Jonathan Wilk was relentless. How could anyone know these were Judd’s words? Couldn’t they be McNamara’s own conclusions? Couldn’t he have put them in recently, even today? Hadn’t a newspaperman invented the whole story?
McNamara shouted, “That’s a lie!” Reprimanded by the judge, he sputtered the names of the neighbours to whom he had told the story, then, in repeating the wording, got the quotation wrong. Finally he admitted, No, he wasn’t sure of the exact quotation.
“Or if there was a quotation at all!” Wilk snapped. But he wasn’t done with his prey. And what did the phrase “friendly judge” mean? Even if Judd had said it, couldn’t he have meant that a jury would be unfriendly, after being stirred up by wild campaigns to creatre prejudice? Was McNamara not only a note-taker but a mind-reader?
Sweating, the policeman growled, “No, I’m not that smart, not as smart as any million-dollar lawyers.”
Wilk looked up at Judge Matthewson. There it all was. They were bracketed together, in prejudiced minds. A million-dollar lawyer before a judge who would be friendly to millionaires.
McNamara lurched from the stand.
Thus on this note of hatred, the testimony ended; the case that was to explore our deepest philosophies, free will, guilt, and compulsion, closed with charges and countercharges of lying, shouts of money influence, with prejudice-stirring, with words bitter and base that were yet to reach into the last moment of the trial.
I WONDER WHETHER in all courtroom history the speaking effort of one man was ever awaited as was the speech of Jonathan Wilk for the defence of Steiner and Straus. Perhaps there was in this anticipation the sense that all the probings, all the expert testimony, had still fallen short of an explanation, and that only the ultimate effort of a great man could lift the meaning before us.
I kept wondering about Wilk in another way. For weeks he had been striving with all his might for these two boys in the crowded, dense, boiling courtroom. Yet, though Judd in particular seemed always to be trying to reach him with his gaze, Wilk did not appear to respond. It was as though Wilk defended them on principle, even, perhaps, against an inner sense of revulsion. His summation would have to be virtually an abstract plea for pure mercy, then.
And surely it would be the last great murder trial in which the tired, ageing Wilk would take part; never again could such extreme circumstances arise. Pure mercy – for murder, pure, without even a concomitant sense of guilt.
So Padua pictured the killing, as he took the first turn at summation, speaking smoothly, convincingly, reciting the law from Blackstone to our own day, precedent after precedent proving that hanging and only hanging, only the extreme penalty, was called for. Mitigation? For what? For their superior intelligence? For their superior advantages in wealth and luxury? For their waste of life, for destroying other lives as well as their own? No, as long as the death penalty existed in human law, it was mandatory in a case of this kind.
Then Ferdinand Feldscher spoke for the defence, proving by precedent after precedent that consideration of the youth and mental condition of the defendants should bring a jail sentence. A hanging would be atavistic. And he awakened a sympathy for himself; we could not forget that he was a relative. And through sympathy for him, there was sympathy for the boys.
The next day came Czewicki’s turn. It was a memorized speech filled with gruesome images piled one on the other; the effect was like turning the pages of an illustrated Inferno. His task was to deal with the psychiatric testimony, and his burden was that it was a virtual hoax, since the defendants were admittedly legally sane. Mad dogs were suffering from illness, but not these pervert prodigies, these vicious lust-killers.
To him, Edgar Feldscher replied, reviewing the entire relationship of psychiatry and criminal law and urging, earnestly, that the tragic case yield, for humanity, a further step in the use of the new science as an aid to justice. Of all who had spoken until then, he touched us most, for there was a deep perplexity in him, and even more than had been felt from his brother, an unashamed personal concern for the defendants. When Edgar Feldscher turned toward them in his plea that their lives were young, that one or the other, sick as they were, might yet have much to give, his voice lost its pitch. He ended by recalling that it had been the wish and hope of the defence that both sides should participate in the psychiatric study; it was still his wish and hope that the use of such knowledge should prevail, in place of oratory, in man’s search for justice.
There remained only Wilk and Horn.
Although only one individual, Judge Matthewson, would render the verdict, the trial was not a play rehearsed behind a dropped curtain. The entire world had become a jury. Thousands of letters, telegrams, petitions, even death threats, inundated the court. Could Wilk move enough feeling, literally sway it, to the side of pity?
If the doors had been crowded before, the day of the great attraction brought an unimagined assault. Their shirts blotched with sweat, the linked bailiffs tried to hold back the charge, when suddenly there was a roar of pain. A bailiff’s arm had been broken.
For half an hour Wilk waited, until there was complete order. The judge nodded, and Wilk arose.
We think of a great speech in terms of an oration that has a rising structure and a shattering climax. And we were indeed to be moved, but not in a continuous line.
He spoke for two days, during four sessions.
In such a lengthy address there were of necessity times when his delivery was relaxed and when he seemed only to be shambling about the courtroom. But the total effect was of a piece. It was of a man talking from his heart, in an intimate and serious conversation.
He began in a low, almost tired key, touching at once upon the question that was on everyone’s mind – the avoidance of a jury.
“Your Honour, it has been almost three months since the great responsibility of this case was assumed by my associates and myself. I am willing to confess that it has been three months of great anxiety. Our anxiety has not been due to the facts that are connected with this most unfortunate affair, but to the almost unheard-of publicity it has received. Newspapers all over the country have been giving it space such as they have almost never before given to any case. Day after day the people of Chicago have been regaled with stories of all sorts, until almost every person has formed an opinion. “And when the public is interested and demands a punishment, it thinks of only one punishment, and that is death.
“In this stress and strain, we did all we could to gain the confidence of the public, who in the end really control, whether wisely or unwisely.
“It was freely published that there were millions of dollars to be spent on this case. Here was to be an effort to save the lives of two boys by the use of money in fabulous amounts, amounts such as even these families never had.
“We announced to the public that no excessive use of money would be made in this case, either for lawyers or for psychiatrists, or in any other way. We have faithfully kept that promise.
“There are times when poverty is fortunate. I insist, Your Honour, that had this been the case of two boys of these defendants’ age, unconnected with families supposed to have great wealth, there is not a State’s Attorney in Illinois who would not have consented at once to a plea of guilty and a punishment in the penitentiary for life. Not one.
“We are here with the lives of two boys imperilled, with the public aroused. For what?
“Because, unfortunately, the parents have money.
“I told Your Honour in the beginning that never before had there been a case in Chicago where on a plea of guilty a boy under twenty-one had been sentenced to death. I will raise that age and say, never has there been such a case where a human being under the age of twenty-three has been sentenced to death.