The exclusive front-page story in the third edition of Britain's Guardian newspaper reached the desks of world leaders less than half an hour after the newspaper hit the streets of London. It was judged important enough by the aides of the American President and British Prime Minister to be read raw without abridgement in bullet points on a briefing paper.
The article was written by the paper's award-winning Tokyo correspondent, Martin Miller, whose contacts in the security and defence industries were legendary. The swiftness with which he had compiled his well-documented account led to accusations that Miller had known of the Japanese plans to conduct a nuclear test for some weeks. But Miller turned the finger of blame back to the American establishment. The headline read: America gave them the bomb with no regrets.
Japan's explosion of a small nuclear warhead came as no surprise to many Washington officials who for some years had advocated a controlled end to the outdated American security pact with Japan. While America's public policy was one of nuclear non-proliferation, a group of powerful officials has for many years been coaxing Japan towards the hallowed nuclear fellowship. They began during the Reagan and Bush administrations when the Soviet Union was seen as the major threat in the Pacific. After that, they believed as an inevitability that at some stage America's security role in East Asia would have to end, probably because of a challenge from an unfriendly power with whom it didn't want to fight. They decided, therefore, to help Japan, a staunch ally, to obtain a nuclear arsenal, before either India or Pakistan declared their bombs or China attempted to test the military resolve of its smaller Asian neighbours.
The policy was blindly simple. America and Europe helped Japan acquire a large stockpile of separated plutonium which immediately gave it an ability to make nuclear weapons. Much of the help came from Savannah River Laboratory. Scientists there passed on technology and hardware for use in two Japanese fast-breeder reactors (FBRs), producing high-quality plutonium, and considered a major threat to nuclear proliferation. The principal behind the FBR is that more plutonium is produced than is consumed. The extra plutonium can be used for other FBRs and so on. However, the FBRs also create plutonium which is far purer than even the weapons-grade plutonium. The International Atomic Energy Agency categorizes Japan's type of plutonium as `super-grade'.
Congress effectively terminated America's FBR programme in 1983, even before US construction began. But Japan operates two facilities. One is the Joyo FBR at the Oarai Research Centre north of Tokyo, which reached criticality in 1977. The second is the Monju FBR near Tsuruga on the coast of the East Sea, west of Tokyo. Monju went critical in 1994. Of critical importance to the development of the nuclear programme was the Rokkasho Mura facility in Amori prefecture. Covering a vast site, the Japanese spent $18 billion on a fuel reprocessing plant alone. It is here that the Guardian understands the government also built a facility to take plutonium oxide, turn it into metal, and machine the metal into shapes suitable for weapons manufacture.
The move to close collaboration between the United States and Japan was sealed when it became clear that Japan was proceeding with FBRs yet America was not. Documents obtained by the Guardian highlight American commitment to keeping abreast of the FBR developments even though they were banned in the United States itself. In 1987, as the programme was being formulated, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Review published the following: `… this collaboration will allow the United States to maintain a core of expertise;… technical experts can stay abreast of developments in the reprocessing field as they participate in a viable, long-term mission…' And a year later William Burch, director of the ORNL Fuel Recycle Division, said: `… the bilateral agreement will be mutually beneficial… Japan will be able to speed up its development period of reprocessing technology through its collaboration with the US, while also probably saving some money… For the US… the deal keeps us in the ball game…'
Both American and Japanese politicians have publicly denied Tokyo's intention of going nuclear. In November 1992, as part of its attempt to develop a self-sufficient nuclear fuel cycle, Japan began to import large quantities of separated plutonium. It now has as much as 50,000 kilograms and by 2010 it's expected to have 90,000. Japan has never been more than thirty days away from constructing a nuclear weapon. All it needed was the political decision, which has now been made.
The statistics are chilling. As little as 3 kilograms is needed for one nuclear warhead with an explosive equivalent to at least 20,000 tons of TNT. With its present stockpiles, it's thought Japan has enough super-grade plutonium for more than 200 warheads. They could be attached to advanced cruise missiles, which we may see in tests the Japanese are expected to begin in the next few days. They would weigh no more than 150 kilograms and have a range of about 2,500 kilometres. Defence experts say that at least two of the recently commissioned Harushio class submarines could now be nuclear armed. At the same time, Japan has developed its H-2 space launch vehicle, which the Pentagon says has recently been developed for military purposes. It includes an Orbital Re-entry Experiment capsule, with a payload capacity of 4,000 kilograms.
Japan has always reserved the right to go nuclear. Even in 1957, the then Prime Minister, Nobusuke Kishi, declared it was not unconstitutional for Japan to possess nuclear weapons provided they were within the definition of self-defence.
Since then subtle changes made to the constitution, coupled with a sea change in political thinking, has made the nuclear option acceptable. In October 1993 Masashi Nishihara of the National Defence Academy said: `We are scared of China. Either we can allow China to become dominant, or we can be more equal by confronting them.' Nishihara believed Japan should treat China as the United States had treated the Soviet Union: face them down, then negotiate arms reduction treaties. But to do that, Japan needed the bomb. China's takeover of the South China Sea was the catalyst. Since the early nineties, concern has been growing throughout Asia about China's increased military budget and its plans for territorial expansion. Unconfirmed but well-publicized reports say that since the 1996 stand-off with two American carrier groups off the Taiwan Straits billions of dollars have been redirected to modernize the Chinese army and navy. But it is still no match for either America or Japan. Today, those two countries share global superpower status. Japan, as the new kid on the block, is being warned that any repeat of its Second World War atrocities will not tolerated.
While Asia is both suspicious and resentful of Japan, the alternative is even more ominous e secretive, non-accountable, non-democratic, unmodernized regime of China. Over the next few weeks, the United States will encourage Asians and Americans to bury their memories of more than fifty years ago, and welcome Japanese military power as the new regional security umbrella. Japanese missiles may be able reach American and Indian cities. But today you can be sure they are programmed only towards China.