I do not know what led to his final dismissal. He left Lublin and went to Trieste as a senior SS and police officer. I know nothing about his activities there.
The second occasion on which I had anything to do with him was in Lublin in the spring of 1943. There had been a dispute between us over some machines and tools which he had got the local DAW (at that time subordinate to him) to deliver to the DAW at Auschwitz. He had described some ancient junk as being the most up-to-date machinery and had used the same description in his report to Pohl.
Since he had personally given orders for these swindles he did not feel very happy about it, but he dismissed the affair without comment and gave me five really modern and most urgently needed machines for the Auschwitz DAW.
My administrative officer, Möckel, had to settle accounts with his department, which had also advised Pohl that the promised equipment had either not been delivered or had been delivered only in negligible quantities. Promises were made of deliveries on a grand scale, but they came to nothing.
At that time, the chief of the SS Personnel Head Office, SS Obergruppenführer von Herff arrived in Lublin to make the acquaintance of the officers of Globocnik’s department. Globocnik took the opportunity of showing him all his model establishments. He began by getting him to inspect the large quantities of Jewish property collected in the former aircraft factory and “his” Jewish workshops where the most hopeless commodities were turned out, ranging from brushes to doormats. Everything he did was done in a way that can only be described as flashy. The Jews there, who had really organized it all, had effectively deceived Globocnik and his officers. They created as many supervisory positions as possible for themselves and then proceeded to conduct their own businesses. This was confirmed to me, later on, by Globocnik’s staff officer Höfle….
As might be expected, he regarded the Lublin concentration camp as “his” camp. He issued orders and instructions to the commandants which completely contradicted those given by the Concentration Camp Inspectorate or by Pohl. This was the cause of perpetual dissension. Globocnik, however, always managed to get his way with the Reichsführer SS by pointing out to him the special position that Lublin occupied. He hardly bothered about instructions that came from the Reich Security Head Office. He organized “his own” police actions, when it suited him. He carried out executions at his own discretion. He built labor camps for the prisoners just where he liked, without bothering in the least about Pohl or DII, for to him they were always “his” camps and “his” prisoners. In the same way he regarded Sobibor, Belzec, and Treblinka as “his” extermination centers.
Eichmann, who had known Globocnik during the time of the SS’s illegal activities prior to the invasion of Austria, was greatly bothered by him. While I spent my time arguing with Eichmann about slowing down the transports of Jews to Auschwitz, Globocnik was saying that he could not get hold of enough. He wanted to be in the forefront with “his” exterminations and “his” collections of valuables.
As his adviser on exterminations, he had SA Oberführer Oldenburg, from the Führer’s Chancellery, who before the war had devised methods of liquidating mental patients.
Among Globocnik’s extermination centers, I saw Treblinka on the same tour of inspection.
The training camp in Trawniki was also a creation of Globocnik’s. He wanted to form a separate unit of Russian guards, and had obtained the consent of the Reichsführer SS.
As might have been expected, these guards, who were called police, were unreliable. A company of them was given to me for Auschwitz. After a short time fifteen fled, taking with them all the weapons and ammunition they could lay their hands on, and during the chase that followed they engaged their pursuers with fire, which resulted in the deaths of three junior officers. All of them were recaptured, except three who managed to make their escape. The company was immediately disbanded and distributed among all the concentration camps.
His staff officer, Höfle, came to Oranienburg in 1944 and should have taken over the position of commander of a protective custody camp. In spite of the lack of suitable officers, even Glücks refused him the post. He had been too long under Globocnik’s tuition. I learned from Höfle something about Globocnik and his machinations.
Globocnik wanted to create a large German settlement in “his territory.” With this in mind, he chose the district around Zamosch. He promised the Reichsführer SS that he would move 50,000 new German settlers there within a year, as a model for the large settlements which it was intended to build later on in the far eastern districts. He wanted to collect the necessary cattle and machines required for this purpose in the shortest possible space of time. But the district he had chosen was then occupied by Polish peasants. He therefore began straight away to evacuate them. He was quite indifferent as to where they were to go, but left that for the UWZ or the Reich Security Head Office or the BDS in Cracow to work out. His main concern was to get the area ready to receive the 50,000 new settlers. According to Höfle’s descriptions this resettlement organized by Globocnik must have been catastrophic. Moreover, the German settlers themselves were by no means satisfied. Their hopes were unfulfilled and they worked themselves to death under the unusual conditions, waiting endlessly for Globocnik to give them assistance.
In the summer of 1943 Globocnik visited Auschwitz on Himmler’s orders to inspect the crematoriums and examine the method of extermination. He was not, however, particularly struck by what he saw. His own installations were far quicker in operation and he began to quote figures to emphasize the daily rate of extermination (for example, I remember he talked of five trains arriving daily at Sobibor) and the enormous amount of property which he had collected. He recklessly exaggerated at every opportunity.
I always had the impression that he believed what he was saying. I knew from Eichmann that, for technical reasons connected with the railroad, only two trains at the most could arrive at Sobibor each day.
After the incorporation of Austria, Globocnik became Gauleiter in Vienna. He caused so much mischief, however, that he soon had to be removed.
He was in reality a good-natured person, and in my opinion his deceptions were due to his pomposity and self-importance. Whether or not he made anything for himself out of the confused muddle of the Reinhardt action in Lublin, I do not know, but I would not put it past him. The officers and men of “his territory” certainly did well out of it. The special SS tribunals were given plenty of work and not a few death sentences were pronounced.
It had become almost a mania with Globocnik to requisition and utilize everything that was within his reach. He wanted to be able to supply the Reichsführer SS with an immense amount of money, and to excel even Pohl by means of “his business undertakings.” He was completely unscrupulous and he never even considered whether “his requisitioning” was right or not. This attitude naturally affected his subordinates, and since hardly any control was exercised over them, many organized their own requisitioning and made a flourishing business out of it, or else they stole whatever they could lay their hands on.
Globocnik’s staff was nothing less than a collection of misfits. But they nevertheless managed to make themselves indispensable and liked by him, which was not very difficult considering his poor knowledge of human nature. When their misdeeds had to be covered up, Globocnik gave them his help, both out of good nature and so that his own intrigues would not come to light.