This is fine, as far as it goes. And yet, as we head toward the end of a century in which aircraft carriers have been the dominant naval weapon, it is worth assessing their value for the century ahead. More than a few serious naval analysts have asked whether the kind of carriers being built today have a future, while everyone from Air Force generals to Navy submariners would like the funds spent on carrier construction to be reprogrammed for their pet weapons systems. Two hard facts remain. First, big-deck aircraft carriers are still the most flexible and efficient way to deploy sea-based airpower, and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Second, sea-based airpower gives national leaders unequaled options in a time of international crisis.
With this in mind, let's take a quick tour of the "boats" that America has been building for the past half century. In that way, you'll get an idea not only of the design, development, and building of aircraft carriers, but also of the size, scope, and sophistication of the industrial effort all that takes.
American Supercarriers: A History
The atomic bombs that forced Japan to capitulate in 1945 almost sank the U.S. Navy's force of carriers. With the end of the war, as a cost-saving measure, most U.S. carriers were either scrapped or mothballed. And by 1947, the wartime fleet of over one hundred carriers had shrunk to less than two dozen vessels. Meanwhile, President Harry S Truman had decreed a moratorium on new weapons development, except for nuclear weapons and bombers to carry them. The Navy, desperate for a mission in the atomic age, began to design a carrier and aircraft that could deliver the new weapons.[27] The USS United States (CVA-58-the "A" stood for "Atomic" combat), would have been the biggest carrier ever built from the keel up (65,000 tons displacement). The Navy argued that immobile overseas Air Force bases were vulnerable to political pressure and Soviet preemptive attack, while carriers, secure in the vast spaces of the Norwegian Sea, the Barents Sea, or the Mediterranean, could launch nuclear strikes on Soviet Naval bases or deep into the Russian heartland.
Claiming that the newly created Air Force could better deliver the new atomic weapons with their huge new B-36 bombers, Air Force leaders like General Carl "Tooey" Spaatz lobbied intensively to kill the new carrier program. By persuading the Truman Administration that they could deliver nuclear weapons more cheaply than the Navy, the Air Force succeeded in having the United States broken up on the building ways just days after her keel was laid (April 23rd, 1949). Soon afterward, the Secretary of the Navy, John L. Sullivan, resigned in protest, leading to the "Revolt of the Admirals" (discussed in the first chapter), which allowed the Navy to make a public case for conventional naval forces. Once the Truman Administration realized the political cost of killing the United States, the cuts in naval forces were stopped. It was just in time, as events turned out. For the carriers recently judged obsolete in an age of atomic warfare held the line in the conventional war that erupted in Korea on the morning of June 25th, 1950.
Even before the end of the Korean War, the Truman Administration recognized the need for new, bigger, more modern aircraft carriers. Though he was never a friend of the Navy, President Truman nevertheless belatedly authorized construction of a new class of "supercarriers" similar to the United States, canceled just three years earlier. The first of the new flattops was USS Forrestal (CVA-59-the "A" now reflecting the new "Attack" carrier designation), which was followed by three sister ships: Saratoga (CVA-60), Ranger (CVA-61), and Independence (CVA-62). These were huge vessels, at 1,039 feet/316 meters in length and almost sixty thousand tons displacement. The Forrestal class incorporated a number of innovations, almost all of British origin. A 14deg angled deck enabled planes to land safely on the angled section, while other planes were catapulting off the bow. Steam catapults allowed larger aircraft to be launched. Also, a stabilized landing light system guided pilots aboard more reliably than the old system of handheld signal paddles. Along with the new carriers came the first-generation naval jet aircraft. Meanwhile, the Navy initiated a huge Fleet Rebuilding and Modernization (FRAM) program for older carriers and other ships, both to give them another twenty years or so of service life and to delay the need to buy so many expensive new ships like Forrestal.
The first Cold War confrontation in which aircraft carriers played a major role was the Suez Crisis in 1956; carrier groups assigned to the U.S. Sixth Fleet spent the next year supporting operations by U.S. Marines and other forces trying to restore stability in Lebanon following the Arab-Israeli war. In 1958, Task Force 77 got a workout in the Far East when it interposed between the forces of Taiwan and Communist China during the crisis over the islands of Quemoy and Matsu. Meanwhile, two new follow-on supercarriers were ordered-Kitty Hawk (CVA-63) in 1956 and Constellation (CVA-64) in 1957. Essentially improved and enlarged Forrestal-class vessels, they approached the upper limits of size and capability for oil-fueled carriers. The time had come for a break with fossil-fueled power plants, and the carrier that followed was truly revolutionary.
The successful development of nuclear reactors to propel submarines encouraged the Navy to put them in surface ships. Backed by the mercurial Director of Naval Reactors, Vice Admiral Hyman Rickover, an improved Kitty Hawk design was developed to accommodate a nuclear propulsion plant. Ever eager to maximize the influence of nuclear power in the Navy, Admiral Rickover dictated that the new carrier should have just as many nuclear reactors (eight!) as there were oil-fired boilers in each Kitty Hawk-class carrier. When the new carrier, designated USS Enterprise (CVAN-65), was commissioned in the early 1960's, she was so overpowered that the structure of the ship could not stand the pounding of a full-power run. There are stories of speed runs off the Virginia capes in which the Enterprise went so fast (some say over forty knots; the actual numbers are still classified), that she left her destroyer escorts far behind, without tapping her full power.
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The atomic combat requirement was outlined in a famous 1947 memorandum prepared by Rear Admiral Dan Gallery. He was a legendary Naval aviation figure (he commanded the escort carrier group that captured the German U-505 in 1944), and his paper would eventually start a virtual war between the Navy and the newly created Air Force. 28 The original carrier USS