34 US Marines overwatching a walled garden, Hue. (USMC)
35 US Marine Ontos crewman, Hue. (NARA)
36 US Marines wearing gas masks, Hue. (Getty)
37 US Marines fighting house to house, Hue. (Topfoto)
38 General Jacques Massu. (Getty)
39 Larbi Ben M’Hidi. (Getty)
40 Casbah, Algiers. (Topfoto)
41 French paras enter Algiers. (Getty)
42 Saadi Yacef. (Getty)
43 Patroling soldier in Belfast, Northern Ireland. (IWM, MH30550)
44 British soldiers fire at rioters, Northern Ireland. (IWM, HU41939)
45 British soldiers patrol in Belfast, Northern Ireland. (IWM, TR32986)
46 British soldiers marching to control riot in Londonderry. (IWM, HU43396)
47 British troops guard a barricade, Northern Ireland. (Topfoto)
48 Aftermath of PIRA bombing, Belfast, Northern Ireland. (Fred Hoare)
49 Russian soldier in Grozny. (Topfoto)
50 Chechen fighter in Grozny. (Getty)
51 Destroyed Russian BMP2 armored personnel carrier, Grozny. (Getty)
52 Chechen fighters, Grozny. (Getty)
53 Ruins of Grozny. (Topfoto)
54 Israeli infantrymen, Jenin. (IDF)
55 Israeli Merkava tanks, Jenin. (IDF)
56 Israeli infantry, West Bank. (IDF)
57 Israeli infantry enter building, Jenin. (IDF)
58 Israeli Merkava tank observing Jenin. (IDF)
59 US soldier senter Ramadi hospital. (Defense Mil)
60 Euphrates River, Ramadi.
61 US infantry providing security, Ramadi. (US Military)
62 US Marines in urban combat in Iraq. (USMC)
63 US M-1A1 tank in firefight, Iraq. (USMC)
64 USMC infantryman, Ramadi. (USMC)
65 Rebel forces, Libya. (Getty)
66 Libyan rebel army, Tripoli, Libya. (Getty)
67 Syrian rebel forces, Aleppo, Syria. (Getty)
CHAPTER 1
URBAN WARFARE, PAST AND FUTURE
Urban Warfare — a military term that received unprecedented attention just prior to and after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 — describes the conduct of military operations in cities. As the US military entered combat in Iraq in 2003, the American military and public were both in awe of urban combat and made nervous by the challenges it posed. Supremely confident in their ability to fight and win a battle of armored vehicle maneuver, the US Army was much less confident about urban warfare. To the US Army it was a new, mysterious, and particularly nefarious type of warfare for which the US military was historically unprepared, and of which the US military was particularly wary.
That such a view prevailed in 2003 is not surprising given the generally poor knowledge of history within the general public and even among some of the professional military. The facts are, however, that urban warfare is not a new phenomenon; the US military has quite a bit of experience with urban warfare; and though, like all war, urban warfare can be brutal and costly, it is not unusually more so than warfare in many other environments. Urban warfare became the norm for US military operations in Iraq between 2003 and 2011. The nature of those operations in Iraq, including tactics, and operational and strategic context, was a natural extension of the type of urban warfare that developed over the latter half of the 20th century, since World War II. Modern urban warfare, in many respects, is not too different from urban warfare as practiced throughout the history of warfare. Given how warfare has evolved in the last decades of the 20th century, many experts believe that the complex urban battlefield will be the common environment for warfare in the 21st century. If that is the case, then military history is going “back to the future,” as an examination of military history reveals that urban warfare is common, and in fact is more common in the history of warfare than classic battle in the open field.
Urban warfare has existed since men began to wage war on other men. War is fundamentally about one group imposing its will on another group. The 19th-century German military philosopher, General Carl von Clausewitz, defined war as pursuing politics by other means. The word politics comes from the Greek word politika. Aristotle described politics as “affairs of the city.” In Greek the word for city is polis. In the modern world, as in the ancient, political discourse mostly takes place in large urban areas. Cities are where laws are passed and leadership resides. Logically then, to use force to impose political will on a group of people often requires that that force be exercised where the people live, where their leadership resides, and where they carry out their political activities — in cities. Politics, cities, and warfare are inextricably linked, and because of that connection, military forces through history have devoted much of their capability and effort to fighting for, in, and around cities.
Beyond the general nature of politics, there have been, and to this day remain, real, important military reasons for fighting in and for cities. One of the most important reasons for attacking a city was to capture the enemy’s political, economic, or cultural center, thereby destroying his morale, his ability to sustain a war, and his capability to govern. In other words, the city was attacked because it was the enemy’s center of gravity. This resulted in numerous battles for capital cities such as Rome and Paris. In ancient times, the Persian Empire’s efforts to subdue the independent Greek city-states centered on the most important city-state and its capital, Athens. Between 492 and 479 BC, the Persians mounted three separate unsuccessful campaigns to capture the Greek cultural and economic center. The Greeks succeeded in defending Athens in a series of brilliant battles fought not in the city but on its land and sea approaches. These victories were central to the Greeks’ successful resistance to the Persian invasions. In 1453, the successful siege and capture of the Byzantine capital of Constantinople by Muslim forces not only spelled the end of the Byzantine Empire but also ended Christian efforts to dominate theMiddle East. Thus, the successful attack or defense of a key city could decide the outcome of the campaign, the war, or the fate of an empire.
Attacking the urban political center of an opponent was often, but not always, decisive. The Persians eventually did capture an abandoned Athens but it did not lead to the success of their campaign. The capture of Mexico City by US forces in 1847 did not compel the surrender of Mexico. Napoleon’s successful capture of Moscow in 1812 did not compel the capitulation of Russia for, as historian David Chandler explained, the French capture of Moscow allowed the Russians to seize the initiative in the campaign and then wait for “General Winter” to wreak havoc on the French army. Napoleon’s focus on capturing the enemy capital and not on destroying the enemy’s field army contributed directly to the failure of his Russian campaign and his disastrous retreat. Attacking an urban area as a means to defeat a nation required careful evaluation of the military situation, geopolitical factors, culture, and economics before executing operations. An incomplete understanding of the role and importance of the urban area to the opponent could lead to an extensive expenditure of time and resources with little operational or strategic gain.
A compelling reason to attack urban areas was military operational necessity. Commanders sometimes attacked an urban area to destroy an enemy force located there or because of the strategic location of the urban area. Often the urban area contained a capability that was necessary for future operations. When defending, a commander often located his forces in an urban area because of his inferior capability and the increase in combat power provided by the inherent defensive qualities of the urban terrain. These reasons compelled commanders to engage in urban operations for purely military reasons. Strategic geographic position was an important reason for deciding to attack or defend a city. Wellington’s bloody siege of Badajoz in 1812 was necessary to secure the primary invasion route into Spain. During the American Civil War, General Ulysses Grant’s decision to capture Vicksburg was primarily motivated by that city’s strategic location on the Mississippi River. When Vicksburg surrendered on July 4, 1863, the Union gained unchallenged control of the river and divided the Confederacy geographically. This success greatly inhibited support and communications between the eastern and western Confederate states and was a devastating blow to the South’s morale and prestige.