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out anonymously—they “felt

really strongly that this was

something important they

discovered and went rogue

with it,” Erik explained, even

while noting, with a laugh,

that he had no actual evidence

to back up his hypothesis.

Most of the weekend,

though, was spent talking not

about Satoshi, but instead

about

the

incredible

challenges that everyone in

this group faced. The one-two

punch of Charlie Shrem’s

arrest and Mt. Gox’s collapse

had killed much of the hope

that Bitcoin would gain

mainstream

acceptance

anytime soon.

Dan Morehead had been

running

his

Bitcoin

operations

from

inside

Fortress’s

San

Francisco

offices, and there had been a

vague plan for his small team

to be integrated into Fortress,

a publicly traded company.

With all the crises, though,

Pete Briger had let Dan know

that Fortress was not going to

be able to have a formal role.

Dan was going to have to

move his staff, operating

under the name of his old

hedge fund, Pantera Capital,

out of Fortress’s offices.

Things did seem to be

going well for the old college

fraternity

brothers

who

founded Bitpay, both of

whom were in Tahoe. They

had signed up lots of new

online merchants who were

happy to find a cheaper way

to process online transactions

—the 1 percent that Bitpay

charged versus the 2 to 3

percent charged by credit

cards—without

worrying

about chargebacks. But it was

now becoming evident that

consumers had much less of a

reason than merchants to use

Bitcoin for online purchases.

Consumers, after all, never

see the 2.5 percent processing

fee that merchants pay, so

products aren’t cheaper when

purchased with Bitcoin. And

consumers

generally

like

having the peace of mind

offered by chargebacks. For

the sake of Bitcoin as a

whole, there were many who

worried that the consumers

who were buying things

online through Bitpay were

pushing the price of Bitcoin

down; generally when online

retailers accepted Bitcoins

they immediately sold them

off for dollars, creating a

downward pressure on the

overall price.

Bobby Lee talked at

Tahoe

about

the

many

unusual stresses of running a

virtual-currency startup in

China. After the government

had forced the payment

processors to cut off Bitcoin

exchanges back in December,

Bobby’s

competitors

had

quickly opened bank accounts

where

customers

could

deposit funds. Bobby had

chosen not to follow the same

path—it seemed to violate the

clear intent of the statement

from the Chinese regulators

in December. Bobby had

grown

up

working

for

American companies, which

generally tried to obey, or at

least give the appearance of

obeying, not just the letter but

also the spirit of the rules.

Bobby had internalized this

cultural code. But as Bobby

watched

his

business

dwindle, and his competitors

thrive,

his

Chinese

cofounders pushed him to

understand

that

Chinese

regulators weren’t looking to

enforce a strict reading of the

law—they just didn’t want to

have anything shoved in their

face.

“Turns out, in China,

there’s no ethics—there’s no

moral

obligation,”

Bobby

would say of his discovery,

with a hint of amusement and

a

dash

of

frustration.

“Westerners see that as a bad

thing. Chinese see that as,

‘We’re being flexible.’”

With a sense that he was

caught in a street fight and

limiting himself to punching

with boxing gloves, Bobby

eventually

bent

to

the

Chinese

way

of

doing

business and opened up the

company’s bank accounts to

customer

deposits

shortly

before coming to Tahoe.

“If no one listens, and

there is no penalty, our

competitors do what’s best

for them and then we’re left

in

the

dust,”

Bobby

explained. “So instead we

decided to embrace the local

method.”

There were, though, limits

to how far Bobby would go in

his hunt for business. He was

outspoken about his belief

that his competitors were

faking their volume numbers

to make it look as though

they were attracting more

business. He also initially

declined to follow the lead of

one

of

his

increasingly

successful

competitors,

OKCoin,

which

had

introduced what is known as

margin trading. Customers of

OKCoin could essentially

borrow

money

to

make

bigger bets on Bitcoin. If the

price went up, customers

could pay back the borrowed

money, but if it went down

the customers quickly lost

their original money—the

normal outcome in margin

trading. This didn’t seem to

Bobby like a good formula

for a long-term business,

though he was coming to

reconsider all of his Western

judgments.

Despite all the challenges,

Bobby was clearly having a

good time, enjoying the

audacity and inventiveness

that were required of an

entrepreneur in China. He

was making plans to move his

staff into bigger offices and

he

had

announced

his

candidacy for one of the

Bitcoin Foundation seats that

Charlie Shrem and Mark

Karpeles had vacated—a seat

he would eventually win. In

Tahoe, he was the very

picture of the fun-loving,

confident risk taker, sweeping

the poker games. He likened

his situation in China to being

in a tunnel with no clear way

out.

“Everyone behind me is

like, ‘Dude, Bobby it’s a dead

end, you are not going to get

out,’” he said. “But I’m like,

‘If I get out, the prize is so

huge.”

The weekend provided

plenty of reminders of why

everyone had gotten into this

in the first place. After dinner

on

Friday

night,

Dan

introduced

a

celebrated

economics

professor

at

Stanford, Susan Athey, a

winner

of

the

most

prestigious award for young

economists, who had recently

been

diving

into

the

blockchain technology. She

told

the

group

of

her

discovery of Bitcoin in the

spring of 2013. At the time

she went to her academic

colleagues and found that