I have discussed, in broad terms, the growing authoritarianism that conservatives are making part of American government and politics. Needless to say, I find this trend troubling. I am struck by how an understanding of authoritarianism explains the patterns of behavior that I have seen time and again during my years of observing government and politics. It answered questions about why people who call themselves conservatives act or respond as they do. I have only touched on the subject. Authoritarian behavior is often described as “protofascists,” which led me to read deeply and widely about fascism. For example, Professor Robert O. Paxton recently observed that a “fascism of the future—an emergency response to some still unimagined crisis—need not resemble classical fascism perfectly in its outward signs and symbols…. An authentically popular American fascism would be pious, antiblack, and, since September 11, 2001, anti-Islamic as well.”[98] Are we on the road to fascism? Clearly we are not on that road yet. But it would not take much more misguided authoritarian leadership, or thoughtless following of such leaders, to find ourselves there. I am not sure which is more frightening: another major terror attack or the response of authoritarian conservatives to that attack. Both are alarming prospects.
Like Dick Cheney’s, my memory is seared by Vietnam and Watergate, and so it appears is Bob Altemeyer’s. His work initially caught my attention because he noticed that as Watergate unfolded, the public was very slow to react. For example, the Watergate burglars from the Nixon reelection committee were arrested inside the offices of the Democratic National Committee on June 17, 1972. Polls conducted shortly before the 1972 elections showed that some 62 percent of the voters dismissed the Watergate break-in and resulting investigation as “mostly politics.”[99] Notwithstanding the growing and hard evidence of the president’s deep involvement, public opinion was slow to change or turn against Nixon. Americans want to believe in their president, and for that matter, their own representatives or senators—although they may hold Congress and politicians in general in low esteem. Altemeyer understood what few did: It was not public opinion that forced Nixon from office. He correctly noted that Nixon resigned “because [Nixon’s] attorney had forced the disclosure of evidence so damaging that it seemed certain he would be convicted of high crimes by the Senate.” This is true, but there is more to the story.
In fact, Nixon had many defenses that he could have mounted had he gone to trial in the Senate, many of which Bush and Cheney are promoting today under the rubric of national security and the inherent power of the presidency. The reason Nixon did not go to trial was not his loss of support on Capitol Hill, which he might have rebuilt, but rather because he lost the support of his defenders, principally on the White House staff. Other than White House counsel Fred Buzzhardt, and possibly chief of staff Al Haig (with whom Buzzhardt had roomed at West Point), no one was aware that Nixon was lying about what he knew and when he knew it once the cover-up had initially fallen apart. Nixon provided the lawyer he had hired to defend him in the House’s impeachment inquiry, James St. Clair, with false information, and St. Clair—as it happened—was a man of integrity and not a right-wing authoritarian follower. When he found out that his client had lied to him he had two choices: to resign or to join the new cover-up. He was, as it happened, interested in participating in the latter. Nixon at one point considered defying the Supreme Court ruling that he turn over his incriminating tapes (evidence that revealed that his defense was a sham) on the very grounds that Bush and Cheney argue: They have authority under the Constitution to read it and comply with it as they see fit. Once it was apparent that Richard Nixon had broken the law, he made the most significant decision of his presidency: the decision to honor the rule of law and resign.
What does this have to do with authoritarianism? Everything, for there is little doubt in my mind that Bush and Cheney, in the same situation, would not budge; rather, they would spin the facts as they always have, and move forward with their agenda. The president and vice president, it appears, believe the lesson of Watergate was not to stay within the law, but rather not to get caught. And if you do get caught, claim that the president can do whatever he thinks necessary in the name of national security. Bush and Cheney have also insulated and isolated themselves so that when they break the law—which they have done repeatedly—they have already built their defense. To protect themselves, they have structured their White House as La Cosa Nostra might have recommended, and surrounded themselves with men who owe their careers to their bosses. All of the key staff people close to Bush and Cheney have very long relationships with them. These have been mutually beneficial relationships. Stated differently, Bush and Cheney are protected by staff who will take a bullet for them. That, I believe, is precisely what Scooter Libby is doing for Dick Cheney regarding the Valerie Plame leak, and if he goes down, he knows that Cheney will take care of him, unlike Haldeman and Ehrlichman, who were on their own when Nixon cut them loose (and they turned on Nixon). Scooter Libby is now gainfully employed by the Hudson Institute, a conservative think tank, and according to the Washington Post, “[H]is salary is on par with the going rate for the deep thinkers—presumably at least as much as his $160,000 White House gig—and that, if he wants, he’ll probably still have time to do some consulting or work on a second novel.”[100]
Bush and Cheney are protected as well by loyal supporters (ranks of right-wing authoritarian followers). When those few individuals out in the departments and agencies who have been distressed by the White House policy on torture or electronic surveillance of Americans have leaked information about such activities, the political damage has been minimal. The White House takes the hit, and then claims, “Hell, yes, we’re protecting Americans from terrorists.” Many of Nixon’s abuses of power were motivated by a similar desire to “protect Americans from communists.” Nixon, for all his faults, had more of a conscience than Bush and Cheney. They cannot think of a mistake they have made since coming into office, and in doing so display self-righteousness far beyond Nixon’s. Bush and Cheney are Double High authoritarians, far above Nixon’s league.
What has driven this book is the realization that our government has become largely authoritarian. It is run by an array of authoritarian personalities, leaders who display all those traits I have listed—dominating, opposed to equality, desirous of personal power, amoral, intimidating, and bullying; some are hedonistic, most are vengeful, pitiless, exploitive, manipulative, dishonest, cheaters, prejudiced, mean-spirited, militant, nationalistic, and two-faced. Because of our system of government, these dominators are still confronted with any number of obstacles, fortunately. Yet authoritarians seek to remove those complications whenever they can. They are able to do so because the growth of contemporary conservatism has generated countless millions of authoritarian followers, people who will not question such actions. How, then, can authoritarianism be checked?
Not easily. Bob Altemeyer’s work reveals that only a few right-wing authoritarians who become aware of their conduct deal with it. They stop trusting those who are not to be trusted; they put away their prejudice; they drop their mean-spirited, narrow-minded intolerance; and stop trying to bully people. They realize their inconsistencies and contradictory beliefs, and start thinking critically; they learn to deal with the fear that has driven them to find comfort in authority figures that never really deliver, who would rather keep them fearful. They find true conservatism, which respects the rule of law. They find their consciences. Unfortunately, this is a very small number of individuals; they are the exception and not the rule.
99.
Bob Altemeyer,
100.
Al Kamen, “Scooter Finds Fellowship at the Hudson Institute,”