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APPENDIX III – Field Deployment of an American Armored Division

During World War II, the U.S. Army had two types of armored divisions. The 1st and the 4th through the 20th Armored Divisions were “light” divisions, each with approximately 11,000 men and 168 medium tanks. The 2d and 3d Armored Divisions were “heavy” divisions, each with approximately 13,500 men and 232 medium tanks. Both types of division had a number of light tanks; because of their extremely limited capability, they were used primarily for reconnaissance. Some felt that the light divisions, based on the highly successful German panzer divisions, would be more effective than the heavy divisions. This was a highly controversial issue among the armored force staff. It was finally decided to leave the 2d and 3d as heavy armored divisions.

The thinking behind the light armored divisions was based on quantitative numbers instead of the qualitative capability. In relative qualitative comparisons of the strength of the main tank forces, the Germans held an edge of at least five to one. Although the light armored divisions did an excellent job, it was soon discovered, after the Normandy invasion, that they did not have the staying power to take horrendous casualties and recover as rapidly as the heavy divisions. As a result, it was decided that in assault operations the 2d and 3d Armored Divisions had to be used to a much greater degree than the lighter units.

Armored Force Tactical Doctrine called for the operation of two types of armored units. The first was the GHQ tank battalion, designed to work with and support infantry divisions. The second was the armored division, a completely self-contained unit containing tanks, self-propelled artillery, and mechanized infantry.

In addition, the armored division contained all the necessary support arms, including reconnaissance, combat engineers, supply, medical, and maintenance. This provided a single unit with the firepower, mobility, and shock capability necessary for independent combat operations. The mission of the armored division was not to make the initial breakthrough but rather to exploit the breakthrough made by the GHQ tank battalions and infantry divisions.

The armored division had the capacity to supply itself for three days without outside assistance. Its immediate objective was not to engage other enemy armored units but instead to bypass them and attack artillery and supply units and destroy enemy infantry reserves before they could deploy. By not dissipating its armored striking power by engaging enemy tanks, the division would maintain its full capability.

This tactical doctrine was developed simultaneously by a group of young British and American officers in the late 1920s and early 1930s. By adopting the tactics and basic mission of horse cavalry and modernizing it with tanks and other mechanized units, an entirely new type of combat unit was created. The Germans obviously came upon the same idea.

An American heavy armored division deployed in the following manner: The basic unit consisted of a division headquarters, three combat commands, and the division trains. The division headquarters consisted of the headquarters company, a reconnaissance battalion, and a signal company. Each combat command consisted of a headquarters, a recon company, two tank battalions with two medium tank companies and one light tank company each, an armored infantry battalion, an armored field artillery battalion with eighteen M7 self-propelled 105mm howitzers, an armored combat engineer company, an ordnance maintenance company, a medical company, and a supply company. The division trains consisted of their headquarters, the ordnance battalion headquarters company, the medical battalion headquarters company, and the supply battalion headquarters company. In addition, a heavy armored division had attached to it an antiaircraft battalion, a tank destroyer battalion, and a heavy artillery battalion of 155mm GPF rifles mounted on an M12 tank chassis. This gave the division a total strength of approximately 17,000 men and 4,200 vehicles. Had the division ever gotten on the road in single file, in normal march order interval, it would have stretched 150 miles from the head of the column to the end.

Once the division deployed to exploit a breakthrough, it moved out with two combat commands abreast and one in reserve. Each combat command contained two separate task forces, moving as much in parallel as the contours of the land would permit. The front of a heavy armored division could vary in width from several hundred yards up to twenty miles depending upon the terrain. During the daylight hours, each task force had available four P47 fighter-bombers under the direct control of an air force liaison officer who rode in the lead half-track with the task force commander. The task force’s mission was to advance rapidly toward its objective, leaving any resistance to be cleaned up later by the infantry, which might arrive within the next few hours to two days.

At night the combat elements would coil off the road and form a circular perimeter. The tanks and infantry would form the outer perimeter, and the maintenance, medical, and supply units would be inside, where they could do their work. At daybreak, when the combat units moved out, the maintenance unit commander had to make certain critical decisions. All vehicles repaired and ready for action would be returned to their units. All others would be towed to the next stopping point. If there were more vehicles than the wreckers could accommodate, a vehicle collecting point (VCP) was established. The ordnance company commander would detach a maintenance platoon to establish the VCP and repair the vehicles that were left behind. This could take several days. During this period, the maintenance platoon would be completely isolated behind enemy lines and be responsible for its own security.

After the vehicles were repaired, they returned to their original units, and the maintenance platoon went forward to rejoin the ordnance company. In some instances, there would be several VCPs along the route of advance. As soon as any platoon finished its repairs, it would leave the others and return to the company. By utilizing this system, plus the replacement vehicles brought up each day by the ordnance liaison officer, the combat command was able to maintain its effectiveness during long, continuous operations.