Mr Andrew Dixon, Leader of the Opposition: Then tell us, yes or no, whether you support the French action?
Mr Stephenson, the Prime Minister: France has treaty obligations towards Vietnam. I support governments who honour their treaty obligations.
Mr George Cranby: In order to silence the Opposition benches and bring some national consensus to bear with this problem, could my right honourable friend tell us with which countries in the Far East do we have treaty obligations and in what way do we plan to honour them?
Mr Stephenson, the Prime Minister: We have long-standing arrangements with Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei. Through the 1984 joint declaration with Hong Kong we have responsibility to ensure that the Chinese military campaign does not interfere with the Special Administrative Region in any way whatsoever. We also have military contractual arrangements with Indonesia and Malaysia which are included in the sale of aircraft and other equipment. We plan to honour all our commitments when and if we are asked to do so. So far no requests have come across my desk.
Sir George Fallon: The government has known for many years the nature of the Chinese government. It is a ruthless and repressive dictatorship which is no different from Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Gaddaffi's Libya, or Hitler's Germany. Frankly, I am appalled when the Prime Minister tells us that British jobs are dependent on doing deals with such a disgusting regime. Would we have let the Nazis across the white cliffs of Dover because BMW owned Rover? We on this side of the House have warned against your policy of `economic interdependence' with China and `constructive engagement'. Could the Prime Minister now tell us that his policy has been shamefully and morally wrong and that no more secret deals will be done with the regime in Peking?
Mr Stephenson, the Prime Minister: No.
Mr Fred Clarke: Could my right honourable friend assure us that he is not simply waiting for the telephone to ring to receive instructions from either Germany or the United States as to what path to pursue and that he will continue to ensure that Britain will safeguard its own national interests with its own policies in this most crucial time in world affairs?
Mr Stephenson, the Prime Minister: Britain will and always has followed its own path in foreign policy consultation with our allies. Nothing has changed in the past twenty-four hours to change that.
Ms Clare Truman: Then could the Prime Minister explain this to the House: if we honour our contractual arrangements to the authoritarian governments of Indonesia and Malaysia, because of our weapons sales to them, how can we bring pressure to bear on the Russians who as we speak are supplying hundreds of military advisers and tons of equipment to ensure that the Chinese war effort continues to be a success? And with that problem unsolved, Mr Speaker, could the Prime Minister tell us whether he welcomes a Newer World Order with a nuclear, non-democratic, expansionist China as the rising military superpower?
Mr Stephenson, the Prime Minister: I refer the honourable lady to the answer I made a few moments ago.
President Bradlay's Private Secretary alerted him to the incoming call from Japanese Prime Minister, Noburo Hyashi. The two were not close, in spite of Hyashi's more than passable command of English. They had crossed swords in the mid-1990s, when after the collapse of the Liberal Democratic Party Hyashi had made a push for prominence on a veiled nationalist ticket that was implicitly hostile to the US. Bradlay was an up and coming senator who had sought to project himself as someone with a deep understanding of international affairs.
`Mr President,' Hyashi intoned.
`Nobby, is that you?' Bradlay replied.
`Yes, Jim, it's me.'
`And how's Mitsuko? I trust she's well?'
`Yes, Jim, she is just fine. And the First Lady?'
`Fine, fine. You've got a bit of a problem in the South China Sea over there…'
`We have a problem, Jim, and that's the reason for this call. Have you learned of the catastrophe with the Philippine Marines on Mischief Reef? My cabinet colleagues and I feel that we must invoke our security treaty. We need a combined show of force here to demonstrate to the Chinese that they have gone far enough.'
`We certainly need to do something, Nobby, I agree with that. This morning in New York we will be calling upon the Security Council to censure China and demand that it withdraw from the Spratlys and Paracels and compensate Vietnam for the loss of life and equipment over the past two days.'
`As you Americans would say to chance. The Chinese will use their veto to quash any such resolution. I think we need something firmer than just mere words. The French have sent troops to Vietnam.'
`We have been down that route before, Nobby. The American people have little appetite these days for foreign wars, let alone wars in that particular part of Asia.'
Bradlay returned the receiver of his secure telephone to its cradle. Hyashi had a point, but so too did the Washington Post's latest poll. Its polling agency had pulled out all the stops on Saturday night, with a telephone survey of opinions about the Chinese seizure of the South China Sea and what, if anything, the US should do about it. A thumping 79 per cent of Americans, or at least 79 per cent of the 1,036 randomly selected Americans, thought the US should have no part of it. Moreover, an analysis of past crises and their effects on presidential popularity underlined the mixed nature of such events, from a domestic political point of view.
The piece pointed out that international crises historically tended to improve presidential standing. In three quarters of the cases studied from the 1940s to the 1980s, presidents received boosts in popularity in the month following international incidents. The President's approval ratings rose 5 points after the CIA-backed invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in 1961, even though the operation failed. Lyndon Johnson's popularity went up after the 1965 invasion of the Dominican Republic; Gerald Ford's improved 11 points after the 1975 Mayaguez incident in which a US merchant vessel was seized by Cambodia; Ronald Reagan's approval ratings went up 5 points after the 1983 US invasion of Grenada; and George Bush's increased 14 points after he announced the Persian Gulf military build-up in 1990 and another 18 points when he launched the war against Iraq in January 1991.
So far so good. But this poll showed people saw the fight in Asia as unwinnable. There was also a racial tinge. The main body of the poll showed a rising concern about Japan and dislike for the Japanese. Anti-Japanese feelings had increased sharply in the United States. A growing majority of Americans were saying they were trying to avoid buying Japanese products. The constituency in the American heartland for risking American lives to protect Japanese interests was as thin a gruel as anyone could make. Unhappily it was a Republican, Mr Joseph Borchert, Senator for Washington state, who caught the popular mood. `The overwhelming majority of Americans do not want the United States, by itself or in concert with other nations, to interfere in Asia,' Borchert said. `There is no national security threat, no public policy reason, no excuse at all.'