“These counterfeits,” said Stroh, “are not the result of a simple and limited criminal enterprise. Rather, they are our worst nightmare — the products of a large-scale, concerted industrial effort by hostile governments. We are convinced that Syria and Iran’s long-term objective in producing the Supernote is economic terrorism — a direct attack on the monetary system of the United States.
“We believe the following are Syria and Iran’s immediate but secondary objectives.
“To compensate for the cutoff of economic and military aid which followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact.
“To compensate for the failings of the Syrian and Iranian national economies.
“As demonstrated by Port Sudan, to provide a source of funding for Islamic terrorist groups.
“But we believe that Iran and Syria’s primary goal, as demonstrated by the huge numbers of Supernotes in the Russian Republic and former Soviet Republics, is to obtain nuclear weapons technology, nuclear materials, and most likely nuclear weapons themselves. In a development that we view as highly alarming, several North Korean intelligence operatives were recently apprehended in Hong Kong attempting to pass half a million dollars in Supernotes.”
The room fell silent, and Murdock felt it was time for him to ask a question. “Do we have any idea how many Supernotes have been produced?”
“Perhaps two billion dollars a year,” said Stroh. “Perhaps more.”
If you couldn’t buy a nuke with that, Murdock thought, you couldn’t buy a nuke. And the North Koreans and Iranians were among those known to be hard at work trying to make them.
Stroh clicked the slide projector. It displayed an aerial photograph, overhead imagery of a town. The detail was such that it had to have come from either a KH11 or KH12 spy satellite.
“Baalbek, Lebanon,” said Stroh. He flicked out a high-speed laser pointer and threw a red dot on the screen. “This is the warehouse where the Supernote is now produced. It is right in the middle of town. As you know, gentlemen, Baalbek is the headquarters for the Iranian Revolutionary Guard presence in Lebanon. We estimate a minimum of four hundred combat-ready Revolutionary Guards and perhaps the same number of Hezbollah militia in Baalbek at any one time. The warehouse is also guarded by elements of a commando battalion from Syrian Army Special Forces Division Number 14.”
Stroh paused. “We would like Lieutenant Murdock and his platoon to go in and take out that warehouse.”
Just like the E.F. Hutton commercial, all eyes in the room were locked onto Blake Murdock. For his part, he had a quick mental picture of himself turning slowly on a spit over a cheery fire. With an apple in his mouth.
7
Everyone seemed to be waiting for him to say something, so Murdock decided to take the bull by the horns. “I appreciate your confidence in my platoon,” he said. “But I think first of all I need to know just exactly what you want me to do.”
“Fair enough,” said Stroh. “That warehouse has to be completely destroyed. The presses, the chemicals, whatever stockpiles of paper and finished bills are there. And the plates for the Supernotes. The plates absolutely have to be destroyed.”
“Then it seems to me,” said Murdock, “that the easiest way to go about that would be with one or two F117 Stealth fighters and several laser-guided bombs.”
“That would be our first choice also,” said Stroh. “But with every country in the Middle East currently engaged in peace talks, the U.S. can’t precipitate an act of war with Syria. The Syrians know that perfectly well, of course, and have been using it to get away with murder for years. It’s also why we have to hit them right now, because once they sign a peace treaty they’ll be untouchable. And for all those reasons, the guidance we’ve received for this mission requires that it be entirely covert.”
Murdock was well used to such typical governmental hypocrisy. When the Israelis had dumped the intelligence about the terrorist cell in Port Sudan into the CIA’s lap, the Agency had had trouble deciding what to do.
There were no photos of the terrorists, just physical descriptions, and if the terrorists got out of the Sudan they could change identities and modes of transport a dozen times, and it would be only too easy for the intelligence community to lose track of them.
The solution was clear, but the sticking point was Executive Order 12333, signed by President Ronald Reagan on December 4th, 1981. It stated, “No person employed by or acting on behalf of the U.S. government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.”
As an example of classic American naivete, the executive order was unsurpassed. The assumption was that it was better to launch multimillion dollar air strikes against Libya, dropping thousands of tons of bombs and killing perhaps hundreds of innocent people, than it was to blow Colonel Khadaffi’s head off his shoulders with one well-aimed round. The invasion of Panama and the post-Gulf War Tomahawk missile strikes against Iraq were further examples of the order’s consequences.
The bottom line was that, like any good bureaucracy, the CIA kicked the problem upstairs. In this case to the White House. Violation of the law was grounds for impeachment. However, bombs going off in Europe during the election year of an incumbent American Government that could have done something to prevent it was something that struck right to the heart of politics itself.
The solution was also typically American: call in the lawyers. They drafted a tortuously reasoned finding that required Blake Murdock and 3rd Platoon, SEAL Team Seven, to “attempt” to “apprehend” the terrorists.
Surrounded by embarrassed CIA officers who did everything but wink and nudge him with their elbows to let him know what was expected, Murdock had merely shook his head in disgust and signed the required five copies of the form acknowledging that he understood the orders and took complete responsibility for carrying them out. But later, in private, he’d broken it down this way for his platoon: “We’re going in to kill the motherfuckers.” And that was exactly what they had done.
So, since they couldn’t go to war with Syria even though they were going to war with Syria, all Murdock could say was, “I understand.” Then he took a deep breath. “But I’m concerned that this mission seems to be outside NAVSPECWAR’s parameters for SEAL operations.”
First developed during the Gulf War, the criteria for the employment of SEALs had proven very effective. They included:
1. A high probability of mission success.
2. Operations in a maritime environment or within one day’s patrol of the water.
3. Missions which required no more than a full platoon to undertake successfully.
4. Taskings which assured high survivability of the operators involved.
Murdock had been referring to criteria number two, though what he really had in mind was number four. These people seemed to be asking a SEAL platoon to bite off a lot more than it could chew.
“According to USSOCOM protocol this would normally fall under the heading of a Delta Force mission,” said Stroh. “However, we would like to keep the number of people with knowledge of the operation as small as possible. You were already acquainted with the details and the money through the Port Sudan operation, and frankly, in view of its success, we wanted you to take this on. Admiral Raymond concurs with US.”
If the admiral was going to put his chop on it, Murdock knew that avenue was closed. “I don’t have any other immediate concerns,” he said, leaving himself a little room. “I’ll start my planning immediately. Will I be working with you and Paul Kohler again?”