North Vietnam also recognized that South Vietnamese and American military operations were generally achieving success in their efforts to expel the North Vietnamese military from South Vietnam, and subdue the Viet Cong. Because of this, the DRV determined that the situation in the South would continue to deteriorate unless they made a bold move. General Vo Nguyen Giap, commander of the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN), received permission from the DRV government to launch a general offensive in the South in 1968, supported by a general uprising of South Vietnamese communists. The PAVN scheduled the offensive to begin during the Tet holiday, a time when much of the South Vietnamese army would be on home leave. The objective was to use a combination of PAVN regular troops, in conjunction with the Viet Cong, to strike at key targets, mostly urban areas, throughout the South. American and South Vietnamese army forces would be destroyed as they counterattacked. Simultaneously, a spontaneous general uprising of the South Vietnamese population against the RVN’s government would ensure the destruction of the South Vietnamese government.
The city of Hue was assigned as the objective of the Tri Thien Hue Front command. The North Vietnamese plan to take the city was relatively simple. Viet Cong guerrillas, in civilian garb, would infiltrate the city in the days before the attack. They would observe targets and position themselves for the attack. On the night of the attack, the Viet Cong would spearhead the attack on the civilian targets and join with two battalions of PAVN sappers to attack military and government positions in the city. Two full regiments of PAVN infantry would then flow into the city to prepare it for defense against the inevitable counterattack. A third PAVN infantry regiment had the task of ensuring that the PAVN line of communications into Hue remained secure.
A Battle in Four Phases
The Viet Cong and PAVN launched their attack in the early, dark hours of January 31, 1968. It was timed to coincide with hundreds of other attacks all over South Vietnam, and achieved complete surprise. The initial attacking force, numbering perhaps as many as 10,000 PAVN and Viet Cong troops, captured most of the city with virtually no resistance. The PAVN 6th Regiment entered and secured the Citadel area north of the river aided by Viet Cong in South Vietnamese army uniforms who overwhelmed the Citadel’s west gate guard detail. The PAVN 4th Regiment quickly secured the south side of the river. The PAVN troops had received special training in urban fighting and immediately began to dig in and prepare defenses. Outside of the city, the PAVN 5th Regiment set up defensive positions to protect the attackers’ line of communications and supply into the city. At the same time that regular troops prepared for the inevitable counterattack, a special cadre of political officers moved through the city with a list of several thousand individuals to be placed under arrest.
Though the attack to capture Hue was a remarkable feat of arms that used stealth, intelligence, and boldness to seize the city with almost no fight, the execution of the assault was not flawless. The North Vietnamese had identified literally hundreds of large and small objectives inside the city, but the three most important were the headquarters of the 1st Army of Vietnam (ARVN) Infantry Division in the northeast corner of the Citadel; Tay Loc airfield, also in the citadel just to the north of the Imperial Palace; and the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) compound, which housed the 1st ARVN Division’s American advisors, located on the south side of the river. The commander of the South Vietnamese division, Brigadier General Ngo Quang Truong, had had several indicators of an impending attack and therefore had his division on full alert. His headquarters was fully manned and operating, as were all of his units, although over half of the division’s strength had been released on leave for the Tet holiday. General Truong was mistaken in his assumption that the North Vietnamese attack would not be directed at Hue itself, because of the city’s unique status and importance. Nonetheless, when the PAVN attack came, Truong’s division was alert and ready to respond.
The PAVN 6th Regiment’s attack through the Citadel moved rapidly from the southwest to the northeast. Little resistance was met until the North Vietnamese attacked Tay Loc airfield. The airfield was defended by the 1st ARVN Division’s reconnaissance company, an all-volunteer elite unit that, though outnumbered, held the airfield against repeated PAVN attacks. The 6th Regiment’s assault did not slow at the airfield but rather flowed around it and ran into Truong’s alert 1st ARVN headquarters. Like at the airfield, Truong’s headquarters troops resisted fiercely inside their walled compound. The PAVN attack had been preceded by a rocket bombardment of the entire city. That bombardment alerted the personnel of the MACV compound on the south side of the city. Thus, when sappers and troops of the PAVN 4th Regiment assaulted the MACV position they were met by a hail of fire from the first of the compound’s defenders to get to their positions. A machine gun on top of a 20ft tower, manned by a US Army advisor, mowed down the first wave of attackers. Similarly, a key bunker occupied by several US Marine advisors was manned and firing to stave off the first assaults on the compound gate. Though both positions were rapidly silenced by the PAVN, they delayed the attack just long enough that the remaining garrison was able to man defensive positions, beat back the attack and inflict severe casualties. Thus, though the PAVN attack was very successful in capturing 95 percent of the city, it failed to capture the three most important military objectives in the city. Although the airfield and two compounds were small failures compared to the wide success of the PAVN almost everywhere else, they were to prove decisive as these positions became the basis of the counterattack to retake the city.
By the morning of January 31, the PAVN was firmly in control of Hue, and PAVN soldiers openly patrolled the streets of South Vietnam’s second largest city. Fighting raged at the airfield, while the PAVN were content to bombard the 1st ARVN headquarters and MACV compound with rockets. The ARVN and MACV radioed for reinforcements but all over South Vietnam chaos dominated on the first full day of the Tet Offensive. The requests for assistance were lost in the avalanche of reports that deluged all major headquarters across the country. Slowly, however, a response was formed and the outline of the battle for Hue emerged. The remaining battle would occur in three distinct phases which were related, but generally independent of each other. One battle occurred on the north side of the river between the ARVN and the PAVN 6th Regiment. A second battle occurred on the south side of the river between the PAVN 4th Regiment and US Marines. A third and final battle integral to the operation to recapture the city occurred to the west and north of the city between the PAVN 5th Regiment and elements of the US 1st Cavalry Division.
The Initial American Counterattack
Marine Lieutenant General Robert Cushman III was responsible for American forces in the vicinity of Hue. He was not sure of the situation in Hue but was aware early on January 31 that there was a need for reinforcements in the city. He ordered that Task Force (TF) X-Ray — located at the large US Marine base at Phu Bai, the closest US headquarters to the city — reinforce US forces in the city and relieve the besieged MACV compound. Brigadier General Foster LaHue, the assistant division commander of the 1st Marine Division and commander of TF X-Ray, was unaware of the scale of the attack in Hue, and thus responded by dispatching A Company, 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment (A/1/1) to relieve the MACV compound.