Выбрать главу

Monitoring all this closely was the spy-infested Russian mission to NATO. This quasi-diplomatic outfit enjoys a remarkably privileged status at alliance headquarters in Brussels, with regular briefings, spacious offices and security badges that allow its members preferential access to meetings, documents and other facilities. This friendly treatment dates from the days when NATO tried to soft-soap Russia about the alliance’s expansion to the former Soviet empire. By opening up to Russia, NATO hoped to dispel any fears about its intentions; belief persists among some member countries that differences with Russia are merely the result of misunderstandings, and that confrontation would be a sign of failure. This approach is heartfelt, particularly in Germany, where it is an article of faith among senior officials that Russia must be embraced and reassured, not deterred. The theoretical argument about whether relations would be even worse without this approach is unresolvable. What is clear is that attempts to build trust have proved unsuccessful in practical terms. On issues such as terrorism NATO puts cards on the table, and receives in return Russian offerings dressed up as serious intelligence, though in truth they are little more than could be found out on the internet. The Russian spies posted to the NATO mission are numerous, ubiquitous, unscrupulous and energetic. They bluntly and repeatedly approach officials whom they regard as promising targets. They are adept at keeping their distinctive ID badges concealed and slipping into meetings to which they have not been invited. Their chief targets are the alliance’s future military thinking, especially its contingency plans; new capabilities, for example in cyber-warfare or missile defence; and NATO’s codes and communications – the alliance’s central nervous system. They have a sharp eye on counter-intelligence: trying to find out what NATO members know about Russia, and where it comes from. They like to have a clear idea of who is being trained for what, by whom, where, and how well.

A paradox here, as so often in intelligence work, is that many of these secrets are both closely guarded and yet not very interesting. NATO’s abilities and capabilities have shrivelled since the end of the Cold War. Many of its members spend risibly little on defence. Many of the member states’ governments have little interest in Russia, and find it hard to share the worries of countries such as the Baltic states and Poland. In a crisis, NATO’s effectiveness depends almost wholly on the United States. Russian intelligence penetration of NATO probably peaked at a time when it revealed a lack of secrets, rather than their existence. Russia’s lavishly resourced spies do not mind about that. For a start, NATO HQ is a good place to recruit highfliers from the countries that matter – chiefly America, Britain, France, the Netherlands, Norway or Turkey – who will go on to careers in their national defence and security establishments. Secondly, Brussels is a great place for agent-running. Belgian counter-intelligence is weak. Only a handful of officers deal with Russia. They have no powers of arrest and face grave difficulties in obtaining warrants. All this is a serious problem for the hard-pressed NATO Office of Security.

A deeper reason for Russian behaviour is a paranoid mind-set conditioned partly by the Cold War, partly by the alliance’s expansion, and partly by the NATO-led bombing of Serbia in 1999.[20] With the Soviet Union out of the way, Russians believe, America and its allies turned a neutral front yard into a cordon sanitaire, deliberately designed to humiliate and constrain the former superpower, and breaking a promise made to the Soviet Union in exchange for German reunification.15 What if NATO decides next to help one of Russia’s near neighbours, say Georgia, or Ukraine, or Moldova, in some military flare-up? When dealing with a powerful and unpredictable military alliance on your borders it is better to have too many sources than too few. Nobody is going to complain about having too much information about NATO’s inner workings. The more the diligent spies report that NATO is ineffective and distracted, the more the instructions come back to dig deeper and find the real story.

Other international organisations are at even greater risk. The mental barriers to giving away secrets are lower (betraying your country or its military alliances is one thing, betraying an anonymous bureaucracy is another). Whereas NATO at least tries to keep spies at bay, the headquarters of the European Commission and European Council in Brussels are a security nightmare: a warren of badly policed offices and unvetted staff, where outsiders can walk in and out almost at will on the flimsiest of pretexts. The European Parliament, newly important since the Lisbon Treaty carve-up gave it and the EU’s big countries the main role in the union’s decision-making, is a particularly vulnerable target. Its members (and office staff, on their behalf) can demand almost any document they like from the European Commission. Staffers are lightly vetted (or not at all) and can ask for a briefing or an informal chat with any official.

The EU, it should be noted, is not in the position to treat Russia the same way. For a start, it has no intelligence-gathering service of its own. Weak leadership, squabbles and bureaucracy plague its misnamed ‘External Action Service’, which is supposed to spearhead a more decisive and better-informed EU diplomacy. An intelligence agency requires much greater grip and focus than a diplomatic service. If the EU cannot yet run a foreign ministry and embassies properly, it has no chance of developing a spy agency capable of dealing with a tough target such as Russia. The only advantage of this is that a bad intelligence agency is more damaging than none at all. If you don’t spy, you can’t bungle; you can’t be fooled by bad sources or get good ones into trouble. The disadvantage is that politicians may lack full knowledge of the people and thinking that they are dealing with. The EU is also unable to get proper intelligence from its member states. For the handful of member countries (chiefly Britain and France) that do have real intelligence services, the job is mostly outwitting the EU on matters of national interest, not helping the Eurocrats to raise their game. Even when European and national interests do overlap, the EU is seen as too leaky to be trusted with more than the stalest crumbs of intelligence.

As with all intelligence agencies, it is one thing to gain a flow of information, and another to use it correctly. American decision-makers are overwhelmed by a ‘fire-hose’ of classified, secret, top-secret and urgent information produced by that country’s sprawling intelligence ‘community’.16 Much of it is dross, either recycled or poorly sourced. Much less is known about Russia’s use of intelligence, although it is clear that Mr Putin takes a close personal interest in the output of his country’s agencies – people who know his daily routine say he habitually spends a couple of hours a day reading its reports and cables, while shunning more conventional (and perhaps more useful) sources of information.

For whatever reason, however, Russia does seem to have the knack of searching through floods of data to find the most usable bits. EU officials who deal with Russia, for example, have told me that they frequently have the impression that the other side already knows every part of their negotiating position. It is easy to scoff at this: why should anyone care if the Russians bamboozle the Eurocrats? The answer is simple. If Russia understands which countries are the die-hard supporters of a particular EU policy that it does or doesn’t like, which are the wobblers, and what is the negotiating position, it knows where to apply diplomatic pressure (or when not to waste time and effort fighting a lost cause).

вернуться

20

t Many worried that a supposedly defensive alliance was waging an aggressive war against a historic Russian ally. Yet NATO got involved only reluctantly and belatedly, after the multiple massacres in the preceding Bosnian war, and when Russian foot-dragging had stymied efforts to stop a Serbian attack on Kosovo.