Eichmann was absolutely convinced that if he could succeed in destroying the biological basis of Jewry in the East by complete extermination, then Jewry as a whole would never recover from the blow. The assimilated Jews of the West, including America, would, in his opinion, be in no position (and would have no desire) to make up this enormous loss of blood and there would therefore be no future generation worth mentioning. He was strengthened in these views by the continual efforts of the leader of the Hungarian Jews, a fanatical Zionist, to persuade Eichmann to exclude from the transports Jews with large families. Eichmann repeatedly had long discussions with this Zionist leader on all questions relating to the Jews. Moreover it was interesting to hear that this man had up-to-date knowledge concerning Auschwitz and the number of transports, and of the process of selection and extermination. Eichmann’s journeys and his dealings with the authorities of the various countries were also kept under continuous observation. The leader of the Jews in Budapest was able to tell Eichmann exactly where he had been in recent weeks and with whom he had been negotiating.
Eichmann was completely obsessed with his mission and also convinced that this extermination action was necessary in order to preserve the German people in the future from the destructive intentions of the Jews. This was the way in which he regarded his task, and he employed all his energy in fulfilling the plans for extermination which the Reichsführer SS had made.
Eichmann was also a determined opponent of the idea of selecting from the transports Jews who were fit for work. He regarded it as a constant danger to his scheme for a “final solution,” because of the possibility of mass escapes or some other event occurring which would enable the Jews to survive. In his view action should be taken against every Jew that could be got hold of, and such actions ought to be pursued to their conclusion as quickly as possible, since it was impossible to anticipate the final result of the war. Already in 1943 he had doubts in a complete German victory and believed that the end would be inconclusive.
APPENDIX 4
Müller
Müller served as an officer in the First World War and later joined the Bavarian police. After Hitler had assumed power, he was transferred to the Bavarian political police under Best, who installed him in the office of the State Secret Police in Berlin.
He quickly assumed a prominent position in this office under Heydrich, and finally became head of the Gestapo himself.
Müller was a police official by choice. It was only after the assumption of power that he became a member of the Party, and it was comparatively late before he was enrolled in the SS.
His specialist knowledge of police methods (he always was an active executive) and his aptitude for the job were particularly useful in the development of the Gestapo. He also played a decisive part in its organization.
It was Müller’s principle to remain in the background, for he did not care to be associated with any kind of operations or actions. Yet it was he who organized all the larger and more important actions taken by the security police, and it was he who planned their execution.
After Heydrich’s departure he became the leading personality of the Reich Security Head Office, Kaltenbrunner was only the chief and concerned himself principally with the SD.
Müller was always well informed about the major political events in the Reich. He had many trusted friends in every kind of official position, especially in the economic sphere, with whom he kept in contact through third parties. He was adept at working behind the scenes.
Müller had only visited a concentration camp on a few occasions and had never inspected them all. Nevertheless he was always kept up to date on matters concerning them, and it was not for nothing that the head of the political department in each camp was a member of the police.
Eicke and Müller had got on very well with each other ever since the time when Eiche was commandant of Dachau and Müller was working with the Bavarian political police.
It was impossible to find out what Müller’s personal opinions were on matters concerning concentration camp prisoners. All his pronouncements on such questions began with: “the Reichsführer SS wishes that,” or “the Reichsführer SS orders.” His own point of view could never be discovered.
As adjutant at Sachsenhausen, and camp commandant at Auschwitz, and later more especially as head of department DI, I very often had dealings with him. But I never knew of a single occasion on which he said: “I decide this—I order that—I want this.” He always hid himself behind the Reichsführer SS or the chief of the security police and the SD, although the initiated knew that his was the deciding voice and that the Reichsführer SS or Kaltenbrunner completely depended on him in all questions concerning the prisoners. It was he who decided what appointments should be made and who should be dismissed, and he also had the final word in the executions, so far as they were determined by the Reich Security Head Office: that is to say that in important cases he submitted the orders for execution to the Reichsführer SS for signature.
He had an accurate knowledge of the far-reaching and delicate question of the special prisoners. He knew the exact details of each of these numerous prisoners and where they were accommodated and their particular weaknesses.
Müller was a tremendously versatile and tenacious worker. He was seldom away on duty and could always be contacted by day or by night, on Sundays and holidays as well, either in his office or at his home.
He had two adjutants and two clerks, whom he kept busy alternately day and night.
He answered every inquiry promptly, mostly through the Reichsführer SS, “since he must always first obtain the decision of the Reichsführer SS!”
I knew from Eichmann and Günther, who had much more to do with him than I had, that he controlled the actions against the Jews in their more important respects, even though he gave Eichmann a fairly free hand in the matter.
As I have already said, he was well informed about all the concentration camps and always possessed an accurate knowledge about Auschwitz, which he had personally never seen. He knew every detail, whether it concerned Birkenau or the crematoriums, or the numbers of prisoners or the mortality figures, with an exactitude that often astonished me.
My personal requests that he should slow down the actions so that the defects in the camps could be remedied were of no avail, for he always sheltered behind the strict order of the Reichsführer SS that “the actions which I have ordered are to be ruthlessly carried out.” I tried everything I could to move him in this matter, but in vain, although in other respects I managed to achieve a great deal with him where others never succeeded, especially later on when as DI he placed much reliance on my judgment. I now believe that they did not want to remedy the conditions in Auschwitz, so that the effects of the actions could be increased by their indifference.