On the downside, the highly capable third-generation SSN — the SSN 20 project — intended to replace the Valiant class, had been recently cancelled as unaffordable. In its place there were plans for a second batch of Trafalgar-class submarines, due to enter service in 2003, fitted with the PWR2 reactor, the larger and more powerful steam-raising plant of the Trident class.
Inevitably, this cancellation would induce a ‘design and build gap’ and it saddened Conley to see some very capable submarine designers and engineers leave Foxhill for early retirement. By the time the new SSN — designed by GEC-Marconi and known as the Astute class — was ordered, VSEL, the sole submarine builder, now owned by GEC-Marconi, had also lost a lot of its own internal expertise in submarine construction. The Astutes, which in the event had many of the planned improved features of the ill-fated SSN 20, had a long and difficult gestation. Almost 50 per cent bigger than the Trafalgars, the first-of-class HMS Astute did not enter service until 2010, by which time she was years behind schedule and her hull cost had nearly doubled in real terms from the original £600m to £1,000m plus.
During the course of his appointment, Conley’s responsibilities were extended to assisting his commodore in the acceptance of surface ships from the shipbuilders, most notably from the firms of Swan Hunter (Tyneside), Vosper Thornycroft (Southampton) and Yarrow (Glasgow). On the submarine weapons systems side of his remit, there were many projects long overdue for final acceptance, including the Spearfish torpedo, which a small section of his officers based in an outpost of the Procurement Executive at Portland were addressing.
The submarine acceptance procedure involved Conley and his team conducting a series of material inspections. The first of these confirmed that a submarine was safe to proceed to sea on contractor’s sea trials, with the final inspection occurring when the building process was proved and the submarine was completed, just prior to commissioning. A key element of the procedures involved identifying and listing all extant defects and agreeing the rectification costs with the shipbuilder. Handover of the vessel and authorisation of the final staged contract payment occurred only after the successful completion of the post-commissioning sea trials.
As part of the peace dividend at the end of the Cold War, all four of the Upholder class were planned to be sold, but it was intended that the three boats still under construction be completed and demonstrated as being fully operational before being put up for purchase. Designed to replace the Oberon class, the Upholders had the specific wartime role of conducting a six-week patrol in the Iceland — Faeroes gap. Designed by VSEL, they were the first British single-screw diesel submarines of streamlined, teardrop ‘albacore’ form. With a much smaller crew than the Oberon class, many of the systems fitted to the Upholder were highly automated and this was to cause a number of problems.
It soon became evident that the class had several serious technical deficiencies, the first of these manifesting itself in Upholder herself during her sea trials in 1989 when she suffered a complete loss of power and propulsion. This, it was discovered, had been caused by a design defect which was only fixed after several months. Other problems which soon became evident included a paltry range of about 4,000 miles, serious safety concerns with the torpedo tube operating system — described as being like a computer driven by hydraulics — and the snort exhaust system, which leaked badly after use.
Arriving at the Cammell Laird shipyard in Birkenhead for the first time, Conley was briefed by Gordon Howell, its managing director. Howell was an extremely experienced and astute ship and submarine constructor who had started his career as an apprentice with Vickers at Barrow. Returned to private ownership in 1986 and renamed Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering Ltd (VSEL), the company had acquired the Cammell Laird yard as part of the deal. It was a sprawling 150-acre site on the west bank of the Mersey, a run-down complex of old buildings and sheds which, like many British shipyards at that time, was quite unsuitable for modern and efficient shipbuilding, though it did possess a covered construction hall. At the time Conley arrived, Unseen lay in the fitting-out basin with her sisters, Ursula and Unicorn, yet to emerge from the vast cavern of the hall.
Howell explained that, because there were no further orders in the offing, the workforce of about a thousand faced redundancy on completion of the present contract. Although he was trying his best to find a buyer for the yard, he was hamstrung because the yard did not qualify for either British or European Union intervention funding support for merchant shipbuilding. In the meantime, he was downsizing the estate, selling off pieces of land and other facilities where he could. He assured Conley that, notwithstanding this sad situation, he and his workforce were determined to complete the three boats to the very highest of standards. For his part Conley soon came to have the highest regard for Howell, with whom he got on well; together they formed a strong professional partnership.
Within a few weeks Conley and his team found themselves aboard Unseen in the early phases of her conducting contractor’s sea trials in the Clyde Estuary. Climbing onto the bridge he noticed her slow speed as she headed on the surface to her diving areas; about 10.5 knots was her maximum on the surface, although she was capable of 18 knots dived. There was a following wind and the bridge was shrouded in the exhaust gases from the two diesels. Apart from its toxicity, the acrid fumes reduced the ability of the bridge team to keep an efficient lookout. For some reason the designers had not built in a bulkhead under the casing to prevent the exhaust causing this serious problem. Conley was very much bemused by this extraordinary deficiency — the bridge diesel-exhaust problem must have been learned years ago — but thought it would not be costly to remedy.
Having dived in the North Channel between Scotland and Ireland, the priority for Conley and his team was to witness the leaking snort exhaust hull-valve problem through a series of snorting runs of different durations and engine loads. It was evident that as the one-foot diameter hull valve heated up after a period of continuous use, it distorted in shape. Consequently, when the snorting evolution was ended and, as part of the routine, the engines crash-stopped, the valve did not seat properly for some time, thus allowing several tons of seawater to pour into the engine room as it cooled down. This, of course, had serious safety implications. However, Conley reluctantly acquiesced that there was to be no quick fix before acceptance of the boats, other than ensuring the crew had a drill and equipment in place to immediately pump out the engine room bilges on completing snorting. He could have done with the presence of the Upholder project director, a senior civil servant, during some of the sea trials, but the latter suffered from claustrophobia and never went to sea on any of his submarines — a ripe comment on the PE’s placement policy and a reflection upon the little importance it placed upon its project directors actually getting to sea on their charges. Fortunately, the stalwart Gordon Howell was always present during the key sea trials phases and readily appreciated Conley’s concerns.
This was but one serious design shortcoming amongst others, the most notable being a small but plausible risk of the torpedo tube flood valves opening to the sea when the tubes’ rear doors were open. This type of problem was the cause of the catastrophic flooding resulting in the loss of the submarine Thetis in Liverpool Bay in 1939. Again, owing to the complexity of the torpedo tube control system, the only immediate solution was to introduce strict operating procedures to avoid serious flooding. Indeed, as the submarines were due to be disposed of and as the costs for the four boats had escalated to £1,350m at 2013 prices, there was no real impetus to fix the problems, other than the torpedo tube defect which had the most serious implications.