them, even though I like to think that I'm open-minded. I am open-minded, until you start messing with one of my ships….
Tom Clancy: Could it not be said that your willingness to be "adaptive" with those two carriers may very well help to justify continued aircraft carrier development and procurement?
Admiral Johnson: It could indeed. I can tell you for a fact that the Navy gained a whole lot of new friends in the U.S. Army as a result of that exercise. Especially when their troops found out that they did not have to eat MREs [Meals, Ready to Eat] during the mission. In fact, here's an interesting piece of trivia from the commanding officers [COs] of those two carriers. It turned out that the soldiers from the two Army aviation units liked Navy chow so much, and ate so much of it, that we had to retool the resupply schedule. The soldiers were just shoveling down all this food on board the ships. Navy chow is good!