The X-16 mock-up was finished in mid-1954. It consisted of the fuselage and included the cockpit, camera bays, a stub wing, and landing gear. A separate mock-up of the J57 engine was also built. The mock-ups were housed in a special tent, with access limited to project personnel. By October 1955, the prototype X-16 was 80 percent completed. But it was already too late.[30]
Kelly Johnson also had heard about the request for a special high-altitude aircraft. Although Lockheed had not been asked to submit a proposal, he did so anyway. The CL-282 was an XF-104 fuselage fitted with long-span wings. It was much smaller than the X-16—44 feet long with a 70.67-foot wingspan. The emphasis was on weight savings. The airplane had no landing gear; the CL-282 was to take off from a wheeled dolly, then land on two skids. The cockpit was unpressurized, and there was no ejector seat. The camera bay was behind the cockpit.
Johnson's proposal arrived on Seaberg's desk on May 18, 1954, some two weeks after the go-ahead for the RB-57D and X-16. In June, Seaberg recommended the CL-282 be rejected. The primary reason was its use of the General Electric J73 engine. This was an unproven (and ultimately unsuccessful) design. The XF-104 fuselage could not be easily enlarged to accommodate the preferred J57 engine. The air force agreed with Seaberg's recommendations. But Johnson had already submitted the proposal elsewhere.[31]
The CIA was keeping in close touch with the air force on the emerging special reconnaissance program. The CIA's assessment of the CL-282 was very different from Seaberg's. It was "considered to be the best." It had a maximum altitude of 73,000 feet over the target and a speed between 450 and 500 knots. The prototype could be ready in a year, with five planes delivered in two years. The X-16, it was noted, could only reach 69,500 feet and had inferior speed and range.[32]
The CL-282 proposal came at a critical time. Although the Soviets exploded their first A-bomb in 1949, they had limited production facilities. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Soviet delivery systems were similarly limited. They had only Tu-4 bombers — copies of the B-29 propeller bombers.
They were slow and capable of only a one-way attack on the United States.
By the early 1950s, this situation started to change. The first operational Soviet A-bombs were being deployed. Test flights of the Soviet turboprop Tu-95 and Mya-4 jet bombers were under way. The Soviets were also working on long-range ballistic missiles. For the first time, a surprise nuclear attack on the United States seemed possible.
On March 27, 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower told the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization, "Modern weapons had made it easier for a hostile nation with a closed society to plan an attack in secrecy and thus gain an advantage denied to the nation with an open society." The United States was vulnerable to both a surprise attack and political blackmail. These fears also drove up military spending, which Eisenhower saw as a danger to the U.S. economy. On July 26, Eisenhower asked Dr. James R. Killian, the president of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "to direct a study of the country's technological capabilities to meet some of its current problems." The group was to look at ways of overcom-ing the lack of strategic intelligence on the Soviet Union.
One member of the panel Dr. Killian assembled was Dr. Edwin H. Land, a noted photo scientist. Dr. Land was named to head Project 3 of the Technological Capabilities Panel, often called the "Land Panel." Dr. Land once said that discoveries were made by people who had freed themselves from conventional thinking and had the ability to take a new look at old data. Dr. Land realized that technological advances promised a revolution in photo reconnaissance — thin plastic film bases, lens designs which increased resolution 500 percent, computer custom grinding of lenses, and innovative camera designs that allowed a single camera to provide both high-resolution and horizon-to-horizon coverage. Use of a camera incorporating these advances would save weight, increase performance, and provide the intelligence the United States needed."
The Land Panel was briefed by Seaberg on the Fairchild M-195, the Bell X-16, the Martin RB-57D, and the Lockheed CL-282. Aware of the growing support for the Lockheed plane, Seaberg showed the panel a graph that demonstrated that all three designs were aerodynamically similar. If the CL-282 was fitted with a J57 engine, it would be competitive. The following day, Johnson underwent intensive questioning about the CL-282. Johnson said he would use a J57 engine. He also promised to have the prototype ready within eight months after the go-ahead. This was an extraordinary schedule — the RB-57D and X-16 projects had been under way for several months yet the RB-57D would not fly until November 1955, while the X-16 would not go aloft until early 1956. Johnson said he could beat them both, although all Lockheed had was a "paper airplane."[33]
On November 5, 1954, Dr. Land wrote a memo to CIA Director Allen Dulles. Entitled, "A Unique Opportunity for Comprehensive Intelligence,"
it stated about the CL-282: "No proposal or program that we have seen in intelligence planning can so quickly bring so much vital information at so little risk and at so little cost."
Land noted that, "We have been forced to imagine what [the Soviet's] program is, and it could well be argued that peace is always in danger when one great power is essentially ignorant of the major economic, military, and political activities… of another great power… We cannot fulfill our responsibility for maintaining the peace if we are left in ignorance of Russian activities."
The memo recommended that the CIA develop the CL-282, then set up a task force to operate the aircraft, make the overflights, and analyze the photos. Cost for six aircraft, training, and operations would be $22 million. The memo stressed time was of the essence — soon the Soviets would develop radars, interceptors, and guided missiles able to reach 70,000 feet.[34]
On November 24, 1954, a meeting was held with President Eisenhower.
Present were Allen Dulles, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Defense Secretary Charles Wilson, Air Force Secretary Harold Talbott, and Air Force Generals Nathan Twining, Donald Putt, and C. P. Cabell. Eisenhower agreed to production of thirty "special high-performance aircraft." Initial funding would come from a special CIA fund. The air force would buy the special high-altitude version of the J57 engines. Total cost was $35 million. Once the aircraft was ready, he would decide on the overflight program.[35]
Eisenhower was very specific about how the program was to be run. The aircraft "should be handled in an unconventional way so that it would not become entangled in the bureaucracy of the Department of Defense or troubled by rivalries among the services." This meant the air force would provide support, but the CIA would have control of the program. By having the CIA make the overflights and analyze the photos, the intelligence would not become entangled with the internal politics of the air force. Additionally, as a "civilian" aircraft, it could be "disowned" if shot down.
The initial contract for twenty airplanes at a cost of $22 million was signed on December 9, 1954. Unlike an air force contract, there was not a long list of technical specifications. The CIA listed only performance specifications. The project was given the initial code name "Aquatone." Later, this was changed to "Idealist." To the Skunk Works, the aircraft was "the Article" or "the Angel."
32
Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum for Record, Subject: Special Aircraft for Penetration Photo Reconnaissance, (Washington, D.C.: May 12, 1954).
33
Chris Pocock,
34
Edwin H. Land, Memorandum for: Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: A Unique Opportunity for Comprehensive Intelligence (Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, B.C.: November 5, 1954).
35
A. J. Goodpaster, Memorandum of Conference with the President (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kans.: November 24, 1954).