The debate about Japan’s defence role was not new, but Taiwan’s declaration of independence had focused his thoughts. In the past five years, Japan had brought in Boeing 767 mid-air refuelling tankers for its F-14 fighters and launched the Osumi carrier, which could be used with either helicopters or jump-jets. It had put up four spy satellites, which gave it the best imagery in the region, and had brought in long-range air transport planes to deliver troops or rescue Japanese citizens from anywhere in the world.
Wada glanced at his desk-top screen to see the first official Chinese reaction to the Taiwanese announcement. It had come out quickly, but the words were familiar, showing a lack of imagination within the Chinese leadership.
‘The Chinese government and people will not tolerate any action for Taiwan independence or any attempt to separate Taiwan from the motherland,’ said the Xinhua statement. ‘China’s territory and sovereignty are indivisible. The Taiwan question is purely an internal matter for China. If there occurs any action for Taiwanese independence or any attempt by foreign forces to separate Taiwan from the motherland, the Chinese government and people will not sit back and do nothing.’
The fact that China had chosen to release the statement now was an almost certain indication that it would take military action. To do anything less would be an unacceptable loss of face to President Tao and the military.
Under the constitution, the Japanese navy could patrol 2,400 kilometres out to sea. One of its tasks was to keep shipping lanes open with Japanese minesweepers. It was also allowed to give logistical and medical support to American forces in combat in the region. Japanese forces were, of course, allowed to defend themselves if they came under attack. None of this conflicted with the constitutional declaration that Japan would ‘for ever renounce war as a sovereign right’.
‘John Chiu, the Prime Minister of Singapore, is on the telephone,’ said Wada’s long-serving personal assistant, whose desk was in the far corner of his large office.
‘John, I can imagine the purpose of this call,’ said Wada in English.
‘Taiwan,’ said Chiu. ‘Our analysts believe China will attack within two hours.’
‘I have the same reading.’
‘I have just come out of an emergency Cabinet meeting and some members are listening in to this telephone call. Our conclusion was this. For many years our founding Prime Minister was of the view that Japan could never take the mantle of the main regional power in East Asia. However, China’s policies in the recent years have made us uneasy about this view. The events of the past few days have led us to conclude that Singapore would support a strategic pact between India and Japan in Asia. Also we would remain politically neutral should you decide to defend the stability of East Asia in whatever manner you thought right during this current Taiwan crisis. Some time within the next half-century, we will see the American security umbrella close. We believe that now is the time to establish an Asian security umbrella, and we want to see it done not with one power, China, but with two — Japan and India. As you know, Singapore is predominantly Chinese and there will be domestic difficulties with our new thinking. This is why we will be muted in our public support, until we can sustain it. I’m sure you understand.’
Minutes after Wada had finished his call from John Chiu, Hari Dixit was on the line from Delhi. ‘Prime Minister, this is a humbling call for me, but a frank one. It is also too late in the day, but in present circumstances that is beside the point. You have often approached us informally for closer ties and we have responded with insular arrogance. India has been an inward-looking nation, living on a false premise that it was a great country simply waiting for its time to come. We have had a jolt of reality in the past week and that is why I am calling you.’
‘A call from the Prime Minister of India is always welcome,’ said Wada.
‘I believe the international community would support an alliance between our two democracies. I believe that right now it would support action against China. We will hit them on our eastern flank and win back Burma for the free world. We will support vigorously any action you take to contain China in its efforts to keep Taiwan.’
Military Headquarters, Western Hills, China
General Leung Liyin, the Chinese Defence Minister, was speaking in front of a wall map of the Taiwan Straits. President Tao was in the room, together with Tang Siju, and senior military officials. Jamie Song had not been asked to the briefing.
‘80302 Unit of the Second Artillery will launch the DF-15 missile strike from the Huangshan 52 Base here in Jiangxi province. The launch control and command HQ will be with the 815th Brigade at Leping. We have an inventory of 150 missiles for the operation which are now being moved to pre-surveyed launch sites in Jiangxi and Fujian provinces. Unit 80301 in Shenyang in Liaioning province, just here, is on a high alert should we have to strike Okinawa. We hope this will not be necessary. We would use the DF-21 missile and the launch site would be here in Tonghua, just north of the Korean border.’
‘Do you believe, comrade General, that we can defeat Taiwan, or merely use a missile strike as a means to get Lin to withdraw his declaration of independence?’
‘If we decided to settle the issue once and for all, we would have to take action against the enemy’s early warning radar sites, the SIGINT facilities, the command and control centres and power plants. If we did it swiftly in a single mortal blow [zhiming daji] we would need airstrikes and Special Forces operations. The first targets would be Taiwan’s twenty-five early warning radar stations, which we would hit with anti-radiation missiles launched from aircraft. We would send Special Forces into some sites, such as the Chuan Kang Airbase. We have built a replica of the base in Gansu and have trained extensively to prepare for such an assault. We would also have to shoot down Taiwan’s airborne early warning systems, which have taken off in the past hour. The enemy has eight key military airfields which we would have to take out; runways, barracks and control towers. Even if we succeed in shutting down the early warning apparatus, the command and control structure, the key missile sites and the airfields, we would only briefly have control of Taiwanese airspace. This first wave of operation would be fifteen minutes at best, but with both missile strikes and disruption of communication, we could complicate the enemy’s response. We would follow it with a much bigger second wave, with precision-guided bombs which we hope would neutralize both the air-defence system and the command structure. This could be achieved within forty-five minutes. With control of the skies, we could impose a no-fly zone around Taiwan — including American aircraft — and then impose a sea blockade around the island. I would not suggest a land invasion, because it would be drawn out and costly.’
‘Are you recommending it, comrade General?’ said Tao.
General Leung was silent for what seemed to be an interminable amount of time. Then he said: ‘No. It is the only way it can be done, but it is over-optimistic. We have two elements to consider. The first is that five years from now Taiwan will have a fully tested theatre missile-defence system. We are developing sophisticated jamming and chaff devices to confuse the enemy, but it would be far more difficult to conduct the plan I have just outlined. In normal circumstances, I would recommend implementing it now. But I am not convinced we have the resources to fight both in Taiwan and on our western flank with India in Arunachal Pradesh.’