The conversations between Sattar and Deane began with the issue of recruiting local police to protect the neighborhoods north of Camp Ramadi. Sattar, who was a minor sheik of a relatively small tribe, understood that by himself he would not be able to alter the balance of power in the city, so he worked behind the scenes with the other sheiks, convincing them that their long-term interest lay with the coalition and cooperation with US forces. His force of personality, despite his minor status, was sufficient that on September 9, 2006 he met with Colonel MacFarland, commander of the 1BCT and presented him with a written pledge declaring the Al-Anbar Awakening. That document, signed by 11 sheiks, pledged loyalty and cooperation to the CF and opposition to AQI. There was some vagueness regarding the government of Iraq in Baghdad, but Colonel MacFarland ignored that and welcomed his new allies.
The Al-Anbar Awakening was a turning point in the battle. The sheiks made hundreds of fighters available as recruits for the IP. More importantly, their tribal neighborhoods immediately became coalition-friendly and IEDs and sniping in those areas ceased immediately. The sheiks contributed a wealth of intelligence on AQI that included safe houses, names of leaders and fighters, supply routes, and weapons caches. They also began an active recruiting campaign to bring more sheiks into the alliance against AQI.
With the support of the sheiks, the 1BCT’s offensive of establishing COPs could continue with new momentum. Though the hundreds of Iraqi police recruits would not be available until they completed weeks of training, the sheiks’ loyal followers instantly became a militia of auxiliary fighters that could control terrain in their own neighborhoods, facilitate the establishment of COPs and take over COPs in the neighborhoods that were now friendly to the coalition. This “flip” by the sheiks took away AQI safe havens, intelligence sources, and manpower. It essentially made AQI militants fugitives in much of Ramadi. In return for the sheiks’ support the 1BCT shared intelligence with them, provided protection and support when necessary, and steered millions of dollars in contracts and business to members of the allied tribes.
The Al-Anbar Awakening was the second disaster for AQI in Iraq, the first being the aggressive determined COP strategy of the 1BCT. AQI recognized the magnitude of the strategic change represented by the Sunni shift in allegiance and attempted to stop it. They attacked the new allies of the coalition to attempt to coerce them back into supporting their ideal of an Islamic State of Iraq. They also stepped up coercive pressure on sheiks who were neutral, or who may have been contemplating switching sides. The battle of the Shark Fin in November 2006 was an example of AQI’s unsuccessful bid to keep the Sunni sheiks loyal.
Around 3pm on November 25, Lieutenant Colonel Chuck Ferry, commanding 1st Battalion, 9th (TF 1/9) Infantry at Camp Corregidor (TF 1/9 Infantry replaced 1/506 Infantry in October), received a call from Sheik Jassim Muhammad Saleh al-Suwadawi. The sheik was not a participant in the Awakening, but was one of the group of sheiks who had moved from being an active supporter of AQI to neutral. The sheik was the leader of the Albu Soda tribe, a small group located in an area east of Ramadi and just south of the Euphrates River called the Sufia, known as the Shark Fin by the Americans because of the shape of the bend in the river course. Jassim had been in secret discussions with both the Americans and Sheik Sattar as he contemplated joining the Awakening. He purchased a satellite cell phone so that he could stay in contact with Sheik Sattar. On November 25 he was using that cell phone to report that AQI fighters were attacking his people and he requested the help of the TF 1/9 Infantry to defend the homes of his tribe.
Colonel Ferry did not know Sheik Jassim, and he was in the midst of preparing for an operation to push in the opposite direction, into central Ramadi from the east, but he understood the concept and intent of the 1BCT plan, and thus he made a quick decision to reorient his task force and dispatch a tank and infantry team to support the sheik. At the Shark Fin, more than 50 AQI fighters arrived in several cars and trucks, armed with RPGs and AK-47 assault rifles. They immediately engaged a small contingent of the Albu Soda tribe who were armed but outnumbered. As this was occurring 1BCT moved unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) over the scene and commanders were able to observe by video the firefight going on at the Shark Fin between the followers of Sheik Jassim and AQI. The 1BCT requested air support and quickly two US Marine F-18 fighters and a Predator drone aircraft were above the fight ready to support. The TF reaction force of Bradley fighting vehicles and Abrams tanks proceeded toward the area.
Colonel Ferry could see the sheik’s men and AQI engaging on the video and he was able to talk to the sheik on the cell phone (through his translator). The F-18s were in position but the fighters were too closely engaged for the fast-attack aircraft to safely engage, so instead they made high-speed low-level passes and mock attack runs over the fight to let AQI know they were there in position and prepared to participate. The 1BCT was also in contact with the sheik, and they had his men wave towels and scarves so they could be identified on video. The AQI fighters, unnerved by the jets overhead, decided to break off the attack but as a final act of intimidation they tied the body of a tribal fighter to the bumper of their vehicle and dragged it behind their convoy of four vehicles as they loaded up and departed the Shark Fin. This was a mistake.
The cars dragging the body down the road were clearly visible to both the UAVs and the F-18s. As the cars left the neighborhood and they could be safely engaged they were attacked by the F-18s and the Predator-firing Hellfire missiles. Three of the four vehicles were destroyed. Other AQI fighters leaving the scene were intercepted by TF 1/9 who, using the night-vision devices on their vehicles, ambushed the fleeing AQI vehicles with tank and Bradley fire. By dawn the task force’s quick reaction force was linked up with Sheik Jassim’s fighters at the Shark Fin, the area was secure, and another sheik had joined the Awakening. Jassim’s forces lost seven fighters while over a dozen AQI fighters were killed. The Shark Fin, one of the most important AQI support areas in eastern Ramadi, quickly became another bastion of support for the coalition and the Awakening movement, and a source of police recruits.
The Shark Fin fight was typical of the synergistic effects of the aggressive 1BCT tactics and the Awakening movement. The BCT inspired the sheiks to resist AQI, and the resistance of the sheiks enabled the aggressive tactics of the 1BCT. By November 2006, the operations of the 1BCT were hitting their stride. The brigade had control of over 70 percent of Ramadi, more sheiks were joining the Awakening movement, and both the coalition high command and the Iraqi government were becoming aware of and supporting the effort to pacify Ramadi. Hard fighting remained however. In December TF 1/37 began pushing east into some of the last AQI strongholds to establish police stations in preparation for the growing operational Iraqi police force. When the operation ended in January 2007 they had killed 14 AQI fighters, captured 72, and most importantly, established three police stations. By the end of January 2007 over half the tribes, 450,000 of the citizens of Ramadi were part of the Awakening movement. Most of the rest of the sheiks had openly declared their neutrality and had ceased resisting 1BCT and its Iraqi army and police allies. Only a handful of tribes were still in the AQI camp and they were mostly located in east Ramadi.