Making his final address on the last day of the appeal, Mr Coomaraswamy pointed out that the Court of Appeal could order a re-trial. He said that although he had made complaints about the trial judge’s conduct, he was not for a moment saying that it was intended. “Those of us who know the judge know that he does things in a certain way, but the accused does not know, neither do the members of the jury.” Counsel said that he felt it unlikely that Ang would get a fair trial in a re-trial before a jury. The three stages of publicity, he said, to which the present case had been subject, would not give him a fair trial. He urged the Court of Appeal to give Ang a re-trial under Section 304, culpable homicide. This would be without a jury, but by a judge alone.
Dismissing the appeal on 19 November 1965, Justice Tan said, “It is true that the learned trial judge expressed himself with great emphasis and in strong terms on various matters. But the jury were left in no doubt that they were the sole judges of the facts in the case.”
Justice Tan dismissed as ‘quite trivial’ a good number of the grounds of so-called bias on the part of the trial judge. “In one instance, however, it is clear that the learned trial judge was in error, when he stated in his summing up that both the appellant and the witness Henderson used an improvised washer during demonstrations in court. In fact, it was Henderson who used an improvised washer, while the appellant used a new Healthway washer in the course of another demonstration. In our view this was a slip of no great consequence made in the course of a long trial, and is no indication of bias on the part of the learned trial judge.”
The Acting Chief Justice said, “The appellant’s real intention was to murder Jenny, and in pursuance of that intention he assisted Jenny in putting on the diving equipment, which had been brought in the sampan and allowed her, a novice, to go down alone wearing a flipper, which had previously been cut, into waters which he knew were dangerous and hazardous, with the result that she met her death.”
Sunny Ang was driven back to Changi Jail. He was still confident he would not hang.
Appeal To Privy Council
More than a year was to elapse before Ang’s application for special leave to appeal to the Juridical Committee of the Privy Council could be heard. On 5 October 1966, Mr Ralph Millner Q.C. appeared before the Committee on his behalf.
Sunny Ang’s legal advisers decided to base their application principally on the ground that Justice Buttrose wrongfully allowed the prosecution to tender evidence of the road accident in which Ang, driving the car with Jenny as the passenger, was involved. Such evidence was ‘evidence of the res gestas, and also evidence of similar acts by the accused to rebut the defence of accident or mistake’.
The prosecution, they said, appeared to rely upon this evidence as showing a previous attempt by Sunny Ang to kill Jenny, although this suggestion was never put to him in terms in cross-examination, ‘and does not appear in terms anywhere in the learned trial judge’s summing up to the jury’.
Sunny Ang’s legal advisers argued that this car accident was not connected with, and was removed in time from, the matters which formed the subject matter of the charge against Ang, and could not be said to be part of the res gestas (or the alleged intention of Ang to kill Jenny).
They held that the alleged acts of Ang on the day of the road accident were not ‘similar acts’ to those that the prosecution alleged he did in the commission of the offence with which he was charged. The evidence relating to the motor car accident, they said, would not have been sufficient to sustain a charge of attempted murder: at its highest it could only have given rise to some suspicion against Sunny Ang.
Therefore, they submitted, this evidence was irrelevant and inadmissible, and, as it was put forward in effect as evidence of some other offence or misconduct on his part, was highly prejudicial to Ang’s defence. Furthermore, the prejudicial effect was so disproportionate to any possible evidential value that it ought to have been excluded in fairness to Ang. In any event, the judge, having ruled that the evidence was admissible gave the jury no direction whatsoever as to how it was to be treated or applied. They submitted that if the evidence was admissible at all, he should have directed the jury that, if they thought the occurrence might have been a pure accident, the evidence would be of no assistance to them, and they should also ignore it if it only gave rise to suspicion. The evidence would have been relevant to rebut a possible defence of accident only if they were satisfied that Ang tried to kill Jenny by deliberately causing the accident. They held that the evidence would not sustain such a conclusion.
Ang’s petition to the Privy Council also submitted that Justice Buttrose misdirected the jury as to the effect of circumstantial evidence, in particular as to the way the jury should consider and evaluate the evidence relied upon by the prosecution as showing Sunny Ang’s guilt. Justice Buttrose had said that it was the cumulative effect of the evidence that was important not one isolated link in the chain of circumstantial evidence. He said it would be wrong to consider the case link by link, and reject any one link being by itself as too weak.
While the petitioners did not dispute that such a direction would be proper in a case ‘in which all the pieces of the circumstantial evidence are directed to show that an accused committed the particular act or was responsible for the particular omission which is relied upon as being the act of murder’, it was inappropriate and misleading where, as in Ang’s case, the prosecution alleged a number of acts or omissions, the cumulative effect of some, or all of which is relied upon as contributing the offence.
In Ang’s case, apart from evidence of motive or intention, and evidence as to subsequent conduct, which the prosecution relied upon as showing guilt, the prosecution case was that the death of Jenny was caused by: · Ang taking her scuba-diving in what he knew were dangerous waters and when, as he knew, she was a novice scuba-diver; ·
Ang cutting her flipper causing it to come off in the water and causing her to panic and to get into greater danger; and · his delaying, on a false pretence, for some ten minutes, instead of himself diving in or joining her, or making any effort to rescue her.
In these circumstances the judge’s direction to the jury as to how circumstantial evidence should be regarded was wrong. It was incumbent upon him to consider separately the various acts and omissions for which Ang was alleged to be responsible, and which taken together, made up the alleged crime. Instead, the judge invited the jury to lump all the circumstantial evidence together. He should have brought to their minds that the various pieces of circumstantial evidence were directed respectively to various acts and omissions, the combination of which the prosecution relied upon as constituting the crime of murder.
The petition said that the ‘main ingredient in the alleged crime of murder’ was the cutting of Jenny’s flipper. Ang’s act of cutting it, they submitted, was strongly in issue, ‘and there was some evidence to support the defence contention that it could not have been cut by Sunny Ang at the time and manner suggested by the prosecution’. Had the judge directed the jury correctly on the weight and effect of circumstantial evidence, he would necessarily have invited the jury to consider how the case stood if they were not satisfied that Ang had in fact cut Jenny’s flipper. He should have directed the jury in this context: that they should be satisfied that Ang induced or persuaded Jenny to scuba-dive in dangerous waters and so caused her death. The petition also argued that there was no direct evidence that Ang ever persuaded or induced Jenny to go to the particular spot where she made the dive from which she did not return. There was no direct evidence that Ang cut her flipper.